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Liberal education has long claimed moral education to be a chief aim of its 
educational format. Liberal education supporters regularly assert its unique ability to 
foster moral and ethical development in students, but data regarding higher education’s 
efficacy in promoting moral development are limited. Additionally, the educational goal 
of moral development suffers important philosophical and epistemological critiques 
which bring into question its adequacy as a worthwhile aim of contemporary higher 
education. In order to discern whether higher education resources should be used to 
pursue this educational objective, liberal arts practitioners and supporters must identify 
clearly what moral education is, whether it is a facet of college student development 
worthy of our attention, and how to adequately measure it. This study offers a careful 
analysis of data related to student moral reasoning development gathered in an evaluation 
process of a liberal education course at a mid-sized research institution. The central 
research questions focus on aspects of student moral development and students’ 
perceptions of the moral dimensions of coursework and highlight how these interact with 
students’ abilities to receive and process course materials and activities. The research 
design employs a concurrent triangulation approach to quantitative and qualitative course 
assessment materials. James Rest’s Defining Issues Test (DIT), a well-researched, neo-
Kolhbergian measure of moral reasoning, and student writing were analyzed in pre- and 
post-course evaluations to investigate students’ moral reasoning development as they 
entered, changed and left a year-long liberal arts course. Results reveal important features 
of student moral growth, illuminating how students at different levels of moral reasoning 
development and with varying degrees of change with respect to moral reasoning 
engaged with liberal education course materials and activities in quite distinct ways. This 
is an important step in uncovering the unique aspects of liberal education that may foster 
and sustain moral growth. 
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Chapter 1: 
Moral Education in American Higher Education 
1.1  INTRODUCTION  
Among the many goals and purposes of American higher education, the aim of 
advancing college students’ moral or character development is positioned among the 
most contentious in the contemporary scene. Recent conversations among politicians and 
leaders in higher education have recommenced the public debate about the fundamental 
aims of American higher education, opening the door to a renewed consideration of this 
once preeminent but now embattled educational aspiration. In the past two decades, a 
number of higher education leaders have offered defenses of the aim of moral education, 
recommending serious reflection on what is lost when higher education jettisons this goal 
(Arum & Roksa, 2010; Bok, 2007; Delbanco, 2012; Gutmann, 1997; King, 1997; 
Kronman, 2008; Lewis, 2006; Reuben, 1996). A concurrent conversation in the political 
sector has emerged in the past few years regarding these same sorts of questions but from 
a different vantage point. This conversation is marked by calls for reform and oversight 
of institutions to make postsecondary education more accountable to economic and job-
related outcomes. Recent legislation such as 2012’s “Student Right to Know before You 
Go Act,” sponsored by Senators Wydon and Rubio, and the Obama administration’s 
repeated commitment to a College Scorecard (Shear, 2014) echo a common demand for 
increased institutional disclosure of graduates’ employment and earnings data in order to 
evaluate the public good of higher education. These join the 2013 college funding 
programs designed by the governors of Texas and Florida to increase access to state 
universities, discounted only for study in “workforce need” fields such as information 
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technology, logistics and management. Though these conversations take place in different 
arenas and highlight different concerns, they intersect profoundly in the question of the 
end and purpose of American higher education. Both conversations assert quite different 
central visions of which outcomes matter most in higher education.  
For practitioners and supporters of liberal education, this point of intersection is 
of great concern. As liberal arts and humanities education becomes less sought after by 
students and their families (Lewin, 2013), this question is not simply an academic 
exercise but is instead a question of the very relevance of liberal education in the future 
of higher education. In order to remain relevant and viable in the American higher 
education scene, especially in the context of contentious public and political debate about 
the value of higher education, liberal education practitioners must give a robust and 
research-based account of the unique aims and outcomes they claim to offer. 
Liberal education has long claimed moral education to be a chief mark of its 
educational format. Liberal education supporters regularly assert its unique ability to 
foster moral and ethical development in students, but this claim is insufficiently 
researched. Adherents of liberal education may attest to the great value of moral 
education for students and society, but data regarding higher education’s efficacy in 
promoting moral development are limited. Additionally, the educational goal of moral 
development suffers important philosophical and epistemological critiques which bring 
into question its adequacy as a worthwhile aim in the contemporary era. In order to 
discern whether moral education is a suitable and sustainable objective for American 
higher education and hence whether higher education resources should be used to pursue 
it, supporters of moral education must identify clearly what moral education is, why it is 
 3 
important for students, and how adequately it can be measured. This study seeks to 
contribute to that discussion through an examination of current scholarship in the field of 
moral development as it pertains to higher education and though a careful analysis of 
quantitative and qualitative data related to student development gathered in the evaluation 
process of a liberal education program. The central research questions of this project 
focus on aspects of student moral development and students’ perceptions of the moral 
dimensions of coursework within a liberal education context. Certainly, no one study can 
articulate an entire educational program or pedagogical format, but the case for 
reaffirming moral education as an important aim of postsecondary education rests largely 
on a clear and persuasive defense of its impact in the lives of college students and its 
value in a democratic society.  
1.2 MORAL EDUCATION’S HISTORY IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 
In early American higher education the cultivation of mind was undoubtedly tied 
to the cultivation of character and moral fortitude, and this fusion of intellectual and 
moral aims was valued for both its ecclesiastic and civic benefits. This construal of a 
moral dimension of higher education persisted even as the classical curriculum gave way 
to modern educational paradigms and philosophical shifts (Bowen, 2005; Brubacher & 
Rudy, 1997; DelBanco, 2012; Kiss & Euben, 2010; Reuben, 1996; Sloan, 1980). 
Educational historians note that the moral dimension of early American higher education 
depended on the centralizing notion of the coherent confluence of knowledge and the 
moral order (Brubacher & Rudy, 1997; Marsden, 1993; Reuben, 1996). In a recent piece 
on these historical foundations and their eventual breakdown, Reuben (2010) notes that 
the story of the decline of moral education as a centerpiece of American higher education 
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aims may be read as either of two distinctly different narratives: on the one hand, it may 
be seen as the attenuation of the religious and moral underpinnings of the foundational 
missions of American colleges, while on the other hand, the disintegration may be 
interpreted as the unshackling of higher education from the pervasive and invasive 
influence of religion and its moralizing capacity 
From its beginnings American higher education was profoundly concerned with 
the moral character of its graduates. Colonial colleges served primarily to cultivate the 
minds and hearts of an elite class of gentlemen and a robust clergy for the New World 
and as such, held fast to their religious foundations and moral purposes. The capstone 
tradition of 18th and 19th century American colleges, inspired in large part by Scottish 
Enlightenment college models, “furnished an integrating principle for the entire 
curriculum” (Sloan, 1980, 5) that brought the college President into contact with college 
seniors to ensure that young men developed the sort of moral attitude and behaviors 
expected of educated, young Christian gentlemen of civil society (Brubacher & Rudy, 
1997; Bowen, 2005; Kiss & Euben, 2010; Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991; Reuben, 1996). 
For the early founders of American higher education, the cultivation of mind was not 
simply an effort to address ecclesial needs but was grounded in a general interest in the 
cultivation of character and moral fortitude among the young men of this new society. 
Though moral or character education was part and parcel of the religiously driven 
missions of the colonial colleges it certainly had civic roots as well, as fewer than half of 
17th century Harvard graduates went on to ministerial work (DelBanco, 2012). The aim of 
the early colleges’ cohesive classical and Christian curricula extended to whole person 
formation for the sake of a civic order populated with an adequate number of educated 
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men who could understand and judge wisely the world as given by God. However, the 
aim of character development and assessment became and for several centuries remained 
an admissions tool, a means of managing ethnic, gender and sectarian access to the early, 
elite colleges. This misuse of the notion of character as a means of exclusion may have 
proven to be part of its undoing, insofar as the rightful interruption of that abuse 
ultimately debased the role of character education in the academy. 
As higher education expanded in the US in the 18th century, the diminishing 
power of churches over universities shifted the center of authority away from ecclesial 
bodies and increasingly toward autonomous faculties, college presidents, and eventually 
governing boards of colleges and universities. This shift ultimately dissembled the 
authoritative claim of a particular and highly focused aim of higher education (Reuben, 
1996). Indeed, religious diversity within the early colonial colleges itself proved to be the 
first encroachment on various churches’ authority over the aims and accounts of moral 
education, as internal divisions within Christian denominations ushered in discord 
regarding the elucidation of moral norms. By the end of the colonial period the pedagogy 
and educational content of the nine established American colleges remained under fairly 
strict church authority, despite the weakening effects of diversity on religious authority 
during this growth period.  
It was in the post-revolutionary spirit that colleges were reconceived by the likes 
of Thomas Jefferson as a training ground for secular leaders, not simply clergy. In this 
new vision of a truly American form of higher education, curricular innovations and 
freedom from religious oversight and control were suggestive of a less centralized 
approach to the aims of higher education, offering Enlightenment virtues as the new 
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moral center. Already by the writing of his 1828 Yale Report, Jeremiah Day felt 
compelled to provide a vigorous apologetic of classical curricula’s cultivation of 
“disciplines of mind” over “furniture of mind” in light of debates about the aims of 
education. Day admonished his colleagues to recall that the material advancement of a 
nation ought to be accompanied by an attendant moral advancement as well. The eventual 
dominance of 18th and 19th century science over and against natural theology contributed 
to higher education’s skepticism about finding a robust grounding of morality. As 
empiricism and positivism prevailed in scientific inquiry, value-free research gained 
popularity among natural and social scientists. These shifts encouraged university 
reformers to endorse greater autonomy for faculty, departments, and students. The 
divestiture of university control of curricula stimulated great strides in academic freedom, 
curricular innovation and specialized scholarship but it also diminished the power of 
institutions to assert robust, university-wide educational goals. By the turn of the 20th 
century, journalistic exposés raising serious concerns about the moral environments of 
American colleges and universities prompted university leaders to take greater control of 
the various aspects of student life which had proliferated under the reform ethos of 
student autonomy and social freedom. By the 1920’s, colleges and universities were 
substantially expanding professional staffs to deal with student life, shifting social and 
moral issues away from traditional academic contexts. 
By the late 20th century the aim of moral and character education became 
particularly tenuous, largely out of sync with the aims of the research university model 
and besieged by a complex set of challenges from both consumers of higher education 
and the academy itself. The world wars of the first half of the 20th century precipitated a 
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persistent demand for scientific and technological advances and accompanying post-war 
anxieties about the social, political and ethical fabric of western democracy. The malaise 
following the World War I was only deepened by the recognition that the horrors of the 
Nazi regime flourished in a highly educated and civilized nation. By the start of 
American higher education’s Golden Age (1945-1970), the emerging dominance of the 
research model and increasingly differentiated and highly specialized fields of inquiry 
brought into sharp focus the seeming irrelevance of moral education in a thoroughly 
modern university system. The Age of Sputnik ushered in a new, largely scientific 
agenda for universities attempting to answer the call of service to a common good 
situated firmly in the context of the Technological Age. Massive growth in higher 
education participation, funding, and collaboration with industry and government 
precipitated a major reconsideration of higher education’s central purposes. Now, higher 
education was expected to produce knowledge rather than simply to transmit knowledge 
and culture from one generation to the next (Brubacher & Rudy, 1997; Kerr, 1963; 
Pascarella, Wolniak, Siefert, Cruce & Blaich, 2005; Reuben, 1996). Following the World 
Wars federal assistance programs introduced university aspirations to American families 
that had previously been excluded from the largely elite systems of the early collegiate 
model. Curricular changes in universities and colleges in the middle of the 20th century 
echoed the exigencies of the new research agenda of the technical age while the new 
egalitarian mode of higher education raised questions about the legitimacy of higher 
education’s traditional aims and raised doubts that education could promote moral 
soundness in students. Powerful postmodern and feminist critiques of traditional agendas 
contested the overly rationalist and paternalistic nature of moral education and brought 
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into question its claims of ethical and moral normativity. Increasingly, student moral 
development was perceived as outside the purview of faculty or the primary work of a 
university, consigned regularly to general education electives, capstone courses, service 
learning courses and ethics modules within pre-professional coursework. By the 21st 
century even colleges that require philosophy and religious studies courses rarely offer 
courses with explicit goals of ethics or the advancement of students’ moral character 
(Hoekema, 2010). Decades of research into the impact of college on college students in the 
second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st have not quieted the restive 
contemporary conversations regarding the place of moral education in the American 
higher education scene.  
1.2.A.  Moral Education within Great Books Programs 
In the midst of this 20th century unease regarding diminishing ethical norms, a 
new regard for a “general education” was developed in the Great Books movement. It 
sought to reintroduce moral education without reliance on sectarian traditions which were 
by then viewed as divisive to democratic society. In this context, University of Chicago’s 
Robert Hutchins recast his Great Books movement, originally conceived as a rigorous 
intellectual program, as an educational model that offered the sort of character education 
needed for education of democratic citizens. Hutchins argued vociferously that the 
principles taught in Great Books programs provided students with robust understandings 
of democratic principles and laid the ground for moral as well as intellectual virtues and 
habits. Adopted by colleges like Harvard as an overview of and lively debate about 
historically important questions and texts (rather than Hutchins’ vision of the program as 
formational of a moral grounding), the general education movement of the 20th century 
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became an influential educational venture. Along similar lines, Catholic colleges and 
universities largely retained a classical paradigm via the traditional Jesuit Ratio 
Studiorum curriculum model, despite pressure by accreditors to modernize and rejection 
of Catholic college-educated students in elite graduate schools. In the 1960’s, programs 
designed to stimulate interest in moral and social values, such as experimental college 
curricula, residential programs, and seminar courses became a popular response to 
student movements’ demands for curricular reform.  
Student activism in the 60s successfully won greater student autonomy and 
student control over educational choices, largely subduing the momentum of the post-war 
general education movement. These movements challenged university in loco parentis 
practices and echoed larger societal shifts of increasing wariness of authority and a 
general hermeneutic of suspicion regarding moral norms. The secularization of many 
colleges and universities (and faculties) that were religiously founded or affiliated 
proceeded apace in this period. American higher education’s great expansion during the 
1960s precipitated rapid and significant institutional and structural changes that 
threatened its economic stability while public dissatisfaction with the civic mission of 
higher education continued to grow. As the economics of higher education became more 
precarious, student and administrative opinion regarding the aims of higher education 
tacked toward professional education and vocational training. Astin’s long-standing 
survey administered by the Higher Education Research Institute of first year students’ 
designation of what they hold most important sheds light on the shift (Reuben, 1996). By 
the late 80s, 80% of students considered being financially well-off very important or even 
essential, while only 45% considered “developing a meaningful philosophy of life” to be 
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very important, inverting the importance of those values from the late 60s. Finally, 
increasingly complex enrollment management systems developed in the last part of the 
century, coupled with rising reliance upon national rankings such as those found in US 
News and World Reports, fostered a consumer posture among students and their families. 
A university’s ability to ensure students’ professional and financial success replaced 
traditional goals such as moral and character education as primary pursuits of institutions. 
The dominance of economic concerns in American higher education has yielded only 
slightly to the aim of moral education in recent years, evinced by the rise and popularity 
of service learning programs, an increasing presence of ethics programs within 
professional schools, and the prevalence of “critical thinking skills” in the pantheon of 
higher education’s central aims. American higher education’s long and storied 
association with moral education could mean that recent attention to this facet of 
education might be another phase in a rather fickle relationship.   
1.3 THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE OVER MORAL EDUCATION IN THE ACADEMY 
In recent years, growing number of leaders in higher education have strongly 
cautioned against American higher education’s abjuring of liberal education and its moral 
development aims, calling for a reinvigoration of these traditional aspirations (Arum & 
Roksa, 2010; Bok, 1988, 2007; Delbanco, 2012; Hauerwas, 2010; Keohane, 2006; King, 
1997, 2009; Kiss & Euben, 2010; Kronman, 2008; Lewis, 2007). Citing the needs of a 
flourishing and educated democratic citizenry, national higher education reports have 
likewise called for renewed attention to the aims of moral and character education. The 
Association of American Colleges and Universities report, Great Expectations: A New 
Vision of Learning as a Nation Goes to College, challenged higher education to foster 
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“an acceptance of responsibility for the ethical consequences of our actions and ideas” 
(2002, p. xii), reiterating the 1998 Higher Education Act’s affirmation of character 
development as one of the primary aims of American higher education. These 
exhortations echo former Harvard University President Derek Bok’s assertion of the 
obligation of educators to “help their students understand how to lead ethical, reflective, 
fulfilling lives,” in his continued advocacy of higher education’s role in fostering 
students’ moral growth (1988, 2007). Patricia King argues that educators ought to have a 
basic understanding of moral development and its processes, maintaining that the oft-
cited mission statement goal of fostering good citizenship and character among college 
students requires the articulation and communication of “the moral dimension of 
university life” both in terms of the programmatic content and process (1997, p. 90). 
With a view to broader philosophical concerns, Martha Nussbaum recommends a 
revitalization of liberal education as an important corrective to the dominance of practical 
and economic influences in society, noting liberal education’s explicit aim of nurturing 
and developing the habits of mind necessary to relate to others beyond the confines of 
economic terms and relations (Gutmann, 1987, 1999; King, 2009; Nussbaum, 2004). A la 
Dewey, Nussbaum asserts liberal education’s unique ability to cultivate civic and 
narrative imaginations needed in deliberative democracy. 
Not all educational leaders agree with these endorsements of the moral aims of 
higher education and liberal education’s unwavering commitment to it. One of the most 
ardent contemporary critics of higher education’s responsibility for moral formation is 
emeritus dean, professor of humanities and law, and literary critic Stanley Fish, who has 
been a passionate critic of moral purposiveness in the Academy. In his well-known 
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works, “Aim Low” (2003) and Save the World on Your Own Time (2008), Fish decries 
the goal of moral education as a faulty and unworkable idea that blurs the lines between 
the purely conceived academic purpose of higher education – to teach the content and 
techniques of specifically defined and discrete disciplines and train researchers for those 
fields – and dogmatic or partisan attempts to indoctrinate students to some predetermined 
notion of the good life. While he acknowledges that rigorous and intellectually grounded 
ethics courses are suitable for the academic realm, Fish maintains that this sort of critical 
assessment of various aspects of ethical theory or ethical dilemmas simply should not 
converge with aims of the advancement of the students’ moral lives. Fish points out that 
moral growth and development arises in and through so many variables as to make it 
impossible to evaluate, to plan for, or to teach to moral growth. 
Here Fish makes an important distinction between ethics theory, which might be 
the proper purview of academic work, and ethical praxis. He suspects, rightly, that the 
moral education movement seeks to impact not only moral judgment but moral behavior 
in students, and this Fish rejects as a tenable aim of education. Central to Fish’s argument 
is the firmly held argument that higher education should resist tying its aims and goals to 
how a student turns out morally, ethically or civically. The moral growth of a student, 
Fish claims, is something for which no educator can or should be responsible; that type of 
development simply falls outside the bounds of education to facilitate, measure, or 
anticipate. Fish’s position is certainly not a new one. Plato’s Meno asks the same sort of 
questions, whether virtue can be taught and if so, by whom. Indeed, Plato concludes in 
the dialogue that virtue cannot be taught: centuries of “morally sound” education in the 
early years of American higher education cannot offer clear evidence that he was wrong 
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(Hoekema, 2010). Moreover, Fish’s sentiments echo the seemingly unsettled quality of 
the moral education discourse among contemporary developmentalists and moral 
psychology researchers and are illustrative of a general attitude of many college and 
university personnel. Among even the most ardent supporters of moral development 
researchers, there is an acknowledged and problematic research gap between viable 
measures of moral judgment and moral action.  
However, others within higher education leadership have recently proclaimed the 
need for a new form of moral education, one that eschews the traps of paternalism, 
parochialism, and ideology and rejects the dogmatic narrowness of Fish’s position. Public 
intellectual and ethicist Stanley Hauerwas (2010) concedes that in the present postmodern 
context, in which we find little or no commonly held convictions about what is true or 
good, universities will necessarily struggle with questions of larger, less tangible 
purposes or educational goals because the terms and definitions of these are nearly 
impossible to identify. Hauerwas points out that the convergence of the specialization of 
disciplines and the professionalization of those disciplines has resulted in an extreme 
autonomy of academic fields which increasingly allows disciplinary justification only in 
and through the terms and relations of the field itself, thus diminishing a university’s 
ability to define any central purpose or comprehensively construed moral aim. 
Interestingly, Hauerwas makes the claim that religious traditions, particularly in Christian 
and Jewish contexts, flout this narrowing and isolating principle since the emerging self-
understanding of these traditions as ongoing and active, with public missions, demand a 
reflection on the dialogical roots of their central themes and debates. They also require, 
Hauerwas claims, an educated public to comprehend the various “agreements that make 
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their disagreements intelligible” (107). A similar case might be made for Great Books-
style programs in liberal arts colleges and university programs, which also involve a 
uniquely dialogical and dialectical approach to understanding one’s own intellectual 
heritage and an attentiveness to one’s own cultural character. Hauerwas here picks up on 
a thread of an argument that has a long history in American higher education. Debates 
regarding the cultivation of an educated populace able to comprehend and appreciate the 
pillars of democratic society extend back to those of Socrates and the Stoics, Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers and de Tocqueville. Indeed, the contemporary debates on moral 
education build on a long history of claims about what higher education can and should 
be expected to accomplish and what purpose it serves vis à vis the needs of the 
community. 
Hauerwas’ and Fish’s arguments on the aims and purposes of higher education are 
much more than an academic exercise and are situated against the backdrop of criticisms 
lodged at higher education’s abnegation of moral education by educational leaders. 
Though conservative corners of the academic sector have long lamented the demise of 
moral education, the past two decades have seen criticism of this sort from across the 
political and institutional spectrum. Derek Bok, former president of Harvard, has been a 
vocal critic of higher education’s diminished commitment to the traditional connection 
between liberal arts and moral education since the 1990s. He has recently been joined in 
this protest by a cadre of equally respected and highly placed educators. The themes of 
Bok’s 2007 critique, Our Underachieving Colleges: A Candid Look at How Much 
Students Learn and Why They Should Be Learning More, were echoed in that same year 
by Excellence without a Soul: Does Liberal Education Have a Future? by Harry Lewis, 
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former Harvard Dean, who published his own appraisal of the disjointed aims of higher 
education. Both Bok and Lewis decry the loss of educational cohesion in higher 
education. In Lewis’ view, the decay of general education programs is deeply rooted in 
the entrenched specialization and isolation of departments and fields of inquiry and the 
subsequent deterioration of moral education as a goal recognized across disciplines. 
Other detractors offer similarly discouraging reviews of higher education, including 
former Yale Law School Dean Anthony Kronman’s publication, Education’s End: Why 
Our Colleges and Universities Have Given Up on the Meaning of Life (2008), 
sociologists and educational researchers Richard Arum and Josipa Roksa’s Academically 
Adrift: Limited Learning on College Campuses (2010), and cultural critic and Columbia 
University Professor of Humanities Andrew Delbanco’s College: What it Was, Is, and 
Should Be (2012). Numerous exposé articles in popular periodicals, including Rolling 
Stone, The Daily Beast, The New Yorker and The Atlantic, to name but a few, regale the 
public with tales of the moral dissolution of college and university students and the 
institutions that cultivate the student cultures in which they live and learn. Though these 
sorts of exposés seem perennial, they signal that American higher education is once again 
in a period of attention and concern regarding moral education’s relevance. 
1.3.A  Contemporary Research and Moral Education 
A retrieval of moral or character education as an aim of American higher 
education is a precarious endeavor. In many academic circles, this aspect of education is 
seen as parochial and paternalistic, while in others it is simply seen as impracticable and 
outside the jurisdiction of scholarly concern. Advocates of moral education recommend 
that higher education pay more than just lip service to the goal and criticize its nominal 
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use in university and college mission statements. A rapidly growing body of research, 
including several meta-analyses of recent research, confirms that moral growth and 
development is quite active during the college years and that collegiate experiences in 
particular impact moral growth significantly (King & Mayhew, 2002; McNeel, 1994; 
Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005). Indeed, Rest and Thoma’s (1985) 6 year study of high 
school students, which included subjects who did not attend college and students who 
went on to two- and four-year colleges, found significant evidence of college’s unique 
impact on moral reasoning development. Additionally, the large scale, 2006-09 Wabash 
National Study of Liberal Arts Education (WNS), culling data from 19 institutions of 
various types (liberal arts colleges, regional and research universities, and community 
colleges; private and public, single-sex and coed, religiously affiliated and non-
religiously affiliated) found that among 12 outcomes measured, students’ moral 
reasoning showed the largest positive gains. Indeed, these gains represented a ten percent 
increase in the first year, while many other outcomes showed little or negative change. 
This type of research raises questions about which aspects of the college experience 
precipitates moral growth and best practices for advancing and enhancing that 
development. Researchers in the field of moral development point out that the first year 
of college is particularly fruitful, finding evidence of what educational psychologist 
William Perry characterizes as a trajectory beginning in freshman year that moves a 
student from simplistic forms of ethical understandings, through relativistic 
configurations, to complex forms of commitments to values and meaningful horizons of 
living (Perry, 1970, 1981, 1999). As Patricia King and Mathew Mayhew assert within 
their own research in the field, moral reasoning is related to general cognitive structures 
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and does not simply unfold as part of the maturation process, context matters and the 
context of college matters significantly (2002).  
In How College Affects Students, Vol. 2 (2005), Pascarella and Terenzini revisit 
their iconic 1991 synthesis of over 2,600 studies done on the impact of college on college 
students, in which the net and long-term developmental effects of college participation 
were examined. This meta-analysis reconfirms significant change in college students’ 
moral reasoning from freshman to senior year, findings which have been held across 
measurement instruments and different cultures and controlling even when controlling for 
subject maturation, socioeconomic status, and levels of precollege moral reasoning and 
intelligence. Pascarella and Terenzini acknowledge several impediments to any grand 
claims regarding growth in moral development, including the difficulty in assessing 
precisely the magnitude of effects, a lack of evidenced connection between moral 
reasoning and moral action, and research validity issues connected to the non-random 
assignating of college student subjects (since college attendance itself involves self-
selection) along with regularly insufficient control groups. In his work on the intersection 
of moral development and higher education participation, researcher Mathew Mayhew 
similarly asserts that much work needs to be done to try to untangle the seemingly 
countless variables that converge to produce development of moral reasoning, but his 
work and his meta-analyses of research in this area reveals that progress is indeed being 
made in sorting out which aspects of college truly do account for the striking advances 
that college seems to promote in students’ moral development (King & Mayhew, 2002; 
Mayhew, 2004a, 2004b; Mayhew & Deluca Fernandez, 2007; Mayhew, Wolniak & 
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Pascarella, 2008; Mayhew & King, 2008; Mayhew & Grunwald, 2008; Mayhew, 
Vanderlinden & Kim, 2010; Mayhew, Seifert & Pascarella, 2010, 2012). 
Thus, three noteworthy trends converge related to moral education and its place in 
the academy. First, there is an expressed desire among educational and political leaders 
for more attention to be paid to moral education, and this desire is clearly connected to 
the goal of developing and strengthening the moral reasoning capacity of students. 
Second, research has shown clear evidence that the experience of going to college is 
uniquely influential on the advancement of moral reasoning and, though difficult, it is not 
impossible to identify which aspects of that unique experience contribute to this 
influence. Third, there is a decline in participation in and support of liberal arts or general 
education programs which often implicitly and explicitly aim to promote the sorts of 
intellectual skills and capacities needed for increasingly complex moral growth, such as 
critical thinking, the capacity for perspectival thinking, creative problem solving, 
exposure to ethical theory. Despite various reproaches regarding higher education’s 
abandonment or embrace of moral development as an aim, moral education’s place in 
higher education remains hampered by inadequate definition, content, and measurement. 
Recommending the reinvigoration of moral development as an educational goal 
necessitates a clear understanding of the various elements of moral development, as well 
as a research-based account of how moral growth might be measured and which aspects 
of higher education significantly influence that development. 
1.4 THE AIMS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
The topic of this study regards questions about moral education: which aspects of 
student development it purports to impact, how to evaluate that impact, what place it 
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might hold in the pantheon of higher educational goals, and how to best assess various 
educational interventions’ effectiveness in achieving those goals. Though there is little 
consensus about what constitutes moral education and what might count as outcomes or 
goals of moral education, great strides in 20th century developmental theory have enabled 
researchers to identify more clearly the scope of moral development and its many aspects. 
Educational research is well served by utilizing these advances to begin thinking more 
concretely about how to best promote moral development in students.  
Though researchers concede that participation in college is a uniquely impactful 
experience on moral reasoning, it remains unclear how and to what extent particular 
educational interventions such as course content might influence the development and 
enlargement of moral reasoning abilities. This study examined the impact of an academic 
program’s course content on the moral reasoning of students and the association of 
students’ perceptions of the moral dimensions of course content and their own 
development. The course at the center of this study is an interdisciplinary, liberal arts 
course that follows a great books model offered to first year students only at Boston 
College, a mid-sized research university. Part of a more comprehensive, interdisciplinary 
program of study housed in the university’s philosophy department and included in the 
core curriculum, the course is designed to engage students and faculty in tracing the roots 
of major philosophical and theological inquiries through close readings of primary texts. 
Heavily influenced by Heideggerian insights into historical-critical methodology, the 
course seeks to make students more consciously and critically aware of their own notions 
of what is good, true, and valuable for individuals and for communities. Taking up ethical 
theory explicitly at points throughout the course, students engage in an evolving dialogue 
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between ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary thinkers about the moral aspects 
of personal, social and political orders. Textually centered discussions seek to encourage 
students to think critically and foundationally about the private and public nature of 
ethical and moral choices. Though the explicit aims of the Perspectives Program are 
primarily intellectual, the first year course, Perspectives in Western Culture, seeks to 
foster a critical and reflective consideration of the ways that a student’s values have been 
shaped by her culture and history. Taking up the question, What Is the Best Way to 
Live?, as a central theme signals to both students and faculty that the course intends not 
simply an academic study of these texts but also aims to establish and invite students into 
a robust conversation about how we understand, choose, and live our individual and 
communal values.  
Whether or not liberal education courses like these are effective in advancing 
intellectual and moral development in students is crucial to the relevance of liberal 
education’s aims in colleges and universities, particularly within institutions with 
research agendas and aspirations. Programs like the Perspectives Program must clearly 
articulate their education goals and find ways to demonstrate that they can deliver on the 
outcomes they pursue. Making grand claims rooted in education’s nostalgic past or 
abstract notions of what we suspect and hope is happening in the hearts and minds of 
students is inadequate against the backdrop of rising costs of higher education and 
daunting economic uncertainties facing college graduates. If liberal education claims to 
make substantial contributions to democratic society and to the lives of young adults, it 
behooves practitioners to provide substantial research to showcase those contributions 
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and to identify best practices that make those contributions possible. The present study 
seeks to aid in that endeavor. 
  
 22 
Chapter 2: 
Literature Review 
 
Once a central aim in the lecture halls and campus cultures of American higher 
education, moral or character education has been largely jettisoned from college 
classrooms and residence halls and relegated to university mission statements. Recent 
conversations among politicians and leaders in higher education, however, have 
recommenced a public debate on the fundamental aims of American higher education, 
opening the door to a renewed consideration of this once preeminent educational 
aspiration. Practitioners of liberal arts education have long claimed moral education to be 
a chief mark of its educational format and assert its unique ability to foster moral 
development in students, but this claim is insufficiently researched. While supporters of 
liberal arts education attest to the great value of moral education for students and society, 
data regarding higher education’s efficacy in promoting moral development are limited. 
As a national discussion moves forward about what matters in higher education, it 
behooves those invested in liberal arts education to demonstrate through empirical 
research that moral education affects moral and ethical development, that this growth can 
be measured as such, and that aspects of liberal arts education significantly influence 
moral development.  
Advances in the field of moral development in the last half of the 20th century 
provide a foundation for contemporary work toward these goals. Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s 
early theoretical structures have given important stability to the field, allowing for 
burgeoning contemporary research into various aspects of moral and ethical 
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development. Neo-Kohlbergian studies and research are beginning to lay the groundwork 
for a thorough exploration of aspects of moral development such as ethical sensitivity, 
moral reasoning and principled action, as well as their connections to education. This 
literature review seeks to examine how a key piece of moral development—moral 
reasoning—has come to be understood relative to moral development generally, how 
adequate measurement tools have been designed to assess moral reasoning, and how 
research may help educators better understand and promote moral development in their 
students. What follows is a review of the literature of these topics to gain an overview of 
the present state of the field. 
2.1 MORAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH 
In its 2002 report, Great Expectations: A New Vision of Learning as a Nation 
Goes to College, the Association of American Colleges and Universities challenged 
higher education to foster “an acceptance of responsibility for the ethical consequences of 
our actions and ideas” (p. xii), echoing former Harvard University President Derek Bok’s 
1988 assertion of the obligation of universities to “help their students understand how to 
lead ethical, reflective, fulfilling lives,” in his piece on higher education’s role in 
fostering students’ moral growth. To these ambitious and yet ambiguous educational 
goals, Patricia King adds that educators should have a basic understanding of moral 
development and its processes, noting the helpful neo-Kohlbergian conceptual 
frameworks in mapping out common patterns of moral and ethical growth (1997). King 
argues that the goal of fostering good citizenship and character among college students, 
an aim regularly highlighted in the mission statements of institutions of higher education, 
 24 
requires the articulation and communication of “the moral dimension of university life” 
both in terms of the programmatic content and process (1997, p.90). 
Working from Kolbergian and Piagetan foundations, neo-Kohlbergian researchers 
James Rest and his colleagues at the University of Minnesota (referred to henceforth as 
the Minnesota group) have contributed more than thirty years of research on the moral 
development of college students and young adults. Rest’s interest in the psychological 
and cognitive aspects of moral behavior led the Minnesota group to examine how the 
various components of moral development evolve and function. Rest’s work provides 
three important tools for the advancement of moral development research: a schematic of 
moral development that attempts to revise Kohlbergian and orthodox stage model 
paradigms by employing softer “schemes” or patterns of moral reasoning; a four-
component conceptual model of moral development which allows researchers to focus 
more precisely on specific functions of moral development; and a much tested and widely 
accepted measure of moral judgment, known as the DIT (Defining Issues Test, currently 
being used in its second version, the DIT2, hereafter referred to simply as the DIT). The 
Minnesota group’s work has advanced moral development research significantly and the 
DIT’s efficacy, facility, and large norming samples make it a highly reliable and much 
used measurement device. The DIT aims at capturing patterns or modes of moral 
reasoning, identified by Rest as one of the most salient features of the much more broad 
set of functions properly understood as moral development. Rest’s central question 
regards how moral awareness ignites motivation and moves toward action and character 
via moral reasoning, decision-making, judgment and perseverance. In his early work, 
Rest points out that moral development is itself not necessarily a predictor of moral 
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action, but rather, it is “a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral action” (1986, 
p.58). Thus, he began to conceptualize moral development not as a unitary process but a 
dynamic set of interconnected components, each of which might be observed or assessed 
in patterns of usage and growth. Rest postulated that Kohlbergian attempts to measure 
moral development via the Moral Judgment Interview, developed by Kohlberg during his 
doctoral work in Psychology in 1958, failed to distinguish adequately the non-sequential, 
non-linear fluctuations of the various processes of moral reasoning.  
Kohlberg’s work relied heavily on the foundational work of Jean Piaget and was 
thus influenced by Piaget’s groundbreaking work in exploring and explaining the 
cognitive developmental processes of children as they navigate moral meanings and 
judgments (Piaget, 1997). Piaget pioneered a framework for developing a theoretical 
construct of moral development, identifying the basic cognitive and logical structures that 
children use to sort out moral meanings and construct moral decisions and values. 
Piaget’s work departed from a Durkheimian “Character Education” or cultural 
socialization model, which posited that students develop moral reasoning through 
didactic methods and positive reinforcement of good behavior (Snarey & Samuelson, 
2008). Piaget’s model insisted on a view of the child as an active participant in her own 
moral thought and action via cognitive developmental processes that emerge out of action 
and interaction with one’s culture and environment. Piaget observed that children meet 
increasingly complex moral situations that challenge the limitations of their own 
structures of thought and understanding, and postulated that these “collisions” would 
instigate a demand for higher order thinking. Construction of these higher orders, Piaget 
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asserted, was the central moral task of a child, and he argued that these constructions 
were cognitive and structural in nature.  
Piaget’s approach also diverged from the behaviorist tradition’s focus on causal 
correlations of human action and behavior, attending instead to verbalizations and 
explanations not as behavior indicators or predictors, but as the expression of a world of 
meaning and value out of which behaviors flow (Rest, 1979). For Piaget, verbal and 
written responses of children revealed not simply behavior motivation, but more 
importantly illuminated a developing inner world of children, with a particular internal 
logic and sets of meanings and values. Piaget did not assume a world as “given,” with 
human understanding striving to work out better and more direct apprehension of that 
world, but rather he attempted to sort out the conceptual framework and subsequent 
intuitive position of a child that is “the world” of the child’s moral point of view. For 
instance, Piaget proposes that a child’s behavior reflects his or her own understanding of 
moral obligations as fixed frameworks, characterized by Piaget as “moral realism,” seen 
not as social constructions but as fixed laws. The movement from heteronomous 
morality, in which a subject unilaterally conforms to authorities and rules, to an 
autonomous morality that includes reciprocity and mutual cooperation, demonstrates for 
Piaget an important evolving cognitive development. This development undergirds a 
conceptual framework needed to scaffold increasingly complex moral problems and their 
solutions. Using stories and games, Piaget elicited and observed children’s verbal 
accounts of behavior, noting unique elements from which he drew conclusions about 
underlying cognitive and sense making operations. Piaget’s work in identifying age-
related differences capitalized on advancing complexity and nuance in cognitive 
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operations. But Piaget postulated that development of reasoning capabilities ended after 
adolescence, and so it was left to later researchers like Lawrence Kohlberg to explore the 
further development of moral reasoning in post-adolescence.  
2.2 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG’S WORK AND INFLUENCE 
Kohlberg’s work with young adults, primarily college students, found its roots in 
his own pre-college experiences during and after the Second World War. Having learned 
of the atrocities of the Holocaust in high school, Lawrence Kohlberg postponed his 
college career, traveling to Europe to witness the end of the war (Snarey & Samuelson, 
2008). His Zionist sympathies stirred, the young Kohlberg engaged in illegally smuggling 
Jewish refugees through a British blockade, likely rousing a formative set of moral 
questions via a unique and moving experience of a personal moral dilemma. Quickly 
completing his undergraduate degree at the University of Chicago upon his return to the 
US, Kohlberg moved on to a doctoral program in psychology where his dissertation work 
centered on a single moral dilemma and the responses elicited by it in a group of 
adolescent boys. Noting significant age-related differences, Kohlberg posited a six stage 
theory of moral judgment which drew heavily on the type of cognitive developmental 
work put forth by Piaget (Reed, 2008; Whitely, Bertin, & Berry, 1980). In later years, 
Kohlberg would also retrieve and utilize aspects of Durkheim’s character education, or 
cultural socialization model, adverting to the need for a democratically formed version of 
indoctrination. According to this model, in the context of shared and respected rights 
education by a social collective would not seek to extinguish the priority of the individual 
and would therefore allow an individual’s autonomy in the face of an illegitimate 
authority. In establishing a proper tension between the participant-centered cognitive 
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developmental model of Piaget and the authority granting cultural socialization model of 
Durkheim, Kohlberg was convinced he had sidestepped the basic problem of extreme 
cultural relativism the likes of which might occur when a highly educated, sophisticated 
social community surrenders its moral reasoning capacity to a totalitarian regime.  
Kohlberg’s research involved the design and implementation of the Moral 
Judgment Interview (MJI) in which college-aged subjects were asked standardized 
questions regarding a hypothetical moral dilemma. The interviews elicited subjects’ 
explanations and verbalizations of judgments in attempting to resolve the dilemma 
(Colby, 1983; Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs & Lieberman, 1983; Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; 
Pacscarella & Terenzini, 1991; Rest, 1999). The subject of much criticism and acclaim, 
the MJI nevertheless generated a wide array of studies on the impacts of age, gender, 
race, ethnicity, etc. on moral judgment, and contributed substantial research on the impact 
of college on students’ moral development (Brabeck, 1984; Gilligan, 1982; Nucci & 
Pascarella, 1987). Using standardized questions and classification methods of analysis of 
interview responses, Kohlberg asserted that he could observe and identify direct 
indications of the cognitive processes involved in a mode of moral reasoning and could 
thus determine a “score” that identifies a stage of moral development within a continuous 
scale (Pacscarella & Terenzini, 1991; Rest, 1999b). Kohlberg’s work with the MJI was 
grounded in his basic allegiance to a social-construction theory – an assertion that the self 
emerges in and through series of patterned responses to social interactions – and that this 
self-constitutive process is mediated by cognitional structures that are reconstructed as 
interactions between the self and others become more complicated and more demanding 
(King, 2009; Reed, 2008). In light of this social constructivist underpinning, Kohlberg 
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asserted that direct and repeated social-moral experience was indeed necessary for moral 
development, motivating him to advocate for educational interventions like role-playing 
exercises and moral dilemma discussions (Armon & Dawson, 1997; Kohlberg, 1984; 
Reed, 2008). Via research data from the MJI, Kohlberg hypothesized that subjects move 
through basic stages of moral development in a structured, invariant pattern. Like Piaget, 
he noted that progression through the stages was fueled by the subject’s recognition of 
the inadequacy of existing structures of thought and judgment. Facing complex 
challenges, he observed, would precipitate this recognition and the subsequent need for 
higher orders of thinking in predictable and identifiable patterns. These patterns provided 
Kohlberg with the grounding of his renowned six stage developmental model of moral 
reasoning, progressing from a morality centered on the self to an other-centered morality, 
which can recognize and accept the perspective of another person or group of persons, 
known or even unknown to the subject.  
For Kohlberg (1984), a subject’s moral development may be traced through three 
levels which include six “hard” – in the sense that they are discrete and sequential – 
stages of cognitive patterning, each of which might be characterized by a particular moral 
orientation. In the egocentric “pre-conventional level,” we find the Punishment-
Obedience stage (Stage 1) and the Instrumental-Relativism stage (Stage 2) in which 
rewards and punishment, rule following, fairness as equality and reciprocity, and self-
interest dominate moral judgment. Moving sequentially to the multi-perspectival 
framework of the “conventional level,” a subject may advance to Kohlberg’s 
Interpersonal Concordance stage (Stage 3) and the Law and Order stage (Stage 4), in 
which relationships and mutuality temper self-interest, allowing for consideration of a 
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third person perspective, adverting to the significance of duty and obligation, and 
accepting the social norming that supports these kinds of social and political 
arrangements. Kohlberg’s final “postconventional level” posits a Social Contract/ 
Legalistic Orientation stage (Stage 5) and a Universal Ethical/Principle Orientation stage 
(Stage 6), in which complex and nuanced understandings of justice and morality give rise 
to apprehension of universal sets of rights and principles. Kohlberg notes that these stages 
track the cognitive-structural path of moral development that is not separate from but 
rather parallels affective aspects of development, supporting other researchers’ 
suggestions that moral development is best understood as one part of an integrated 
network of development (Bruess & Pearson, 2000; Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991). Initial 
use of Kohlberg’s MJI showed promise with college aged students, though meta-analysis 
of data from early versions of the MJI give very limited evidence of third level (Stage 5 
and 6) reasoning and startlingly little increase in moral reasoning in older adults, raising 
questions about the efficacy of the measurement tool and the adequacy of the stage theory 
itself (Armon & Dawson, 1997; Whitely, Bertin, & Berry, 1980).   
Kohlberg’s basic theoretical construct has many supporters and detractors, 
including claims of male bias in Kohlberg’s evaluative model (Gilligan, 1982) as well as 
insufficient evidence of stage 5 and stage 6 reasoning (Rest, 1999b). The MJI as a 
measurement tool also suffers from demonstrated limitations of interrater reliability of 
interviewers and interview techniques and self-reporting biases (Kay, 1982; Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). Additionally, later researchers including James Rest cite fundamental 
problems with the “production” model of the MJI, noting that its demands on subjects’ 
verbal judgments skew assessment of cognitive structures and sensitivities. For these 
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reasons, James Rest and his colleagues (1975, 1979, 1981, 1986, 1999, 1999b) sought a 
more reliable and effective measurement tool which would build on Kohlberg’s basic 
moral dilemma structure and sidestep the limitations of the MJI’s production mode and 
interview analysis format while also attempting to address the limitations levied against 
Kohlberg by other critics.  
2.3 NEO-KOHLBERGIAN RESEARCH: JAMES REST AND THE MINNESOTA GROUP  
Like Kohlberg, James Rest’s own personal history precipitated a search for 
explanations of moral and ethical dissonance in a tumultuous moment in American 
history. It also led him to assess the limitations of Kohlberg’s work measuring moral 
development. Raised by a minister in the American South during the Civil Rights Era, 
Rest was dismayed at the inability of members of the family’s church congregation to 
respond to the legitimate claims of the civil rights movement in a way congruent with the 
general moral behavior of that congregation (Thoma, 2002). Rest wrestled with the 
discordant attitudes of people he knew to be otherwise charitable and generous, leading 
him to conclude that moral engagement might be more broad-ranging and situation-
dependent than Kohlberg had envisioned. Rejecting the hard stage quality of Kohlberg’s 
theory, Rest instead opted in his own line of inquiry for “softer” schemes, seeking 
patterns of interconnected components that together make up the broad spectrum of moral 
development. Rest joined others (Bebeau, 2002; Rogers, 2002; Thoma, 2002) in noting 
the broad range of what is commonly held to be morality and moral development, 
choosing to focus on a measure of moral judgment, considered by Rest to be the most 
pivotal component of moral reasoning and moral behavior (Rest, 1986).  
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By the early 1970’s, Rest had left Harvard for a position at the University of 
Minnesota. At the time, Kohlberg and his colleagues at Harvard were beginning to turn 
their attention to the difficulties of the interview and scoring methods of the MJI, 
eventually jettisoning scoring for Stage 6 due to lack of data. Rest sensed that the 
interview method, held onto by the Harvard group in the face of growing criticism, 
depended too heavily on a production model of justification from subjects.  At the 
University of Minnesota, Rest reworked the basic format of the MJI, developing a paper 
and pencil test in which subjects read and responded to a series of dilemmas, including 
but not limited to the Heinz dilemma of the MJI. Using research from MJI studies, Rest 
noted that at certain stages, subjects noticed and utilized particular elements of a dilemma 
in their attempts to resolve the conflicts (Rest, 1986; Thoma, 2002). This moved Rest and 
a growing contingent of colleagues in Minnesota to develop prototypic statements (with 
accompanying irrelevant non-stage typed statements) to prompt subjects to respond to 
various stage-related justifications for various resolutions. Thus, unlike the MJI model, 
the DIT asks subjects not to produce justifications for their attempts to resolve conflicts 
and sort out the complexities of dilemmas, but to choose among statements that present 
various angles on the dilemma. The six dilemmas in the DIT are accompanied by a set of 
twelve statements that a subject might take into consideration in thinking about a possible 
resolution of a moral conflict. The subject is then asked to rate on a five point Likert scale 
the degree of relative importance of each statement in the subject’s consideration and 
decision regarding the dilemma. Finally, the subject is asked to rank the four most 
important and motivating statements from the list, providing a “second pass” through the 
statements and giving a second mode of scoring the subject’s responses. In this way, the 
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DIT does not rely on the production or articulation of moral reasoning, which in the MJI 
risked confounding verbal ability and advanced moral development, but depends instead 
on the recognition of aspects of moral reasoning pertinent to working out moral issues. A 
series of scores are gathered from the rating and ranking tasks to produce a Principled 
Reasoning score (P-score), indicating the extent to which a subject used principled 
reasoning (later used to denote postconventional) in working out the dilemmas. This first 
version of the DIT was published by Rest in his 1979 work, Development in Judging 
Moral Issues. This early work developing the DIT would lead James Rest and the 
Minnesota group in a number of different research directions, three of which are 
significant for research in moral development and for the present study.  
2.4 THREE NEO-KOHLBERGIAN RESEARCH DIRECTIONS  
First, the DIT proved to be an excellent research tool for measuring moral 
development or some aspect of it. It was easy to administer and to score and thus became 
a regularly used tool, which in turn enhanced the Minnesota group’s ability to 
demonstrate its effectiveness and validity. Over the years, revisions of the DIT itself and 
scoring techniques associated with the test (Rest et al., 1986, 1999) have resulted in 
remarkable advancements in moral reasoning research and have fortified the stability of 
the DIT as a reliable research tool. Second, it gave the Minnesota group a set of data with 
which to reassess Kohlbergian stage theory, eventually leading the group to work with 
schema theorists to reconceive Kohlberg’s “hard” stages. What emerged in the 1980s for 
the group was a “neo-Kohlbergian” moral schema theory, diverging from an “orthodox” 
stage model while retaining some salient features of Kohlberg’s fundamental theory. 
Third, using emerging data from the DIT, the group began to address strong criticisms of 
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moral development theory’s inability to bridge the apparent gap between moral judgment 
and moral action, levied ardently by critical reviews of moral development literature 
(Blasi, 1980; Schlaefli, Rest, & Thoma, 1985; Thoma, 2002). In response to the assertion 
that moral action must necessarily serve somehow as the final arbiter or measure of moral 
development, the Minnesota group began to work on a formulation of a more robust and 
precise conceptualization of moral functions and their relevant domains within 
development generally. The result of this work was the Four Component Model, outlined 
by Rest in 1983 in a review of literature of moral processes for a series volume on 
cognitive development, in which Rest articulated findings of differentiated domains of 
moral competency and adverted to affective as well as cognitive developmental demands 
of moral maturation (Rest, 1983; Thoma, 2002). Each of these three research directions 
has proved extremely fruitful for late 20th century and early 21st century research in the 
area of moral development generally and moral reasoning specifically.  
2.4.A. Development of the DIT 
Rest and his colleagues have contributed more than 40 years’ worth of expansive 
research with and on the DIT and its extensive use by researchers in widely divergent 
settings with a variety of populations has added to its reputation as a robust research tool 
(King & Mayhew, 2002; Rest, Thoma, Narvaez, & Bebeau, 1999). Rest’s exposure to 
developments in contemporary Psychology convinced him of the limitations of hard stage 
theory for the test’s evaluator purposes and eventually led him to take up insights from 
schema theory in developing his own “soft stage” model (Thoma, 2002). The Minnesota 
group retained Kohlberg’s foundational assertion that growth in moral judgment is a 
cognitive development, and hence anticipated observable upward movement in moral 
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reasoning that would bear out with age, would map on to other age-related development, 
and would be particularly correlated to intellectual development. Further, in agreement 
with Kohlberg the group asserted that specific experiences, particularly socio-moral 
experiences that demand complex modes of thinking, ought to influence the progression 
of complex moral reasoning.  
The search for robust indices able to capture the sort of moral reasoning growth 
that the group identified was a grounding task in the early years of the DIT formulation. P 
scores were initially used to denote a subject’s “principled considerations” ranking based 
on Kohlbergian post-conventional prototypic responses (Rest, Thoma, & Edwards, 1997). 
The DIT’s use of recognition formats over the MJI’s production format resolved the 
conflation of cognitive and moral development and allowed for tacit and unarticulated 
principled reasoning to be assessed.  
Attending to limitations acknowledged by the researchers themselves as well as 
criticism from other researchers including Kohlberg (1979), the Minnesota group sought 
an index that would give better results without having to give up decades’ worth of DIT 
data. By the late 1990’s the group, working with over two decades of DIT-based 
research, gleaned insights into the relative power of the P score, rejecting others that 
failed to outperform it (Davison, 1977; Evens, 1995; Lawrence, 1987; Thoma, 1994, 
2002; Thoma, Rest & Davison, 1991). Eventually, Rest was able to detect a more precise 
index, known as the N2, which combined P scores with decreases or systematic rejections 
of lower stage reasoning (Lind, Hartmann & Wakenhut, 1985; Rest, Thoma, Narvaez, & 
Bebeau, 1997). This combined power of two effects allowed researchers to identify when 
subjects are simultaneously gaining complexity of moral reasoning and clarity in 
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rejecting overly simplistic or inadequate reasoning. This new score has offered a robust 
mode of observing the influence of educational interventions on the moral reasoning 
capacity of students (Bebeau & Thoma, 1994; McNeel, 1994).  
King and Mayhew’s extensive meta-analysis of DIT research (2002) reviewed 
over 500 publications (peer reviewed articles, conference papers, dissertations, etc.) that 
have used the DIT in research with college students, though they noted that a substantial 
number of these studies used college students merely as a proxy for intelligent young 
people and many of the studies did not primarily use the DIT for an examination of moral 
reasoning.  Focusing on 172 of these studies which used the DIT specifically to explore 
the impact of undergraduate college experiences on moral development, King and 
Mayhew’s analysis strongly supports Rest’s assertion of the DIT as a robust measure of 
moral reasoning and his claim of its responsivity to the impact of educational 
interventions. 
2.4.B. Schema Theory and the DIT Schemas 
The new scoring techniques of the DIT represented an important shift in the Neo-
Kohlbergian work of the Minnesota group, which in the late 1990s began utilizing 
schema theory rather than Kohlberg’s hard stage depictions. The N2 score attempts to 
identify “shifting distributions of stages” as opposed to hard or discrete stages, thus 
locating the extent to which a subject tends to use higher or more complex levels of moral 
reasoning (Rest, Thoma, Narvaez, & Bebeau, 1997; Thoma, 2002). In this way, the 
Minnesota group sought via the N2 scores not to pinpoint a stage of moral development, 
but to “assess the pattern of responses across stage orientations, estimating development 
on a low to high continuous scale” (Mealy, 20xx, p. 40). This use of softer patterns along 
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a continuum depended heavily on Rest’s interest in emerging work in Psychology in 
schema theory. 
Rejecting Kohlberg’s limiting hard stages, Rest and his colleagues turned to 
Schema Theory which is “concerned with the application of organized generic prior 
knowledge to the understanding of new knowledge” (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, Thoma, 
1999). Conceived by theorists as cognitive structures built throughout an individual’s 
development through experiences and her reactions to them, schemas provide a 
conceptual framework used by an individual when confronting new data or questions. 
These frameworks serve to parse out the various aspects of the new data, attempt to fill in 
missing information, and guide the individual in the pursuit of further relevant 
information toward a solution or goal with respect to the data. Rest found Schema Theory 
more helpful than the operations-based stage theory employed by Kohlberg, which even 
Kohlberg lamented for its restrictions (Kohlberg, 1984). Though Rest himself worried 
about the DIT’s abstract use of schema theory and wondered if the term schema might 
prove inadequate in identifying what the DIT captures (1999), he nonetheless saw the 
construction of the DIT’s moral dilemmas as a tool to activate moral schemas in such a 
way that researchers could evaluate an individual’s working conceptions of basic moral 
principles.   
Recent developments in cognitive science ratify the Minnesota group’s choice of 
schema theory. Accounting for the ways that individuals organize experiences and move 
toward interpretation and articulation of those experiences, cognitive scientists identify 
conceptual structures that utilize experiential memory and past understandings to receive 
and flexibly handle present experiences. Schema theory suggests that “general knowledge 
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structures residing in long-term memory” are formed by patterns or experiences layered 
with interpretation and meaning which in turn form conceptual structures that anticipate, 
receive and attempt to interpret new experiences and data (Narvaez & Bock, 2002, 
p.300). Likewise, memory functions in such a way to create cognitive fields that correlate 
various experiences into working categories which might receive new data, allowing a 
variety of relevant understandings and assumptions to come to bear on decision making 
as new situations arise for an individual’s consideration (Derry, 1996; Narvaez & Bock, 
2002). Schema theorists posit overarching structures, or “mental models” that integrate 
these various memory caches and their correlated cognitive fields into meaningful and 
explainable horizons of decision and action. Rest’s use of these various aspects of schema 
theory was considerable (Rest, 1979; 1999b). He noted two crucial attributes of schemas, 
namely, that schema progress tends to be flexible and dynamic (as opposed to stage 
progress), and that while backward and forward progress through schemas is common, as 
individuals activate later schemas they are less likely to utilize early schemas. Moreover, 
he noted that schemas may be activated without an accompanying ability to articulate or 
explain the reasoning behind a chosen path of solving a dilemma. Rest concluded that the 
DIT and its verbal recognition model would thus resolve the weaknesses of the MJI’s 
verbal production model and its hard stage restrictedness.  
Narvaez and Bock point out that Rest’s early dissertation work adverted to three 
tasks which together form the movement of development and would later be the basis of 
his shift to a recognition measure: preference, comprehension, and spontaneous 
production (Narvaez & Bock, 2002; Rest, 1973). By presenting subjects with prototypic 
statements which reflect the moral reasoning of the various Kohlbergian stages, Rest 
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could elicit from subjects their evaluation of and preference for each stage. What Rest 
began to understand was that moral development moves in ordered, hierarchical patterns 
and that movement toward a higher stage begins with increasing preference for the higher 
stage reasoning, which might be identified in rating and ranking tasks with fragments of 
stage reasoning. This preference is followed by comprehension and the subsequent ability 
to produce justification or articulation of higher stage thinking. In the end, Rest and his 
colleagues chose the recognition model with accompanying rating and ranking tasks 
exclusively, since production models confounded moral development with verbal ability 
and comprehension skills. 
The DIT focuses primarily on macro-moral questions, highlighting how social 
and institutional orders operate with particular emphasis on decisions and actions 
regarding those not in our own social or personal spheres. The schemas conceived by the 
Minnesota group (1999) were closely related to but not tidily mapped onto Kohlberg’s 
original 6 stages, which Kohlberg grouped evenly into three levels (Pre-Conventional, 
Conventional and Post-Conventional), identifiable via cognitive operations. The DIT’s 
extensive use of verbal recognition patterning via a set of read moral dilemmas excluded 
most of the earlier childhood, stage 1 individuals. The remaining early stages are 
collapsed by Rest into a schema known as the Personal Interest Schema, which closely 
parallels Kohlberg’s Stages 2 and 3 (see Table 2.1), and highlights cognitive fields of 
personal interest and advantage. The collaboration and cooperation of this schema give 
way to give way to reciprocity and care for others. The Maintaining Norms Schema 
emerges via an interplay of understandings of cooperation, fairness, and reciprocity that 
intersect with conceptions of those outside the “in-group” (Narvaez & Bock, 2002; Rest 
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et al., 1999). Shifting to this schema relieves the tension of situations and questions 
insufficiently answered in the Personal Interest Schema, finally addressing the exigencies 
of the demands of “the Other,” those outside the scope of the group known to us. 
Kohlberg’s stage 4 falls within the range of this schema, which involves the cognitive 
coordination of larger social demands and meets the need for functional societal systems 
of rules, codes, and laws. Finally, Rest’s Postconventional Schema envelops stages 5 and 
6 of Kohlberg’s theory, stages which partially or wholly eluded measure via the MJI. 
This final schema encompasses individuals who, while committed to the primacy of 
shared and shareable ideals, advocate these ideals while adverting to contextual 
exigencies of communities, cultures and times. Rest is less precise in defining this 
schema than Kohlberg but includes in it characteristics of full reciprocity and moral 
purposiveness (as opposed to de facto norms) as necessary components in moral 
judgment at this level.  
Table 2.1 Kohlberg’s Stages and Rest’s Schemas 
Kohlberg’s Stages Rest’s Schemas 
1. Punishment-Obedience stage NA 
2. Instrumental-Relativism stage 
Personal Interest Schema 
3. Interpersonal Concordance stage 
4. Law and Order stage 
Maintaining Norms Schema 
5. Social Contract/ Legalistic Orientation stage 
Postconventional Schema 
6. Universal Ethical/Principle Orientation stage 
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2.4.C. The Four Component Model 
Noting the accepted view of Pascarella and Terenzini on college’s general impact 
on student development (1991, 2005), King and Mayhew (2002) point out that much 
work needs to be done in defining and delimiting the specific domain of moral 
development. Rest’s work in developing the Four Component model of morality enabled 
the Minnesota group to hone in on specific facets of moral development that uniquely 
incorporate cognitive and identity development (King, 2009; King & Mayhew, 2008). 
Recently updated by Bebeau and Monson for research in professional education (2008), 
the Four Component model makes clearer which aspects from the larger domain of 
morality might be addressed and observed in research studies. Diverging in large part 
from previous models of morality which tended to separate the cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral aspects of morality, Rest and the Minnesota group posited four components of 
morality each involving interactions of cognition, affect and behavioral manifestations 
(Walker, 2010). The model addresses the various psychological aspects of moral 
functioning, and allows research to target specific areas of moral growth or deficiency. 
The Four Component Model adverts to the “multiplicity of processes” involved in the 
psychology of morality (Rest, 1999b, p. 100) and identifies four components that together 
make up the inner psychological landscape of morality: moral sensitivity, which involves 
the ability to recognize the moral dimension of a situation and the capacity to see the 
impact of a situation from another’s point of view; moral judgment or reasoning, a 
subject’s ability to assess the implications of decisions and actions and an accompanying 
understanding (even if only notional) of the underlying criteria of moral choices; moral 
motivation, denoting the level of commitment one has to a set of chosen values and the 
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courses of action they call for; and finally, moral character, the degree to which a subject 
persists in implementing and following through on moral decisions and tasks (King, 
2009; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1983, 1999).  
Via this distillation of the various aspects of moral development, the Minnesota 
group pointed out that Kohlberg’s work deals primarily with the second of these 
components, moral reasoning, and suggest that a subsequent, neo-Kohlbergian approach 
might continue to explore that element of moral development by bringing new research in 
cognitive and identity development into dialogue with Kohlberg’s groundbreaking work. 
The Four Component Model also blunted a debate among researchers about the apparent 
gap between moral reasoning and moral action that had arisen in the 1980s (Blasi, 1980). 
In distinguishing the various aspects of moral processes, Rest and his colleagues were 
able to sharpen their range of research questions and more clearly identify the 
significance of DIT findings. Similarly, King (2009) notes that this demarcation of the 
proper purview of Kohlbergian research helps to address and possibly counter many of 
the critiques of Kohlberg’s work, noting for instance Brabeck’s claim (1983) that the 
ethics of care dispute raised by Gilligan is partially resolved in the component model, 
since care and empathy issues are more adequately understood as part of the first 
component, moral sensitivity. The component model also offers helpful distinctions for 
present contentious public discourse regarding education’s seeming failure to promote 
sound moral reasoning and engender moral development, when, as Christian Smith points 
out in his study of emerging adults, young adults seem to be unable to determine in any 
meaningful way what it is that makes a moral issue moral (Smith, 2011).  
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Members of the Minnesota group have gone on to research the various specific 
components. Bebeau’s work (1987, 1993) with professional school students resulted in 
the development of a measure of the moral sensitivity component (the Ethical Sensitivity 
Test) through which she has found evidence of significant variability among college 
students within this component. Her work suggests that educational interventions such as 
ethical training programs may impact this component of moral development. Similarly, 
Narvaez’s work (1998, 1999, 2001) contributes much in drawing out salient features of 
moral comprehension on various developmental aspects of morality, such as the impact 
of personal and cultural background, the modes and movements of tacit knowledge, and 
the interaction between moral development levels and sensitivity. Walker notes, however, 
that while advocates of the component model advert to the cognitional and affective 
aspects of the components, most research rather narrowly highlights the cognitional, 
leaving a gap of insights into the affective pieces of the various components (2010). 
2.5.  A NEO-KOHLBERGIAN DEFINITION OF MORALITY 
The theoretical lens used in this study includes a neo-Kohlbergian understanding 
of morality that James Rest and his colleagues posited in the last decade of the 20th 
century and has been used in neo-Kohlbergian research ever since. Rest asserts that moral 
reasoning is a “psychological construct that characterizes the process by which people 
determine that one course of action in a particular situation is morally right and another 
course of action is wrong” (Rest, Thoma & Edwards, 1997). While he affirmed that this 
capacity includes a cognitive capacity, but also suggested that the cognitive strategies we 
use vary significantly from one stage of development to another (Rest, Thoma & 
Edwards, 1997). It is this variation that Rest and more recent neo-Kohlbergian research 
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have sought to investigate in order to apprehend more clearly what capacities are used (or 
not used) as we approach increasingly complex and nuanced moral and ethical issues.  
Rest surmised that when the Maintaining Norms schema is preferred, subjects will 
display great preference for giving unlimited power to authorities at the expense of 
individual rights or needs and will prefer clear and possibly even simplistic social 
norming practice, whereas those with Postconventional schema orientations will favor the 
needs and rights of individuals despite their acknowledgement for systems, norms and 
public policies that function well. They will demonstrate preference for systems and 
norms that allow for individual rights to be expressed and addressed and that serve the 
collective will rather than make unnecessary demands of it (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & 
Thoma, 1999). Thus, the neo-Kohlbergian notion of Postconventional thinking, or the 
highest order thinking concludes “that rights and duties are based on sharable ideas for 
organizing cooperation in society, and are open to debate and tests of logical consistency, 
experience of the community and coherence with accepted practice (Rest et al., 1999, p. 
41). This position stands apart from a number of other streams of moral theory, including 
deontological, utilitarian, virtue-ethics, feminist, fundamentalist, Nietzschean and 
emotivist approaches to morality.  
2.6.  KOHLBERGIAN TO NEO-KOHLBERGIAN RESEARCH: DEVELOPMENT AND 
CRITIQUES  
The Minnesota group saw its work as an advancement of Kohlberg’s work, not a 
rejection of it, clearly identifying their own research as “Neo-Kohlbergian” (1999b, 
2000). Eager to point out the many aspects of development in which their work agreed 
with Kohlbergian theory, the group identified several important facets of Kohlberg’s 
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work that persisted in this Neo-Kohlbergian framework. Like Kohlbergian research, the 
group’s work with the DIT focused on cognition and the personal construction of 
categories that scaffold the cognitional aspects of moral reasoning and decision-making. 
Indeed, the group has been criticized, as Kohlberg was, for focusing too narrowly on 
cognition largely to the exclusion of emotional aspects of moral reasoning. The group 
also agreed with Kohlberg’s basic assertion that moral growth is part of an individual’s 
attempt to make sense of experiences, particularly those of a social nature. Finally, like 
Kohlberg, the group conceived of moral growth as a forward movement toward higher 
integrations of moral understandings, though, as mentioned above, the group came to 
envisage moral growth in “soft stages” rather than the step or staircase model Kohlberg 
favored. However, the group’s work benefitted from reflection upon the many practical 
and theoretical critiques of Kohlbergian theory and utilized advancements in the fields of 
Philosophy and Psychology to hone the horizon of their research. 
Critiques of Kohlbergian theory have come in many forms and offer many 
insights for neo-Kohlbergian research. Kohlbergian theory’s use of and dependence on 
particular foundations elicited two major lines of criticism: first, a basic rejection of the 
normativity-based philosophical foundations of Rawlsian, Kantian and deontological 
ethics; and, second, a claim of bias, particularly gender and cultural bias, embedded in the 
foundations of the work done with these theories. However, Rest and his colleagues 
sensed that they could adequately address the majority of those criticisms while 
maintaining the best of Kohlberg’s insights. 
2.6.A. Critiques of Foundationalism 
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Kohlberg’s theories came under fire from many sides but it has been late 20th 
century developments in moral philosophy and psychology that have brought into 
question the validity of its philosophical foundations (Maxwell, 2010; Rest et al., 2000). 
Contemporary philosophy’s rejection of a singular principle or “grand narrative” to 
which we might appeal as a foundation for claims about moral judgment or morality 
provides an important criticism of theories like Kohlberg’s which employed a unifying 
principle as a means to securing a comprehensive standard for measurement. Kohlberg 
made significant use of Rawlsian “justice operations,” including notions of reciprocity 
and ideal states of fairness or equality, with great value placed on reversibility (as 
discussed in Rawls’ later work [2001] under the auspices of the so-called “veil of 
ignorance”) in developing his MJI and its scoring modes. These Rawlsian notions in turn 
relied heavily on Kantian and deontological conceptions of moral duty and rectitude. 
Though Kohlberg claimed to have purged his theory of philosophical content, preferring 
a more abstract framework that might distil pure cognitional structures, critics claimed 
that he deductively utilized a foundational philosophical principle which was 
controversial and overly directive in his assessment tools (Thoma, 2002). 
Rest largely rejected these philosophical underpinnings of Kohlberg’s work 
(1999b, 2000), adverting to the weakness of depending on top-down, abstract principles 
and instead chose to work from specific cases toward an agreed upon or “common 
morality” that emerges from a community’s reflective consensus on moral issues (Rest, 
Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2000). Making use of the insights of a social constructivist 
approach, utilizing “looser, broader notion[s] of cognitive advance” (Rest et al., 2000, 
p.388) and building the DIT via a “bottom-up” mode, Rest and his colleagues established 
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a tool for activating moral schemas that resonate with subjects. Thus, the Neo-
Kohlbergian stance involves the claims that justice is not found in individuals but is the 
fruit of lived, communal meanings that are interpreted and recognized by individuals who 
participate in those communal understandings and go on to reflect on the ideals and 
logical coherence of those values. From this point of view, notions of what is moral and 
just are the result of incremental, non-arbitrary social cooperation that values impartiality, 
organization of rights and responsibilities, and balancing of self and social concerns.  
2.6.B. Gender Matters 
Though critiques of Kohlberg’s work and Kohlbergian theory come from many 
different perspectives, the most well-known, even in popular spheres, was the claim of 
gender bias leveled by Kohlberg’s student and colleague, Carol Gilligan (1982). Gilligan 
contended that Kohlberg’s studies and conclusions excluded women’s ways of 
approaching and reconciling moral problems from the higher stages. The issue of gender 
bias presents a two-fold problem, including the charge that the principle on which the 
stage theory hinges is at root biased against females, and that Kohlberg’s method of data 
collection was severely flawed. Gilligan’s claims were challenged by later studies 
(Bebeau & Brabeck, 1987; Lifton, 1985; Nunner-Winkler, 1984; Walker, 1984) but their 
impact was significant.  
In 1982, Gilligan published what became a very popularly-known critique of 
androcentric bias in contemporary psychological theory, particularly as regards moral 
development theory, including Kohlberg’s work. Noting Nancy Chodrow’s  (1978) work 
in examining the separation and individuation work of gender identity development, 
Gilligan points out that empathy and attachment produce an ethos of care and relationship 
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in girls, whose identity work is primarily accomplished via an experience of being like 
their mothers, ie. sharing an identity with the mother who is and who symbolizes the 
primary giver of care, as opposed to boys whose main identity work is done in the 
context of separation and differentiation from their mothers. Gilligan goes on to postulate 
that female identity development is so tied to modes of attachment that the separation and 
detachment of male development seem threatening and problematic and are thus not 
valued or highly integrated in women’s ways of approaching conflicts. Gilligan’s analysis 
of interviewees’ responses to the famous Heinz dilemma of Kohlberg’s MJI test 
highlights the different approaches of male and female subjects along these lines. In 
Gilligan’s study, the female subject seeks relational approaches to the problem, asking for 
more options than the MJI interviewer offers, and attempting to find a resolution that is 
inclusive of the complex needs of all the parties in the dilemma, while the male subject, 
construes the moral problem as a question of rights and attempts to construct a logic of 
justice by ordering the claims of the characters in the dilemma. Against the backdrop of a 
justice-operations based theory, like Kohlberg’s, this male approach gives a score that 
reflects a higher developmental stage. Gilligan’s own study of 29 women considering 
abortion construes a female mode of moral reasoning which moves through three 
increasingly complex iterations of the relationship between self and others, the transitions 
of which pivot upon “critical reinterpretation of the conflict between selfishness and 
responsibility” (Gilligan, 1982, 105), articulated in a distinct moral language that Gilligan 
claims is eluded in Kohlbergian stage analysis.  
Recent reviews of the literature examining gender differences in moral reasoning 
show remarkably little or mixed findings along the lines of Gilligan’s claims (Bebeau & 
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Brabeck, 1987; Bruess & Pearson, 2002; Mayhew, 2010; Walker, 2010). Meta-analyses 
reported by Walker (1984, 1986, 2010), Thoma (1986), and Baumrind (1986) and Bebeau 
and Brabeck (1987) show that gender difference yields little variance in MJI results of 
more than 10,000 subjects and reveals that at every age and education level, women score 
higher than men in DIT testing of moral reasoning. Mayhew’s meta-analysis of 43 studies 
(2010) that examines the relationship between gender and moral reasoning via the DIT, 
observes that just over half of the studies find women utilizing more sophisticated 
strategies in approaching moral dilemmas, while the remaining studies show no 
difference or found men to score higher along developmental lines. Moreover, Thoma’s 
meta-analysis highlights the finding that in samples of over 6000 subjects, education was 
more than 500 times more powerfully predictive of moral reasoning than gender. To gain 
a better understanding of the disparity between Gilligan’s claims and the findings of 
many researchers, Bebeau and Brabeck examined a variety of studies that take up 
Gilligan’s claims from several different perspectives (1987). Though studies show little 
difference in MJI and DIT measures of moral reasoning along gender lines, Bebeau and 
Brabeck’s meta-analysis goes on to consider a variety of claims of flaws in Kohlbergian 
and neo-Kohlbergian stimulus material (i.e. terms of dilemmas as well as details about 
characters and situations) and scoring rubrics that emphasize or even exclusively posit 
justice operations over and against care orientations. In research done using Kohlbergian 
dilemmas and seeking both justice and care orientations, they find no overall stage 
difference between genders and observe that men and women are equally likely to 
demonstrate care and justice orientations in their moral reasoning. Their analysis of 
research suggests that moral orientation is not determined by gender but by the type of 
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dilemma one considers oneself to be confronting, which in turn lead Bebeau and Brabeck 
to hypothesize that it is in the realm of moral sensitivity, the very construal of what 
makes a dilemma a dilemma, where males and females diverge.  
In a meta-analysis of studies of gender difference in Kohlbergian measures of 
moral reasoning, Walker (1984) also takes up the claim of gender bias in Kohlberg’s 
work in moral development theory, exploring three basic issues of this claim: first, that 
Kohlberg’s maleness itself brings a bias to the work, Walker points out that a number of 
Kohlberg’s colleagues who shared significantly in his work were women and a senior 
author of the revised scoring methods of his MJI was female; second that Kohlberg’s 
sample included only men. Walker points out that relatively little data support a claim 
that women do not follow Kohlberg’s stages and that studies in subsequent years largely 
demonstrate no significant difference between men’s and women’s attainment of higher 
stages of moral reasoning (Armon & Dawson, 1997; Bebeau & Brabeck, 1987; Walker, 
1984, 1995). Third, the predominance of male protagonists in the dilemmas used in the 
Kohlberg’s study biases the results. For these reasons, Walker points out that studies are 
equivocal in findings with same-gender and opposite gender protagonists and subjects 
(1984). 
2.6.C.  Critiques of the DIT as a Measurement Tool: What Does It Measure? 
Beyond these more well-known criticisms of Kohlbergian and Neo-Kohlbergian 
theory, a number of other criticisms emerged as the DIT became a popular and trusted 
research tool in the 90s and the first decade of the 21st century. During the course of the 
DIT’s development, many researchers including Kohlberg himself questioned the 
Minnesota group’s assertion of the measurement tool’s strength and reliability (Elm & 
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Weber, 1994; Emler, Palmer-Canton & St. James, 1998; Kay, 1982; Murk & Addleman, 
1992; Rest, 1979). Kay asserted that methodological and conceptual difficulties 
associated with the test limited its ability to overcome basic conceptual inadequacies of 
Kohlbergian moral stage development theory generally, noting that the verbal and literary 
designs of both the MJI and the DIT exclude pre-adolescents and confound reasoning or 
comprehension skills or other intellectual development with moral development. Other 
critics have suggested similar confounding variables or found evidence to suggest that 
moral reasoning results reduce to political or religious orientation (Emler, Resnick & 
Malone, 1983, Emler et al., 1998; Getz, 1984). Murk and Addleman (1992) raise 
important questions about religiosity as an important variable in the advancement of 
moral reasoning and examine significant correlations between DIT scores and a set of 
five variables, including age, educational attainment, religious affiliation, gender, and 
Internal-External Locus of Control Scale scores. Though Murk and Addleman’s findings 
were less impactful than Thoma’s and Rest’s, their findings supported Thoma’s and 
Rest’s claims that age and education, though often confounded, account for much of the 
advancement in moral reasoning. Rest and Thoma’s research suggests that age accounts 
for as much as 38 to 52 percent of variance and Thoma’s finding demonstrates even 
greater percentages of variance attributed to educational attainment (Rest & Thoma, 
1985, Rest 1986; Thoma, 1986). Their findings are supported Colby and Kohlberg’s 1987 
research claims of a strong relationship between cognitive variables and moral judgment 
and King and Mayhew’s meta-analysis finding that among 45 studies using design 
strategies that directly test the effects on moral reasoning of participation in formal higher 
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education, 90% showed a significant relationship between formal education and the 
development of moral reasoning. 
Finally, Elm and Weber (1994) concur with Kay’s criticism of the extensive use 
of quasi-experimental studies in assessing the DIT as a fit measure. While these issues 
will be addressed in a later chapter of this work, it is important to note Kay’s subsequent 
hypothesis that the DIT confounds variables like educational achievement, social values 
and intellectual ability with moral development, and is thus a measurement of these 
variables rather than of a unique developmental trajectory (Kay, 1982). These critics join 
a number of researchers and theorists over the years who have speculated about the 
adequacy of the MJI and DIT in capturing unique aspects of moral development and their 
capacity to evaluate any correlation between particular interventions and advancements in 
moral reasoning. Researchers have long wondered about the efficacy of moral 
development measures and the impactful and confounding effects on moral development 
of variables (besides gender, mentioned above), such as educational attainment or 
intellectual achievement (Burwell, Butman, & Van Wicklin, 1992; Mentkowski, 1983, 
Mentkowski et al., 2000), educational environments (King & Mayhew, 2002; Mayhew, 
Fernandez, & Deluca, 2007; Mayhew, Seifert & Pascarella, 2010; Mayhew, Wolniak & 
Pascarella, 2008; McNeel, 1991, 1994; Maeda, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2009; Pascarella & 
Terenzini 2005) verbal ability (Thoma, Narvaez, Rest & Derryberry, 1999), stages of 
identity development (Bruess & Pearson, 2000), political identity (Emler et al., 1983; 
Frimer, Biesanz, Walker & MacKinlay, 2013; Thoma, Barnett, Rest & Narvaez, 1999; 
Thoma, Narvaez, Rest & Derryberry, 1999), socioeconomic status (Finger, Borduin & 
Baumstark, 1992; Mentkowski & Strait, 1983; Rest 1979) religious, cultural or socio-
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political ideology (Murk & Addleman, 1992; Narvaez, Getz, Rest, & Thoma, 1999), age 
(Armstrong, 1993; Shaub, 1994), race and ethnicity (King & Mayhew, 2002; Murk & 
Addleman, 1992). Of these variables, it is noted that the persistent consideration of the 
effects of verbal ability and political orientation on DIT scores has largely emerged in the 
context of questions about the construct validity of the DIT and the Minnesota group’s 
responses (Emler, Palmer-Canton, & St. James, 1997; Mayhew, Seifert & Pascarella, 
2010; Narvaez, Getz, Rest & Thoma, 1999). Finally, synthesizing over 200 empirically 
based studies, researchers noted that cognitive motivation, a willingness on the part of an 
individual to engage in effortful thinking, was associated with moral reasoning 
development (Cacioppo, Perry & Kao, 1984; King & Mayhew, 2002; Mayhew & King, 
2008; Mayhew, Seifert & Pascarella, 2010; Mayhew, Wolniak & Pascarella, 2008). King 
and Mayhew’s 2002 meta-analysis concurs with Rest’s 1999 finding that formal 
education attainment is “by far the most powerful demographic correlate of DIT P-scores, 
typically accounting for 30 to 50 percent of the variance in large, heterogeneous samples 
(p.70). In 2010 review of literature, Mayhew, Seifert and Pascarella note that within 
quasi-experimental and correlation-based longitudinal designed research, formal college 
attendance is consistently demonstrated to promote increased moral reasoning, quite apart 
from the gains attributed to general maturation or age.  
Regarding the impact of variables on DIT scores and moral reasoning 
development theory, the Minnesota group has argued forcefully and regularly that its 
view was not that the DIT provided a pure measure of moral reasoning or moral 
development, nor that it seeks to exclude other variables in evaluating this type of 
development. The group contends for instance that moral reasoning cannot be reduced to 
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cultural ideology but that the process of cultural socialization interacts with the cognitive 
construction of meanings in such a way to create moral thinking—the ability of a subject 
to assess the moral or ethical aspects of situations, the capacity to reflectively discern 
right and wrong behaviors and attitudes and to provide coherent rationales for that 
thinking (Narvaez, Getz, Rest, & Thoma, 1999; Thoma, Barnett, Rest & Narvaez, 1999). 
In this way, the Minnesota group seeks to make sense via the DIT of the work individuals 
do in pivoting from the realm of moral sensitivity (Component 1), the recognition of a 
moral aspect of a situation, through moral reasoning (Component 2), the determining and 
defining of right or ideal action, toward the selection and execution of moral action 
(Components 3 and 4). Rest contends that DIT research adequately examines 
development of this second component and asserts that while moral reasoning 
development does not reduce to specific variables, much work needs to be done to 
determine the impact of various aspects of individuals’ experiences and educational 
opportunities on this development (Mayhew & King, 2008; Rest et al., 1999). 
2.7. RECENT RESEARCH WITH THE DIT: EDUCATIONAL AND PEDAGOGICAL 
INTERVENTIONS IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH  
In an attempt to examine both college student moral development patterns and the 
usefulness of DIT research in determining and identifying practices that advance or foster 
moral growth, extensive research has emerged in the past decade examining pedagogical 
practices and educational interventions which might precipitate moral development. 
Using insights from Neo-Kohlbergian theory and practice, educational researcher 
Mathew Mayhew has investigated many important areas of curricular conditions and 
educational intervention models that might impact and advance moral reasoning. 
 55 
Mayhew and Patricia King argue that in the context of the demands of democratic 
society, themes of ethical and social responsibility are not simply a retrieval of the 
missions of early American colleges and universities but are applicable today to the 
missions of religiously affiliated and secular institutions alike (King, 2009; Mayhew & 
King, 2002, 2008; Mayhew, Wolniak & Pascarella, 2008; Reuben, 1996). Mayhew and 
King posit moral reasoning as a key characteristic that grounds the goals of democratic 
society and advert to the helpfulness of Neo-Kohlbergian developments in thinking about 
how educational institutions might begin to address these mandates. They also note three 
decades’ worth of DIT data which overwhelmingly relates the development of moral 
reasoning to participation in formal higher education. The confluence of renewed interest 
in promoting moral development and increased confidence in the DIT’s reliability has 
convinced Mayhew and his colleagues to pursue a closer examination of the specific 
aspects of higher education that affect moral reasoning development. 
Mayhew and King note that purposeful educational interventions aimed at 
fostering moral development and moral reasoning in students fall broadly into two 
categories: the first involves use of specific content, while the second emphasizes 
pedagogical strategies (2008). In the case of content designed to stimulate moral 
reasoning, Mayhew and King identify two modes used in most classroom interventions: 
explicit moral content and implicit moral content modes. In an explicit mode, instructors 
are apt to teach principles of ethics, model advanced reasoning and perspective-taking 
skills, and engage students in considering morally challenging dilemmas in the hopes of 
encouraging increased capacity for alternative perspective-taking and recognition of 
moral complexity. In the second, implicit mode of content-driven interventions, 
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instructors tend to utilize broader theories of social justice and use social issues as 
prompts for discussions about social ills such as oppression, power, privilege, racism, 
sexism, etc. In brief, Mayhew and King present the major difference between these 
modes as one of focus. In the explicit mode, the logic of moral principles and the nature 
of the moral dilemmas are highlighted, while in the implicit mode, though a need for 
higher level moral reasoning is also demonstrated, harmonious social relations are 
emphasized. A second category of educational intervention overviewed by Mayhew and 
King is that of pedagogical strategy, in which the impact of a variety of educational 
activities such as role-taking, service-learning opportunities, perspective-taking 
discussions, and cognitive-disequilibrium assignments are examined.  
Within both categories of educational intervention, Mayhew and King find 
inconclusive research evidence of particular course effects on moral reasoning, in accord 
with Rest’s 1979 mixed results on short-term educational interventions. In a review of 
over 500 studies conducted in the past thirty years, Mayhew and King (2002) find 
surprisingly little evidence attributing growth in moral reasoning to particular courses, 
pedagogical styles, or educational interventions. Further, they note that among over 60 of 
these studies observing the effectiveness of course-related interventions, most target 
graduate students in professional programs such as medical/dental, accounting or law 
programs, or undergraduates enrolled in upper division, pre-professional programs, 
despite findings of significant effects of the first year in college on moral reasoning 
growth (2002). These researchers thus identify a gap between the clear evidence of 
undergraduate, particularly first year, advancement in moral reasoning and the dearth of 
explanatory evidence regarding exactly what it is in formal undergraduate higher 
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education that precipitates moral growth. Mayhew has gone on to explore a number of 
aspects of higher education that may help us move toward an answer, including 
particularly illustrative work analyzing data from a large, multi-institutional study 
(Mayhew & King 2008; Mayhew, Seifert, & Pascarella, 2012) and a longitudinal study of 
students enrolled in courses with differing modes of moral content. Mayhew and King 
conclude that including explicit moral content in a course appears to be impactful in 
fostering development of moral reasoning and speculate that explicit moral content may 
offer students a helpful language and set of structures to utilize when approaching 
difficult moral challenges. Studies like this are a first step in identifying more precisely 
what it is in higher education that precipitates moral growth and moral reasoning. 
In more recent and very important studies, Mayhew and his colleagues observed 
DIT data from a sample of 1,469 first year, full time students from 19 two- and four- year 
colleges, mostly within the liberal arts tradition, who participated in the large-scale, 
longitudinal 2006 Wabash National Study of Liberal Arts Education (WNS) (Mayhew, 
Seifert, & Pascarella, 2010, 2012). The sample selection reflected the researchers’ goal of 
a diversity of institutional size, location, type residence pattern. Via a series of factor 
analyses, Mayhew examined a set of demographic, course-taking behaviors, educational 
practices, and co-curricular variables, as correlated to the development of moral 
reasoning. Interestingly, though the effects of co-curricular and classroom experiences 
taken together netted a significant but small effect in advancing the moral reasoning 
capacity of these first year students, of four variables used regarding course-taking 
behavior, the variable that yielded a significant effect on moral reasoning was the extent 
to which their courses helped them understand historical, political and social connections 
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of past events and brought these into dialogue with students’ own situations. These 
findings lead researchers to the conclusion that  
exposing students to curricular content that engages them in critical 
dialogue with the past [that] may also encourage them to situate 
themselves, their ideologies, and their notions of fairness, in the larger, 
meta-narrative of human history; such an expanded paradigm for 
understanding how self is related to other is a hallmark of advanced moral 
reasoning (Mayhew, Seifert, & Pascarella, 2010, p. 379). 
In addition, findings of the study recommend frequent positive challenges to 
students in the classroom setting, encouraging the application of course content to actual 
problems, and teaching critical skills needed to point out and correct false arguments in 
basic and communal points of view. The study also finds that quality of teaching and 
interactions with faculty outside the classroom are significantly linked to advances in 
moral reasoning, especially for first year students, suggesting that in terms of moral 
reasoning development, interpersonal connection in the classroom is as important as what 
is taught. Findings in the study identify moral reasoning as a distinctive area of inquiry, 
related to but not reducible to political orientation, gender or racial biases, or other 
cognitive constructs such as intellectual, verbal or academic abilities or cognitive 
motivation. Mayhew and his colleagues claim that the implications of this study are far 
reaching for higher education, noting that very few studies have as yet attempted to 
“unpack the collegiate experience” to discover precisely which aspects of this experience 
significantly affect the sort of moral development called for by college and university, 
state and federal governing bodies.  
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Halliday and Frantis (2006) found similar data in their study on the usefulness of 
ethics courses for undergraduates enrolled in a health care program, noting the 
importance of classroom practices that include many practical examples in demonstrating 
theoretical foundations for ethics programs. Halliday and Frantis pointed out that 
structuring classroom discussions around moral theory and moral issues means that at 
some points in a course, teachers will be asking students to think at a developmental level 
beyond their own capacity. This “challenge and support” model, however, is precisely 
what Mayhew seeks in classroom practice, offering challenges to lower order moral 
reasoning, providing space for discussion that invites puzzling through inadequate or 
insufficient moral paradigms, and presenting more inclusive, more complex and more 
nuanced ways of bringing ethical and moral theory into dialogue with concrete and 
meaningful contemporary issues. These practices are certainly suited to the 
developmental trajectories of Piagetan, Kohlbergian, and Neo-Kohlbergian models of 
moral reasoning.  
Indeed, it is consideration of this practice that lead Mayhew, Seifert and 
Pascarella (2012) to reanalyze their WNS findings in terms of yet another factor of 
students’ moral development. In this analysis, Mayhew and his colleagues examined 
information from the DIT which situates students either in a consolidation or transition 
phase of moral reasoning, adverting to the impact of the stability of a subject’s moral 
positioning on her openness to educational interventions. Using the DIT’s N2 scoring, 
these researchers were able to distinguish students who are apt to use consistent and 
independent cognitive strategies in facing a moral dilemma (consolidated phase) from 
those utilizing a variety of cognitive strategies and prefer to use situational and contextual 
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cues in decision-making (transition phase). Using Astin’s Input-Environment-Output 
model, Mayhew, Seifert, and Pascarella sought “to deconstruct the college experience 
into those curricular, co-curricular, and teaching practices potentially responsible” (2012, 
p. 24) for the moral development gains typically found in studies of college students. 
2.8. IMPLICATIONS FOR LIBERAL EDUCATION AND THE BOSTON COLLEGE 
PERSPECTIVES PROGRAM 
Studies on the impact of educational interventions on moral reasoning regularly 
examine the type of course content and practices that are mainstays of liberal education. 
But participation in liberal education and humanities programs is in steep decline in 
American higher education, particularly within research universities and large 
multiversities, where waning numbers of humanities majors evinces higher education 
consumers’ profound ambivalence toward these traditional educational formats. Against 
the backdrop of a challenging economic reality, parents and students are opting for pre-
professional and vocational programs in increasing numbers. The 2012 CIRP Freshman 
Survey reported an all-time high of nearly 88% of incoming freshmen identifying “to get 
a better job” as their top reason for attending college, a reason which has topped the list 
of reasons for college participation since 2006. Not surprisingly, the numbers of students 
majoring in humanities has been steadily declining since the 1970’s, with business, health 
professions, biological sciences, and engineering occupying the top four intended fields 
of study of CIRP respondents. As a recent New York Times article points out, a 
university with a long tradition of excellence in the humanities like Stanford now finds 
itself with only 15% of its students majoring in humanities which account for 45% of the 
faculty (Lewin, 2013). As fewer and fewer students choose liberal arts and humanities 
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majors, the relevance of liberal education, as well as its central aims, are no longer a 
given.  
Liberal education faces formidable challenges within the academy as well. Liberal 
arts education as we know it today emerged in the early decades of the twentieth century 
as a humanist retrieval of the classical liberal arts curricula. Its champions envision it as a 
response to the increased specialization and value-neutral philosophy of the research 
university model and commend its ability to revitalize the moral purpose of higher 
education. Liberal education claims to offer a timeless curriculum ‒ one that articulates 
perennial questions and expresses transcultural ideas ‒ and to have revived the pursuit of 
moral character and values as legitimate concerns of a college education (Reuben, 1996). 
But the aims of liberal arts education are notoriously difficult to assess and thus don’t 
square easily in the present research-dominated higher education scene. Liberal education 
focuses on critical thinking, ethics, interdisciplinarity and critical/cultural analyses, 
utilizing pedagogical strategies and classroom practices such as small class discussions, 
course-related service-learning, multiple-perspective taking, cross–disciplinary study and 
articulation of basic principles of the common good and social justice. Seeking to develop 
the “whole person” through a diverse, humanities-based curriculum, liberal education 
pursues the development of character and ethics, the advancement of students’ critical 
thinking across a broad range of fields, and an engagement with deeply rooted intellectual 
inquiries beyond the parameters of practical and professional concerns (Cox, 1985; Hirst, 
1965; Pascarella, Wolniak, Seifert, Cruce & Blaich, 2010). It privileges the transmission 
of knowledge over the production of knowledge, seeking primarily to cultivate in 
students what the 1828 Yale Report refers to as the disciplines and power of mind, habits 
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and skills of dexterous thinking, and a balance of character (Brubacher & Rudy, 1997). 
These aims, however, are difficult to operationalize, evaluate and assess, eluding many 
social science research tools. Nineteenth and 20th century paradigmatic shifts in 
epistemology and the subsequent dominance of empirically based research have left 
liberal education with limited means of demonstrating its achievements or outcomes. 
Further, liberal education faces important and daunting postmodern critiques of 
normativity claims that attempt to standardize or objectify moral development. At 
present, liberal education needs to justify its place in the academy as it never has before 
and liberal education programs and majors must prove their worth in the public and 
academic scene (Cox, 1985; Fish, 2003a, 2003b; Reuben, 1996).  
In the spirit of that inquiry, this study sought to explore if and to what extent the 
moral reasoning capacity of first year college students is positively affected by the 
cornerstone course of the Perspectives Program, an implicit goal of which is the 
promotion of moral development in students. The study employed a secondary analysis 
of a university-sponsored assessment of the course, which included over three hundred 
pre- and post-test student surveys and an analysis of student essays on the impact of the 
course. DIT data and essays were examined in a mixed-methods analysis of the course’s 
influence on students’ moral reasoning development in the hopes of contributing to 
ongoing research in student moral development and the advancement of educational 
strategies that promote such development.  
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Chapter 3: 
Research Intervention and Quantitative Methodology 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION: RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DESIGN 
 
Though research indicates that college participation positively influences student 
development, much work remains to be done to identify which facets of student 
development are most impacted by college participation and which aspects of college are 
influential in advancing these developments. In their 2005 meta-analysis of over 2,600 
studies, Pascarella and Terenzini confirmed the impact of college participation on college 
students, noting net and long-term developmental effects. In the case of moral 
development, this meta-analysis found significant positive changes in moral reasoning in 
college students from freshman to senior year in research that allowed controlling for a 
number of factors including subject maturation, socioeconomic status, cultural context, 
and levels of precollege moral reasoning and intelligence. Moreover, this finding holds 
across measurement instruments. Despite evidence that college provides a uniquely 
fruitful context for growth in moral reasoning, researchers admit that controlling for all 
variables which might impact this growth is a major challenge. However, research 
strongly suggests that 1) moral growth in college is among the most significant 
developmental advances of college students, 2) that these advances persist after college, 
and 3) that this growth does not seem to reduce to other factors.  
Pascarella and Terenzini (2005) note that recent quasi-experimental evidence 
suggests that general education and liberal arts education programs that integrate 
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instruction in philosophical methods of analysis in ethics and ethical decision-making 
may enhance moral growth, while the effect of ethics courses and ethics interventions 
generally give mixed results and little evidence is found to support that major field of 
study has any effect on moral development. Pedagogical interventions offer similarly 
mixed results, with service learning requirements not seeming to impact principled 
reasoning unless combined with course reflection within course content, while 
coursework involving role-playing dilemmas or moral dilemma discussions are found to 
be impactful. It is clear to many who are interested in exploring the impact of educational 
interventions that much work needs to be done to specify what sorts of programs and 
pedagogical strategies enhance and advance development. 
The present study was stimulated by these questions and concerns and addresses 
some of them through an examination of assessment data of a course with an implicit 
goal of enhancing students’ moral development. Two chapters outline the mixed-methods 
approach to the study. Chapter Three begins with a sketch of the research questions and 
design of the study and gives a rationale for its quasi-experimental nature. A thorough 
explanation of the research site and the course which serves as the intervention at the 
center of the study is also offered in Chapter Three, as well as a summary of the data 
collection procedures. The chapter commences with a detailed explanation of the 
quantitative measurement tool used in the assessment, the Defining Issues Test (DIT). 
Chapter Four reviews the development of the qualitative component of the study, offering 
a detailed account of the development of writing rubrics used to analyze student essays 
and an explanation of how the quantitative and qualitative data were synthesized. Chapter 
Four will also include an analysis of the limitations of the study and its methodologies. 
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3.2 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study sought to contribute to discussions regarding the impact of college 
participation and the influence of curricular interventions on moral reasoning as a proxy 
for moral development through a secondary analysis of assessment data from a liberal 
education course with an implicit goal of promoting moral development. The study posed 
three research questions: 
1. Does the moral reasoning capacity of first year college students increase in a 
Great Books course with an implicit goal of promoting moral development?  
2. How do students perceive the moral dimensions of the course? 
3. To what extent is the development of students’ moral sensitivity and moral 
reasoning evidenced in their own written reflections about the importance of the 
course? 
This investigation involved a mixed-methods approach and thus presented two 
types of research data: 1) an analysis of quantitative data from pre- and post-test surveys 
measuring change within students moral reasoning and comparison of their reasoning 
levels and growth with national student norms, and 2) an analysis of qualitative data from 
open-ended pre- and post-intervention essays assigned at the beginning and end of the 
course via two analytic rubrics developed by the primary researcher. The rubrics 
examined students’ self-reported perceptions of the moral dimensions of course content 
and student language patterning that evinces moral sensitivity and moral reasoning 
development. 
3.3 THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
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The study consisted in a secondary analysis of course assessment and was thus 
quasi-experimental in nature, since there was no random assignment to the educational 
intervention, which in this case was participation in the course. Students chose to 
participate in the course within their first year of college. The course offered students one 
way to complete a set of required courses within the liberal arts “core” program but the 
course itself was not required by the university. Self-selection of students into this course 
may be one of several important confounding factors that impact the internal validity of 
the study’s findings. A good deal of moral development research literature addresses 
these types of confounding factors, all of which will be considered in Chapter Five’s 
articulation of the findings of this study. Because the course was one of only a handful of 
courses intentionally designed to be a year-long course, the study suffers from not 
including a suitable control group. However, the data examined in this study were 
designed as a larger course assessment and were thus not intended to be measured against 
a control group. How this design element impacts the findings of this study is discussed 
in Chapter Four’s section on the limitations of the study design. 
As regards the first of the central questions of the study, the research design 
assumed a null hypothesis, ie. that students would experience no significant gains in 
moral reasoning development during the year. Literature shows clearly that normal 
maturation and college participation generally impact student moral development, though 
some research suggests that the greatest gains in moral reasoning are found in the second 
year of college. Thus, some gains were expected. Findings were generally measured 
against national benchmarking and trends. With respect to the second and third research 
questions, the study sought to examine students’ own perceptions of the moral 
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dimensions of the course and course content, and to observe students’ own expressions of 
their developmental gains. 
The research design employed a mixed-methods, concurrent triangulation 
(sometimes referred to as “simultaneous triangulation”) approach to assessment materials 
which came in both quantitative and qualitative forms. Quantitative and qualitative data 
collection was implemented concurrently during the period of the course assessment, ie. 
the DIT and essays were administered at the same points in the academic year 
(September and April, 2012), though these tasks were not explicitly linked by instructors 
in the classes. Triangulation is an apt method for examining phenomena like moral 
development and its relation to an educational intervention since this methodology “may 
be used not only to examine the same phenomenon from multiple perspectives but also to 
enrich our understanding by allowing for new and deeper dimensions to emerge” (Jick, 
1979). Morse points out in her overview of methodological triangulation that deductive 
projects working with a priori frameworks are best designed with quantitative data taking 
precedence, complemented by qualitative data (1991). Thus analysis was completed 
sequentially, beginning with an examination of DIT data and subsequent categorizing of 
subjects based on scored outcomes (eg. low scorers with significant gains, low scorers 
with limited gains, high scorers with significant gains, etc.), followed by an analysis of 
student essays grouped as such.  
Mining student writing in the analysis stage was intended not to corroborate 
quantitative findings, but rather to identify aspects of the course that were associated with 
various types of moral growth shown within DIT data sets. Student self-reported 
impressions of moral dimensions of the course helped to elaborate on various DIT 
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findings in ways that deepened and enriched those findings rather than simply validating 
DIT data (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989). Integration of quantitative and qualitative 
data was completed during both the data analysis and interpretation stages of the research 
process. Qualitative material was then analyzed to identify motifs and themes from 
student writing and to capture a holistic and coherent depiction of subjects’ moral 
development (Creswell, Plano Clark, Gutmann & Hanson, 2008; Jick, 1979).  
There were several options for merging the study’s mixed data (findings from the 
DIT and essay analysis). Qualitative data could have been considered first in an 
exploratory mode, followed by quantitative data that might or might not validate the 
findings of the qualitative data. A second option was to analyze the large sample of 
quantitative data first and then use smaller cases within the qualitative data to expound 
and illustrate the kinds of insights offered by the larger data set. This second model 
refrains from prioritizing quantitative data, offering qualitative data as a way to identify 
patterns within grouped DIT levels and profiles as well as providing a larger sense-
making of the impact of the course. The second model was better suited to the original 
purposes of the course assessment, since that process sought to uncover what sorts of 
development might be connected with participation in the course and which aspects of 
the course were impactful to student development. Preceding student writing analysis 
(qualitative data) with DIT data analysis (quantitative data) allowed the larger swath of 
quantitative information to provide a general picture of subjects’ moral development and 
in particular of subjects’ gains in moral reasoning, while the second phase of essay 
analysis offered an opportunity to drill down into what students themselves reported as 
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pertinent to advancement and growth in these areas. The concurrent triangulation design 
of the study is illustrated in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 Concurrent Triangulation Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 THE RESEARCH SITE AND TREATMENT/INTERVENTION 
3.4.A. The Research Site: Boston College 
The educational intervention in this study was a year-long course in the great 
books tradition offered to first year students at Boston College, a religiously affiliated, 
mid-sized research university. The school is part of a 28-college network of Jesuit, 
Catholic colleges and is a strongly mission-driven institution. As such, it has a long 
history of educating students in the liberal education tradition. That tradition is attached 
not only to the original aims of the university which was founded in 1863, but also to the 
educational traditions of Jesuit education, as formulated in the 16th century Ratio 
Studiorum (“plan of studies”) which serves as the de facto official blueprint for Jesuit 
higher education. Also connected to this tradition is a strong commitment to “whole 
person education,” understood by the college as a responsibility to attend to the 
Quan data collection 
DIT 
Qual data collection 
Essay assignments 
Quan data analysis 
DIT via SPSS 
 
Qual data analysis 
Essays via rubrics 
 
Data results compared 
for interpretation 
DIT groupings assigned 
via benchmarking 
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integration of the spiritual and social aspects of students’ lives in addition to their 
intellectual development. As such, the education of a student’s character and attention to 
the moral development of students is part and parcel of the institution’s aims of “student 
formation.” A document recently produced by the university, “The Journey into 
Adulthood” explains this notion of educational formation this way: “[i]nseparable 
from…intellectual formation is the goal of shaping of character, of producing graduates 
who will take seriously the challenge of living good lives and making the world a better 
place” (Appleyard, 2008).  
The college’s national ranking within the top 40 universities in the US (as 
reported in several major, national rankings), a wide array of liberal arts and pre-
professional fields of undergraduate and graduate study and its location close to a popular 
US urban area make it a popular choice for applicants. The school regularly receives over 
20,000 applicants each year for placement in a freshman class of 2,250, at an acceptance 
rate of 32%, with 82% of freshmen having been in the top 10% of their high school 
classes. Boston College regularly highlights its commitment to liberal arts curricula and 
to the moral aims of liberal education. Thus, one can assume that participants in this 
study were fairly high-achieving, motivated students who had competed to gain a spot in 
a highly selective institution which values intellectual excellence as well as personal, 
emotional, social and spiritual flourishing.  
Data from the National Survey of Student Engagement (NSSE) Jesuit Institution 
consortium survey (a NSSE supplement uniquely designed to capture aspects of the Jesuit 
educational experience) offer helpful considerations in understanding the subjects of this 
present study (Boston College Office of Institutional Research, Planning and Assessment, 
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2013). Within its Enriching Educational Experiences section the NSSE survey, seventy-
nine percent of Boston College seniors who completed the 2013 NSSE reported that the 
university contributed “quite a bit” or “very much” their own development of or 
clarification of a personal code of values/ethics. This finding was statistically 
significantly higher than their counterparts at other Jesuit colleges, other colleges and 
universities within the same Carnegie classification, and all institutions participating in 
the NSSE survey. Both freshmen and seniors that same year reported higher indicators of 
reflective and integrative learning than their counterparts at other colleges as well, 
statistically higher than other Carnegie class and NSSE institutions.  
Thus, the research site and its student demographics presented both opportunities 
and challenges to this analysis of student moral development. On one hand, Boston 
College students do not comprise a typical young adult or even college student sample. 
They represent a selective and somewhat elite group of students from predominantly 
privileged backgrounds attending a very competitive school the aims of which explicitly 
include moral and ethical development. Moreover, social justice initiatives and 
volunteerism permeate the campus culture, evidenced both by NSSE data and by self-
reported, robust competition among students for positions in volunteer programs and 
service and immersion trips. It was thus helpful in this study to examine moral 
development data not merely with an eye to national and age-related benchmarks, but to 
focus on specific types of DIT shifts (such as low scores to high, high scores to higher, 
high scores to low, etc.) of individuals. In other words, some students would be expected 
to begin with high moral reasoning scores relative to other young adults in their age 
cohort but would not make significant strides within the first year relative to those 
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initially high scores. Hence, the quantitative component of this study sought to identify 
patterns of students’ moral development, comparing scores with national trends, and to 
establish groups of students within the cohort whose scores reflect significant moral 
development gains (demonstrating gains of one standard deviation or more) from low to 
high scores or from high to higher scores, as well as those who exhibited significant 
losses in moral development (demonstrating losses of one standard deviation or more). 
The qualitative component of the study examined student writing to uncover course-
related insights into students’ moral development gains and losses. An examination of 
student writing within and across these groups sought to reveal how students use, 
perceive, and were impacted by coursework in their own development. 
3.4.B. The Treatment/Intervention and Sample: “Perspectives in Western Culture” 
The intervention that served as the independent variable of the study was a course 
entitled Perspectives in Western Culture. It is the first, cornerstone course within a 
comprehensive, interdisciplinary program of study housed in the university’s philosophy 
department. The course is widely regarded by students, faculty and administrators as the 
type of course that exemplifies the liberal education tradition of the university. Nineteen 
sections of the year-long (2 semester) course are offered each year to freshmen at Boston 
College, with a limit of 25 students per class. In 2013, 452 out of a total freshman class of 
2,405 (n= 1,286 women and 1,119 men) registered for the course, approximately 20% of 
the college’s freshmen. It is important to note that getting into the program is sometimes 
challenging. Many students who would like to participate in the program are not able to 
enroll due to the popularity of the course. Incoming freshmen are informed about the 
course during their freshman orientation sessions and via a course catalog sent out in the 
 73 
summer months before they arrive. Students register for the course during freshman 
orientation programs, with 3-4 seats in each class becoming available during the 7 
orientation programs held during the summer months. Student orientation leader and 
academic advisor training includes a detailed description of the course’s interdisciplinary 
nature as well as its rigorous workload. Students are often alerted to the fact that as a 
Great Books program, the course is demanding and reading-intensive. Due to its 
reputation as a challenging and engaging class, the course is very popular among 
students. All of this results in varying degrees of self-selection into the course of students 
who prefer challenging courses or have a high “need for cognition,” which research has 
found to be highly correlated to moral reasoning development (Cacioppo, Perry & Kao, 
1984; King & Mayhew, 2002; Mayhew & King, 2008). Additionally, student orientation 
leaders are known to direct highly achieving and ambitious students to the course, adding 
to possible confounding of selectivity of students enrolled in the course and thus involved 
in the study  
The course provides twelve credit hours per academic year, with three Philosophy 
and three Theology credits earned in the fall and spring semesters (and as such is 
weighted as a “double” course, representing 40% of the credit hours of a typical first year 
student’s coursework) and serves as part of the university’s core, liberal education 
curriculum. In its cornerstone course for first year students, students and faculty engage 
in tracing the roots of major philosophical and theological inquiries through close 
readings of primary texts, perennial texts. Among the explicit aims of the course is a 
critical and reflective reading of foundational tests from the disciplines of philosophy, 
theology, political science and ethics. Implicit goals of the course include an attendant 
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consideration of the ways that a student’s values and moral sensibilities have been shaped 
by her culture and history. Heavily influenced by Heideggerian insights into historical-
critical methodology, the course seeks to make students more consciously and critically 
aware of the evolution of contemporary notions of what is good, true, and valuable for 
individuals and for communities. Taking up ethical theory explicitly at points throughout 
the course, students engage in an evolving dialogue between ancient, medieval, modern, 
and contemporary thinkers about the moral aspects of personal, social and political 
orders. Textually centered discussions seek to encourage students to think critically and 
foundationally about the private and public natures of ethical and moral choices (for the 
common course syllabus, see Appendix S).  
Faculty members who teach in the program assert its efficacy in advancing 
students’ moral reasoning capacity in addition to their knowledge of foundational texts in 
the fields of philosophy and theology, but their evidence has been anecdotal. For this 
reason, assessment of the implicit goals of the course was desired. The data examined in 
this study represent a first attempt by program administrators and faculty to gain a large-
scale assessment of these and other goals of the program.  
3.5  DATA, DATA COLLECTION AND SAMPLE 
3.5.A. Data 
 Experimental data involves a set of variables: a dependent variable which 
is the observed and measured response to some intervention or treatment, and an 
independent variable which consists of the intervention, presumed to be or not to be (in 
the null hypothesis) connected to the effect noted in the dependent variable. In this case, 
students’ moral reasoning was the dependent variable while the course, understood in this 
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context as an educational intervention being “applied” to students, was the independent 
variable. Applying a null hypothesis, the study presumed that there would be no 
statistically significant change in the moral reasoning capacity of students who took a 
time one test (at the beginning of the course) to a time two test (at the end of the course), 
as measured against other samples and when controlling for potentially confounding 
factors, including age, maturation, gender, race, and political affiliation.  
The data examined in this study were components of a 2012 program assessment 
of the year-long, freshman-level interdisciplinary course described above. A group of 16-
20 faculty members who teach regularly in the program were consulted in the 
development of an assessment of the explicit goals of the course, which included facility 
with major themes of foundational texts in the history of Western philosophical and 
theological thought, and of implicit goals such as advancing ethical and moral reasoning. 
In order to capture data pertaining to the implicit aim of increased moral reasoning, 
faculty agreed to ask students in their sections of the course to complete the Neo-
Kohlbergian DIT in a pre- and post-test fashion. Faculty also agreed to a program-wide 
assignment of an open-ended essay in which students were asked in the final weeks of the 
course to highlight class themes they felt had been particularly impactful to them and to 
their ability to address the central course question, “What Is the Best Way To Live?”  
3.5.B. Data Collection 
The DIT was administered in September, 2012, during the first few weeks of the 
fall semester and then again in April, 2013, during the final two weeks of the two 
semester course, seven months after the first test time. Faculty members were asked by 
the program director during the summer prior to the start of the academic year to allow 
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this assessment tool to be administered in their classes. The request was sent to faculty 
via email. Out of a total of 19 sections, 16 faculty members chose to participate in the 
DIT pre- and post-testing. Three faculty members either did not respond to emails about 
testing times and procedures or contacted the program director too late in the first 
semester to fully participate in the study. The measurement tool was described in some 
detail to faculty and 16 sections of the course were involved in this assessment. The tests 
were administered during class time, with all instructions read by the principle 
investigator in 14 of the 16 test instances. In two classes the test was administered by the 
classes’ own faculty members.  
Of the 452 students enrolled that year (AY 2012-13) in 19 sections of the liberal 
arts program used in this study, 385 students in 16 sections participated in the DIT 
survey. As recommended by the “Guide for DIT-2” (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003), students 
were given as much time as they needed and received no other direction beyond the 
instructions read from the DIT guide. Each student was assigned a 5-digit identification 
number and student names were erased from the tests for anonymity in the scoring 
process. Two copies of the list of identification numbers were kept by the researcher in a 
secured location and one copy of the list was kept in a secured location by the program 
director. The sets of tests were sent in two waves for scoring to the University of 
Alabama Center for the Study of Ethical Development. Due to class attrition, student 
absences or incomplete test forms (names were not included on 6 post-test answer sheets 
and thus could not be paired with a pre-test) 31 pre- and post-tests could not be paired 
and were thus invalidated. Of the 354 completed and paired pre- and post DIT tests from 
the sample, 29 additional tests were purged from the study based on the Center’s own 
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well-researched battery of DIT reliability validity and reliability checks (Bebeau & 
Thoma, 2003). In total, 325 DIT pre- and post-tests made up the sample of the 
quantitative component of the study.   
Additionally, students in all of the sections of the course were asked at the end of 
the course to write open ended essays discussing class themes that were particularly 
important to them and to the course’s central question, “What is the best way to live?” 
However, in several sections of the course students were asked to write an essay 
addressing this question in the first week of class in September and then asked to write 
the final essay addressing the same question in relation to course content in the last two 
weeks of April, at the end of the course. Thus, essays from these classes have the quality 
of pre- and post-essays with respect to the course as an intervention. As such these essays 
illustrate some of the perceived impact of course content on student development and 
were thus examined via a qualitative analysis in the present study to complement the pre- 
and post-course quantitative assessment. This component of the study is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4. 
3.5.C. The Sample 
 The study began with of a convenience sample of 385 subjects who took 
the DIT as part of an assessment of a course in which they were enrolled as first year 
students and which serves as the educational intervention of the study. Of those original 
385 students, the population of the quantitative component of the study consists of the 
325 students who completed scorable pre- and post-DIT tests. Students participated in the 
DIT and the common written assignment as part of the course itself and as such, it was a 
captive sample. However, the sample used for the qualitative data section of this study 
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consisted of 49 students enrolled in just two of the sixteen classes involved in the study. 
In these classes, the essay assignment was assigned in the first week of class and then 
again at the end of the course and thus took the form of a pre- and post-treatment 
evaluation. Due to the fruitful nature of this type of format and its illustrative capacity, 
the students in these two classes became the subpopulation for the qualitative portion of 
the study. Of the 49 students who participated in the two classes in which pre- and post-
course essays were assigned, only 46 completed both beginning and end of year 
assignments, due to class attrition. Thus, the 46 students in the qualitative subgroup 
represent 14% of the study sample. Limitations inherent in these sample selections are 
considered in a broader discussion of the study limitations at the end of Chapter 4. 
3.6. THE QUANTITATIVE INSTRUMENT: THE DIT  
3.6.A. History and Development of the DIT 
Neo-Kohlbergian researchers James Rest and his colleagues at the University of 
Minnesota have contributed more than thirty years of research on the moral development 
of college students and young adults, primarily via their development and use of the DIT. 
Working with insights into Kohlberg’s main tool of measuring moral reasoning, Rest 
developed the DIT, a paper and pencil test in which subjects read and responded to a 
series of narrative dilemmas, including the Heinz dilemma of the Kohlberg’s Moral 
Judgment Interview (Rest, 1986; Thoma, 2002). The DIT utilizes prototypic statements 
and an accompanying set of complex decoy statements to prompt subjects to respond to 
various stage-related justifications for various resolutions. Thus, the DIT relies on a 
recognition model over a production model to explore subjects’ attempts to resolve 
conflicts and sort out the complexities of dilemmas, a strategy that helps reduce 
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confounding effects of verbal and cognitive advantage. DIT subjects are asked to 
consider six moral dilemmas and then to rate and rank the relative importance of twelve 
statements related to a resolution of each dilemma. A series of scores are gathered from 
the rating and ranking tasks to produce a P-score, indicating the extent to which a subject 
used principled reasoning in working out the dilemmas (Rest, 1975, 1979, 1987, 1999; 
Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 1999; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999, 2000; 
Rest, Thoma, & Edwards, 1997). 
Over two decades of DIT-based research offered the Minnesota group keen 
insights into the relative power of the P score. This research in turn helped the group 
reject other scores that failed to outperform it, including an early U score (Davison, 1977; 
Evens, 1995; Lawrence, 1987; Thoma, 1994, 2002; Thoma, Rest & Davison, 1991). 
Eventually, a more precise index was developed, known as the N2, which combined P 
scores with decreases or systematic rejections of lower stage reasoning (Lind, Hartmann 
& Wakenhut, 1985; Rest, Thoma, Narvaez, Bebeau, 1997). This combined power of two 
effects allowed researchers to identify when subjects are simultaneously utilizing 
complex moral reasoning and rejecting overly simplistic or inadequate reasoning, thus 
establishing a more discernable way of delineating what researchers mean by moral 
development generally. This new score also offered a robust mode of observing the 
influence of educational interventions on the moral reasoning capacity of students 
(Bebeau & Thoma, 1994; McNeel, 1994). As described in the review of the literature (see 
Chapter 2), the group’s use of schema theory over hard stage paradigms helped highlight 
shifting distributions of stages as opposed to hard or discrete stages, thus locating the 
extent to which a subject tends to use higher or more complex levels of moral reasoning. 
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This allowed researchers to evaluate patterns of stage orientations on a continuous scale 
and to identify a subject’s application of generic prior knowledge to the understanding of 
new knowledge as she parses out various aspects of new and more complex questions, 
attempts to fill in missing information, and pursues further relevant information toward 
an adequate resolution of a question or quandary (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, Thoma, 1999; 
Rest, Thoma, Narvaez, Bebeau, 1997; Thoma, 2002). The revised DIT is a capable tool to 
activate moral schemas so that an individual’s working conceptions of moral principles 
can be evaluated. This development offers wonderful opportunities for researchers to 
examine moral development in the college experience.  
3.6.B. The DIT in Detail 
The present study utilized the current version of the DIT (the DIT2; for a full 
version, see Appendix A) which includes five dilemmas modeled on Lawrence 
Kohlberg’s “Heinz dilemma,” a moral quandary/dilemma central to Kohlberg’s Moral 
Judgment Interview (MJI) widely used as a benchmarking tool in the early years of 
contemporary studies in moral development (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a, 1987b; Rest, 
Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). In the Kohlbergian dilemma subjects were asked to 
consider the actions of a man whose wife is dying of a type of cancer which could 
possibly be treated by a drug developed and sold by a local druggist. Heinz cannot afford 
the drug, the cost of which has been raised to 10 times its production value by the 
druggist, who will not sell the drug for less. Heinz breaks into the store and steals the 
drug. The updated DIT2 begins with a similar story, involving a man who is 
contemplating stealing food for his starving family from a wealthy man who is holding 
food supplies in a warehouse in order to sell the food at top value (Rest & Narvaez, 
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1998). Subjects are asked to read each story and then complete three tasks related to the 
dilemma.  
First, participants are asked to consider and choose which action the protagonist 
should follow, to steal the food or not, or to indicate that they “can’t decide.” 
Interestingly, this first task is not involved in the eventual scoring of the DIT. It merely 
situates the issues of the dilemma within a horizon or context of action. Offering only 
short and simple options highlights that a choice or movement is necessary, triggering a 
demand for some sort of consideration. Second, subjects read a list of 12 statements that 
present issues related to resolving the dilemma, such as, “Does the rich man have any 
legal right to store food when other people are starving?” Subjects are asked to rate the 
significance of each item to the story on a 5 point Likert scale (rating each as having 
“great,” “much,” “some,” “little,” or “no” importance). Finally, subjects are asked to 
reconsider the 12 statements and choose four items they consider to be most important, 
ranking them as “most important,” second most important,” and so on. It is notable that 
the directions for rating and ranking the items are somewhat fragmentary. To what these 
items are significant or important is not made clear. Participants are left to draw their own 
conclusions about whether they are being asked about the importance of these items to 
themselves, to the characters in the story, to the resolution of the dilemma, or to society 
generally in rating and ranking tasks. This strategy allows participants to determine a full 
range of personal, social, or societal considerations involved in their choices. 
The DIT’s prototypic statements were developed by Rest and his colleagues based 
on research into comments of hundreds of subjects through years of Kohlbergian MJI 
research, thus offering a highly nuanced representation of advanced and advancing moral 
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development (Rest et al., 1999). DIT researchers claim that the careful and thoughtful 
design of the DIT addresses many of the validity and reliability concerns of measures of 
this kind. For instance, extensive use of MJI research in the design of DIT statements 
counters a validity concern regarding the possibility of a highly deductive, Rawlsian bias 
of Kohlberg’s earlier work. DIT statements allow other philosophical positions such as 
utilitarian and libertarian stances to be represented in the category of postconventional 
thinking. DIT researchers also claim that the DIT’s recognition model (versus a 
production model) offers several benefits: first, recognition tasks resolve reliability 
concerns of interviewer and rater/scorer inconsistency; second, recognition tasks allow 
tacit understandings to be activated and reduce the degree to which verbal ability may 
confound developmental findings; third, recognition of items within rating and ranking 
tasks clarifies a horizon of macro- and micro- moral concerns for the subject’s 
consideration and thus avoids validity issues associated with participant test 
interpretation. Lastly, the “fragment strategy” employed in the creation of DIT items 
defers to schema theory’s insights into the centrality of recall and embedded memory in 
moral reasoning, strengthening the validity of the test (Narvaez, 1998).  
3.6.C. Scoring the DIT: From P Scores to the N2 Index 
The first versions of the DIT reported moral reasoning development in terms of a 
P score, originally designed to identify a subject’s preference for prototypic statements 
based on Kolbergian stages 5 and 6. As Rest and his colleagues developed working 
schemas (Personal Interest, Maintaining Norms, and Postconventional) in place of 
Kohlbergian stages, the P index came to indicate a subject’s use of Postconventional 
modes of reasoning (see Chapter 2). By 1997 the Minnesota Group developed an even 
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more robust index for the DIT, the N2 score, reflecting the group’s increased 
understanding of and confidence in schema theory over stage theory Rest, Thoma, 
Narvaez & Bebeau, 1997). These researchers claim that the N2 index is a better fit for 
measuring moral schemas since it reveals tacit and general knowledge structures that are 
stored, invoked, activated, revisited and eventually chosen by subjects in moral reasoning 
(Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999). Additionally, this index highlights schema 
transition and consolidation processes, offering a nuanced construal of a subject’s 
movement in and out of various schemas (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003; Rest et al., 1999).  
P scores were used by James Rest and his colleagues for many years, despite their 
search for a more robust index that could outperform it. P scores are calculated via the 
subject’s DIT ranking task only. Four points are scored if a subject assigns as “most 
important” a postconventional item from the 12 prototypic statements, three points are 
added to the P score if a postconventional item is ranked “second most important,” two 
points are added to the P score for a postconventional item ranked third most important, 
and one point is added for a fourth ranked postconventional item. Thus, up to 10 points 
could be scored on each dilemma. Six dilemmas were used in the original version of the 
DIT to make a perfect P score of 60 points (the DIT2 uses five dilemmas with a total 
score of 50 points). The score was converted to a base 100 percentage, with scores 
ranging from 0-95% since not every dilemma included four postconventional items. In 
the original DIT, missing data resulted in the recalibration of scores on the total ranking 
points completed. In other words, if a subject failed to rank any item fourth on one 
dilemma, the score was recalculated based on total possible points of 59 rather than 60 
(Rest et al., 1997). By 1997, the Minnesota Group discovered the work of German 
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researcher Georg Lind, who noted in DIT ratings a second indicator of development: a 
greater differentiation between high ratings of higher stage items and low ratings of lower 
stage items accompanied advances in development. Thus, the Group devised a new score 
which brought this additional component to bear on the DIT’s measurement capability.  
3.6.D. Calculating N2 scores 
N2 scores combine a subject’s use of postconventional thinking in the ranking 
task (based on the P score) with a second effect derived from a subject’s systematic 
rejection within the rating task of more simplistic, lower stage thinking (Rest et al., 
1997). The N2 index thus allows attention to be given to a subject’s increased 
differentiation in moral reasoning rather than simply adverting to her advances in 
postconventionalism. To calculate the N2 score, two components are used. The first 
component, identified here as N21, is derived through an analysis of the subject’s rating 
of each of the prototypic statements. The 12 statements read by subjects regarding the 
dilemma represent thinking in stages 2-6 (Stage 1 is omitted since the DIT’s reading 
comprehension levels are aptly fitted to Stage 2-6 moral reasoning). The first component 
is a calculation of the subject’s discrimination of stages 2 and 3 (which combined form 
the Minnesota Group’s Personal Interest Schema) from stages 5 and 6 (the 
Postconventional Schema). In other words, a subject is not simply being scored on her 
preference for higher stage thinking or consolidated schema reasoning but for a clear 
discrimination of higher and lower stage thinking. The average of a subject’s rating of 
stage 2 and stage 3 items is subtracted from the average rating of stage 5 and stage 6 
items. This difference provides a discrimination measure which is then divided by the 
subject’s standard of deviation of these four stages.  Thus, the formula of the rating 
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component, N21, may be represented as: N21 = {Stages 5+6 – 2+3}/σ (Stages 
2+3+5+6).  
The second component of the N2 score, identified here as N22, is derived via an 
analysis of the ranking task of the DIT, in which subjects select the four items from the 
twelve prototypic statements which they consider to be “most important.” Subjects 
identify or rank the first, second, third and fourth most important items, scored with four, 
three, two and one point, respectively, as in the original P score model. In this revised 
component, however, many of the scoring adjustments of the original P score are 
excluded and missing rankings are accounted for differently. If a subject omitted a 
ranking in the original DIT, the P score was recalculated based on the highest possible 
score of completed rankings. In the N22 no adjustment is made for a subject’s failure to 
complete all rankings. The omission of a rank is included in the calculation, understood 
in this version of the test as a failure to choose a Postconventional item. Thus, a total of 
ten points is possible for each of the five dilemmas, for a test total of 50 points. A 
subject’s score is converted to a percentage in the N22 component. 
The DIT2 handles other omitted ranking and rating tasks differently as well. A 
subject’s failure to rank any items in one dilemma is adjusted for by using the total N22 
score of the other four completed dilemmas. However, if the ranking task is incomplete 
on more than one dilemma, insufficient test-taking motivation is assumed and the entire 
protocol is invalidated. Similarly, if more than 4 items are not rated, the N21 is calculated 
based on the ratings of the other four dilemmas, but if 4 or more items are not rated on 
more than one dilemma, the test is invalidated. In other words, the DIT2 requires that the 
tasks of 4 dilemmas must be attempted with at least 9 items rated in each and a total of 14 
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of the 20 rankings completed. As Rest and his colleagues developed these new scoring 
procedures, they noted that drawing data from two DIT tasks might cause more frequent 
invalidation of tests resulting perhaps in smaller samples than the earlier version of the 
test. However, they felt confident that the new scoring model was robust enough to 
warrant the shift.  
Finally, the two components of the N2 score, the N21 rating data and the N22 
ranking data, are combined into one score by adding N22 to N21 weighted three times, 
based on research findings that ratings data have about 1/3 the standard deviation of the 
original ranking P scores. Thus weighting ratings data serves to equalize the rating and 
ranking data within the final N2 score. Rest and his colleagues submitted this N2 scoring 
to a battery of comparisons with a 1995 standardized sample of P scored tests, n=1,115, 
in order to standardize P-scored and N2-scored research and to demonstrate the new 
scoring model’s sensitivity to a variety of validity measures. By the late 90s, the DIT2’s 
N2 index was regularly outperforming P scores on a variety of important construct 
validity criteria that had long been posited by Rest and his colleagues as grounding for 
the DIT’s strength as a measure of moral reasoning (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 
1999a, 1999b).   
3.6.E. DIT2 Validity and Reliability 
It is important to note that the DIT’s P and the DIT2’s N2 scores are found to be 
approximately normally distributed. In a 1995 compilation of findings from a mega-
sample (n=45,856) of DIT research culled between the years of 1989 and 1993, a mean 
distribution of 39.1 was found in a range from 0-91, with a standard deviation of 14.84, 
attesting to a normal distribution of P scores (Rest et al., 1999a). Thus, 66% of DIT 
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scores in the sample fall between 24.26 and 53.94 on a scale of 0-91, and 95% of DIT 
scores in the sample fall between 9.42 and 68.78. These results included data from DIT 
subjects representing a range of demographics and with a wide array of educational, 
socioeconomic and geographic characteristics. Results of the sample also highlighted the 
DIT’s ability to capture postconventional reasoning, unlike much of Kohlberg’s own MJI 
research. Current indices of the DIT2 have been standardized to these scales, with a range 
of 0-95 (Rest, 1987; Thoma & Rest, 1999). 
Rest and his colleagues also operationalized seven validity criteria for assessing 
the construct validity of the DIT, along with test-retest and within-test reliability checks. 
The validity criteria include 1) differentiation of age and education levels, 2) longitudinal 
upward trends, 3) correlation to cognitive capacity measures, 4) sensitivity to moral 
educational interventions, 5) links to “prosocial” behavior and highly valued job 
performance, 6) links to political attitudes and choices, and 7) adequate reliability. 
Researchers have also demonstrated test-retest reliability and within-test consistency 
checks to safeguard against “garbage data” (such as answers that are selected to form 
graphic designs on answer sheets) (Rest et al., 1997, 1999a).  
It is helpful to consider each validity criterion separately: 
1) differentiation of age and education levels: Rest and his colleagues opined 
that tests of moral reasoning would likely show that graduate students in moral 
philosophy would score higher on the DIT than high school or junior high 
students. However, in order to determine if the test actually captured 
developmental differences, rather than educational opportunity differences or 
confounding variables like the socioeconomic advantages of those who attained 
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higher education, researchers used subsampling from very large composite 
samples to decrease the possibility of impactful confounding variables. Studies of 
these large composite samples showed that 30-50% of DIT variance is attributable 
to education level. Interestingly, Rest and his colleagues found evidence that after 
high school, subjects’ stage 2 and 3 thinking decreases in proportion with stage 4 
thinking in such a way that makes stage 4 thinking (Maintaining Norms Schema) 
redundant in N2 scores (see more about Stage 4 thinking and its significance in 
validity criterion #6 below). This explains why N2 scores are calibrated via 
increasing stage 5 and 6 thinking combined with decreasing stage 2 and 3 
thinking, without regard for stage 4 thinking (Rest, 1999a). 
2)  longitudinal upward trends: DIT researchers utilize a 10-year longitudinal 
study of women and men from diverse educational, geographical and 
socioeconomic backgrounds to demonstrate that the use of postconventional 
thinking develops in a general upward trend. Moreover, Rest asserts that dozens 
of studies of college students attest to DIT gains as “one of the most dramatic 
longitudinal gains in college of any variable studied in college students” (Rest, 
Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999b, p. 310) with average effect sizes of .80 in 
liberal arts colleges and universities and similar effect sizes in the majority of 
college studies reported (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 1999a). 
3)  correlation to cognitive capacity measures: the component of moral 
development that is ostensibly measured in the DIT is moral reasoning, which 
Rest and his colleagues asserted to be correlated to cognitive capacity. Using a 
modified version of Lind’s Moral Comprehension Test (Lind, 1979, 2010, 2013; 
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Lind, Hartmann, & Wakenhut, 1985), which assesses a subject’s ability to 
correctly identify and recall the gist of a moral argument, the Minnesota group 
verified a significant (p<.001) correlation between moral comprehension and P 
and N2 scores. This significant sample correlation coefficient (moral 
comprehension with P is r =.67 and with N2, r =.69) of DIT scores to moral 
comprehension, recall and reconstruction of moral arguments and articulations 
provides an important piece of evidence of the DIT’s validity. 
4)  sensitivity to moral educational interventions: Researchers assumed that if 
moral reasoning was indeed a part of development connected to cognitive growth, 
it would respond to educational programming and intervention. By the late 90s, 
DIT research included over 60 published studies that examined educational 
interventions via the DIT, including a 1985 meta-analysis (Schlaefli, Rest, & 
Thoma) of 55 studies that showed moderate gains (.41) following educational 
interventions that lasted longer than three weeks, compared to small gains (.09) 
for shorter treatments. Moreover, older subjects (college and older adults) showed 
greater change, adverting to researchers’ assertions that educational interventions 
work best in advancing higher stage thinking after adolescence (Rest et al., 
1999a). Mathew Mayhew’s extensive body of work in the past ten years examines 
a plethora of educational interventions’ impact on moral reasoning using the DIT, 
finding significant effects in a variety of intervention types (Mayhew, 2012; 
Mayhew & Fernandez, 2007; Mayhew & King, 2008; Mayhew, Seifert, & 
Pascarella, 2010; Mayhew, Wolniak, & Pascarella, 2008). 
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5)  links to “prosocial” behavior and highly valued job performance: 
Measuring the link between moral reasoning and moral behavior has been a long 
and hotly disputed point in Kohlbergian and neo-Kohlbergian research. Rest and 
his colleagues readily concede the point that thinking through moral dilemmas 
remains in the world of the hypothetical and cannot uncover a subject’s real moral 
action or behavior. Kohlbergian theory and research was criticized vociferously as 
over-intellectualizing moral development. Many continue to maintain against neo-
Kohlbergian work that thinking about moral choices cannot be linked to actually 
making moral choices. Over the years, however, researchers have continued to 
mine this area of study, noting the important distinctions made by James Rest 
between various components of moral development. As such, Rest and his 
colleagues have delimited the DIT as a measure not of moral character (the ability 
to persist in moral tasks and behavior) but of moral judgment, by which a person 
judges which action is most justifiable (Rest et al., 1999a). More recently, 
members of the Minnesota Group have joined other researchers in assessing 
professional decision making, performance ratings of healthcare, accounting, 
management and education professionals (Bebeau, 1994, 2001, 2002; Bebeau & 
Brabeck, 1987; Bebeau & Thoma, 1994, 1999; Rest & Narvaez, 1994). DIT 
research also suggests that P and N2 scores are significantly correlated at the 
same levels to “prosocial” behaviors such as community involvement and civic 
responsibility as measured by service to one’s community. Rest acknowledges 
that this validity criterion offers the weakest association, accounting for only 5-
20% of the variance of behavior measures (Rest et al., 1997, 1999a). 
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6)  links to political attitudes and choices: Since the DIT proposes to measure 
what neo-Kohlbergian theory understands as macromorality, or the way that 
people relate to others within social horizons, moral reasoning is conceived as 
illuminative of political attitudes and decision making. Hence, the Minnesota 
Group assumed that P and N2 scores would map on to particular civil libertarian 
attitudes regarding issues including free speech, religious toleration, human rights, 
etc. The group found that in studies from the 1970s through the late 1990s, P 
scores remained relatively consistent, notable especially in light of shifts in 
American political views throughout that time period. They also noted that P and 
N2 scores highly correlate with political attitude in the r = .40-.60 range and in 
some cases account for over 60% of variance in attitudes towards highly 
controversial issues (including abortion, women’s rights, free speech, etc.). 
Interestingly, in this validity criterion, the P score offers an advantage over the N2 
score, as Rest and his colleagues found in their work with the development of a 
Law and Order scale early on in DIT research. Wanting to examine closely the 
shift to principled morality, researchers specified in this scale the shift from 
“prioritizing social order, unquestioned deference to authorities, and rejection of 
deviance to the prioritizing of individual welfare, questioning of authority, and 
tolerance of deviance” (Rest et al., 1997, p. 503). Using this scale, Rest and his 
colleagues demonstrated that P scores correlated more closely to attitudes of 
political toleration and awareness over and against law and order preferences than 
N2 scores. Additionally, P scores offered the possibility of isolating and thereby 
highlighting this unique shift from the law and order orientation of the 
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Maintaining Norms Schema (Stage 4) to Postconventional thinking (Stages 5 and 
6) by simply subtracting Stage 4 thinking from P scores. This “P-Stage 4” index 
underlines the final shift out of the Maintaining Norms Schema into the 
Postconventional Schema by calculating P at the expense of Stage 4 thinking, as 
opposed to the N2’s calculation using the exclusion of Stage 2 and 3 thinking 
(Bebeau & Thoma, 2003; Narvaez, Getz, Rest & Thoma, 1999; Rest et al., 1997).  
As regards political orientation, the DIT asks students to identify themselves as 
very liberal, liberal, neither liberal or conservative, conservative, or very 
conservative. Subjects who classify themselves as conservative or very 
conservative report higher Maintaining Norms scores, while those who classify 
themselves as liberal or very liberal have higher P scores, though research has 
shown that moral judgment and political orientation do not reduce to each other 
(Emler, Palmer‐Canton, & James, 1998; Maeda, Thoma & Bebeau, 2009; Walker, 
2002). Thus, moral judgment is viewed by the Minnesota Group as a “co-
contributor to political choice rather than a proxy for political orientation” 
(Bebeau & Thoma, 2003, p. 40). However, the difference has been found to 
become significant at the sophomore level of college and since the present study 
examines the DIT scores of freshmen, the study did not focus on this aspect of 
DIT comparisons.  
7)  adequate reliability: As to the internal reliability of the DIT, researchers 
have put forward composite samples of DIT studies to demonstrate its Cronbach’s 
alpha to be in the high .70s and low .80s, with the N2 index coming in 
consistently in the low .80s. Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of a test’s internal 
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consistency and is widely used to evaluate whether items in a test actually 
measure one thing, in this case, moral reasoning. Educational practice looks for a 
standard of .80 (variance of .36), which is achieved consistently in the DIT. 
Research has shown that ideal ranges of Cronbach’s alpha fall in the .70 to .95 
range, though scores higher than .90 often suggest redundancies in test design 
(Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). 
3.7. CONCLUSION  
 As evidenced in this study’s review of the literature of moral development, 
quantitative data gleaned from the DIT is extremely useful in observing particular aspects 
of moral growth. However, what precipitates moral development, especially in the 
context of college participation and its impact on advancement in moral reasoning 
remains largely shrouded. Decades of moral development research attempting to 
ascertain the efficacy of educational interventions have primarily utilized quantitative 
scales such as the DIT and the MJI. More recently, researchers like Mathew Mayhew 
have combined quantitative measures to identify and scale other confounding variables 
that impact moral growth within educational environments. Mixed methods approaches 
in this area are not common, likely due to the array of problems that plague mixed 
methods research (including problems of representation, legitimation and integration) and 
researchers’ subsequent tendencies to favor one analytic format over another 
(Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006). The present study opted for a mixed methods approach 
to addressing the efficacy of educational interventions, suggesting that a coherent, 
holistic picture of moral development and growth would be aided by student’s own 
perceptions of what moved them forward intellectually and personally within the span an 
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educational experience. If the objective of moral development research is to discover and 
encapsulate aspects of moral advancement, qualitative data’s ability to extract unique and 
illustrative themes and motifs from subjects’ reflections should be considered alongside 
the insights that quantitative measures provide. In the next chapter, the qualitative data of 
this mixed method will be presented. 
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Chapter 4: 
Qualitative/Rubric Methodology 
4.1   INTRODUCTION: RATIONALE FOR QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF WRITING  
While Defining Issues Test (DIT) data offer a unique snapshot of student moral 
development, it is important to consider the challenges of determining appropriate and 
sufficient measures for moral or character outcomes. Moral development is neither 
simply defined nor easily operationalized for measurement and outcome assessment, and 
a variety of proxy measures are often used in quantitative research of moral development 
for the sake of convenience and positivistic science aims (Dalton, Russell & Kline, 2004; 
Strange, 2004). Qualitative and quantitative research in college student moral 
development often suffer from limitations, including small sample sizes, single-
institution cases and reliance on potentially biased student self-reporting. Though the DIT 
and similar measurement tools are designed to control for confounding factors, neo-
Kohlbergian research’s insistence that the DIT is a measure of only one, narrowly 
construed component of moral development reminds us of the difficulty in assessing an 
aspect of personal flourishing that is so broadly understood and holistic. Moreover, 
common notions of advanced moral development anticipate the ability to follow through 
on moral understandings in moral tasks (Rest’s moral character component) and this 
developmental component eludes most research tools. In order to capture as clear a 
picture of moral development as possible, therefore, a combination of measures is 
warranted, as noted in Chapter 3. A mixed methods approach allows for:  
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the strategic and purposeful combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative data collection and analysis…assum[ing] that the 
epistemological and methodological advantages of each can work in 
concert to corroborate or more robustly support the findings, or to reveal 
complementary or even contradictory outcomes (Saldaña, 2011, p. 10).  
Combining qualitative analysis of writing and DIT data provides a means to focus 
a descriptive and analytic eye on specific attributes of moral development as well as on 
the impact of educational interventions on that development. The present study 
triangulated quantitative and qualitative data in an effort to observe in these particular 
cases what, if anything, was happening in a course of study that was thought to be 
impactful to student development. In looking at student writing from a select group of 
students from the study sample, the study engaged in a data source triangulation model 
(Stake, 1995) to uncover aspects of student development that are evidenced (or not) in 
DIT scores. Triangulation of DIT data and subsequent groupings of students based on 
DIT scores with student writing also allowed a consideration of what a measured moral 
development gain or loss “looks like” from the perspective of students’ own experiences 
of reflecting on important topics, texts and themes. In this model different types of data 
are linked together, inviting both cross-validation of particular dimensions of a research 
question and further interpretations of the meaning of research findings (Plano & 
Creswell, 2008; Stake, 1995).   
4.2  THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Thus the study utilized a mixed methods approach to examine students’ moral 
reasoning development, including a qualitative analysis of essays written by students 
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about their own experiences of the course and course content. The purpose of the second, 
qualitative component of the study was two-fold and addressed the project’s second and 
third research questions: 1) how do students perceive the moral dimensions of the course? 
and 2) how is student perception of these moral dimensions connected to gains in moral 
reasoning development? In concert with quantitative, DIT data, student writing was 
analyzed to address these questions and in so doing, to provide a fuller picture of 
students’ moral development.  
4.3  THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
As noted in Chapter 3, an initial analysis of the DIT results of the total study 
sample were completed in the first stage of analysis. The second, qualitative component 
of the analysis focused on a convenience sample subgroup of 46 students from 2 classes 
(see Chapter 3’s description of the samples used in the study). An evaluation of this 
subgroup’s DIT scores allowed subjects to be divided into five categories based on 
scoring attributes:  
1) Low to Low: students whose pre- and post-test scores were low compared to 
national trends, with limited or no change (losses or gains ≤ 12 points 
[approximately 1 standard deviation]); 
2) High to High: students whose pre- and post-tests were high compared with 
national trends, with limited or no change (losses or gains ≤ 12 points 
[approximately 1 standard deviation]); 
3) Gainers: students who posted significant gains in post-tests, regardless of 
position on continuum (gains ≥ 12 points [approximately 1 standard deviation]); 
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4) Decliners: students who posted significant declines in post-tests, regardless of 
position on continuum (losses ≥ 12 points [approximately 1 standard deviation]); 
5) Constant Average: students who posted pre- and post-test scores commensurate 
with national averages and whose scores remained steady (gains or losses ≤ 6 
points [approximately .5 standard deviation]). 
Essay analysis focused on the written work of subjects who fell into the first four 
categories, working with subgroups of not fewer than three students in each subgroup. 
Subjects who remained constant and average in DIT scores were omitted from analysis. 
The study identified three or more students in each group from the subsample for 
qualitative investigation to avoid focusing on outliers. Analysis of three or four student 
essays from each group 1) revealed language patterns and articulation of concepts, 
attitudes and behaviors that offer points of convergence or divergence with the set of a 
priori moral development proxies identified in the first rubric (see Section 4.6 for rubric 
details); and 2) identified common course topics, content, texts, discussions, themes, etc., 
identified by students as impactful to their own development within and across DIT 
groupings. This analysis was implemented via two sets of a priori rubric items designed 
by the principle investigator to highlight moral development proxy items and course-
related items that connect student experiences of course content with aspects of moral 
development. 
The two rubrics used in the study were developed via a thorough review of the 
literature of moral development and a consideration of the course content and program 
aims (see rubric details in Sections 4.5 and 4.6 of this chapter). Writing from subjects in 
all four groups was double-coded along both rubrics. Rubric analysis utilized a typology 
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development strategy to uncover the homogeneity within and heterogeneity between 
subgroupings of subjects categorized along DIT scoring patterns (Caracelli & Greene, 
1993). In other words, analysis was undertaken first to identify what student moral 
development “looks like” within the various groups, ie. what sort of thematic language 
and concept patterns emerged within each group that were connected to moral 
development proxies; second, student self-reporting of what they considered to be 
particularly impactful in the course and in the course content were analyzed to identify 
connections between course-related items and moral development markers. Motifs and 
concepts were identified via three levels of coding (open/pattern, axial and selective 
coding, described in the Analysis Section below). The analysis provided a picture of what 
might be particularly impactful to the moral advancement of students in different stages 
within moral development and how students perceived the connections between course 
content and their own moral development. 
4.4  DATA AND DATA COLLECTION 
Students in almost all sections of the course intervention (for course description 
and details, see Chapter 3) received a fairly open-ended essay assignment at the end of 
the year in which they reflected on the various texts and themes of the course to answer a 
central question, “What Is the Best Way to Live?” Faculty members in the program 
agreed that gathering essays for course assessment would complement other assessment 
tools and most agreed to submit selections of essays to the program director. In the 
academic year of the study (2012), 19 sections of the course were offered. Out of those 
19 sections, students from 16 sections of the course participated in the DIT pre- and post-
testing, with 325 students with complete and scorable DITs included in the study sample 
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(see Chapter 3, section 3.5.C. for a detailed description of the sample). Of the 16 classes, 
2 sections posed the assigned essay in a pre- and post- course fashion, asking students to 
reflect on the question, “What Is the Best Way to Live?” The essay was assigned during 
the first week of class in September and was then repeated during the final week of the 
spring semester. These essays were chosen for qualitative analysis to complement DIT 
data since they offered a unique view of students’ own sense of their progress from the 
beginning of the two-semester course to its end.  
Student essays from these two classes represented a small but not insignificant 
percentage of larger sample of students who participated in the DIT study (n = 15 student 
essays, 5% of study sample). A selected group of essays was examined via a deductive 
heuristic to uncover 1) evidence of moral reasoning or moral sensitivity that illustrate 
particular DIT findings or illuminate DIT gains; and 2) connections between student self-
reported perceptions of the course and course content and their own moral development. 
A protocol for assessing various components of moral development within student 
writing included analysis via two rubrics: the first included a series of student attitude, 
belief and behavior outcome items that correlate with moral development research, while 
the second was comprised of course-related items that anticipate and organize 
connections between the course and students’ expressions of their experiences in the 
course. Student essays were double coded throughout this process for analysis via both 
rubrics.  
4.4.A. Subsample Essay Selection Process 
The subsample of the qualitative component of the present study originally 
consisted of 49 students from two classes in which students were required to write essays 
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at the beginning of the program and at its end. Thus, these essays were assigned at the 
same time that students were taking the DIT pre- and post-tests (early September and late 
April). In both classes, the pre-course essay prompt was the same: “In 3 pages, answer 
the question, ‘What Is the Best Way to Live?’” As such, the essays were construed in this 
investigation as pre- and post-course reflections on what a student considers valuable and 
worthwhile in constructing a life lived well, also one of the central themes of the course. 
The post-course essay prompts were also the same for both classes: “In 3 or more pages 
and in light of the course, how would you now answer the question from the first essay” 
Thus, the second prompt did not explicitly ask students to refer to course texts or themes, 
though students would likely anticipate that as an implicit part of the end-of-year 
assignment. The subsample included 49 students enrolled in these two classes (25 in one 
class, 24 in the other). Attrition, unmatched pre- and post-DIT tests, or incomplete essay 
assignments resulted in a final subsample of 46 subjects (94% of the subsample and 14% 
of the total sample). Using SPSS, frequencies and pre- and post-test differences were 
used to compare subsample Pre-test N2 scores, Post-test N2 scores, N2 change scores, 
etc. with those found in the total sample (for details, see Chapter 5). The categories used 
to identify notable groups in the total sample were revised slightly in order to choose 
subject essays for qualitative analysis. A full discussion of the rationale and procedure of 
this adjustment is presented in Chapter 5. 
Six months prior to subsample essay selection, essays of all students in the two 
classes were matched with DIT identification numbers (using the master list), labeled 
with those ID numbers and names were blackened out by the primary researcher. Since 
the primary researcher was also the instructor of one of the classes, concealing authorship 
 102 
of the essays was necessary to ensure as randomized a selection process as possible. The 
final essay selection was more than 10 months after the class ended and thus authorship 
was no longer identifiable to the primary researcher. Lists of Gainers, Decliners, High-to 
High Scorers and Low Gainers were then generated from this subsample using SPSS 
analytics, which produced a list of pre- and post-test N2 scores and N2 Change Scores for 
all 46 students in the subsample. Using SPSS case sorting, students within this subsample 
were identified as belonging to the various groups outlined for analytical purposes.  
4.4.A.1   Selection of Gainer Essays  
Nineteen identified Gainers (N2 Change Score >= 12 points [or gain of 1 SD]) 
represented 38% of the subsample, a higher percentage than the 27% of Gainers found in 
the total sample, though the subsample Gainers’ mean gain score of 18.69 was lower than 
the total sample’s mean gain score of 20.33. Five essays were selected randomly from the 
list of 19 Gainers. One of the essays belonged to the student whose gain score was the 
maximum gain score of 38.57, and though this gain score is certainly notable, the 
subject’s pre-test score was also extremely low (10.95). Thus, that essay was excluded on 
the basis of its outlier position. The four remaining randomly selected essays belonged to 
students whose mean N2 Change score was 20.27, considered acceptable since the 
group’s mean fell within one point of the mean change score of the total sample. Once 
analysis was complete, ID numbers were checked against DIT lists and it was revealed 
that the four Gainer essays were written by female students and were evenly divided 
between the two classes involved in the subsample.  
4.4.A.2  Selection of Decliner Essays  
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Decliner essays were selected from a list of subjects who fit the parameters of the 
Decliner category (N2 Change Score <= -6 points [or loss of .5 SD]). Only 5 decliners 
were identified, representing 10% of the subsample with a mean loss of -9.42 (SD=3.02). 
The essay which represented the maximum N2 Change score loss (-13.55) was excluded 
in favor of the remaining four whose mean loss was -8.39 in order to avoid the inclusion 
of an outlier. Both the subsample decliners and the decliners whose essays were selected 
from the subsample posted mean losses that were lower than the total sample mean loss 
of -11.79 (SD=6.35). After analysis was complete, comparison of decliner essays against 
DIT information revealed that three of the decliners were female students, one male, with 
the decliners once again evenly divided between the two classes (2 per class).  
4.4.A.3  Selection of High to High Essays  
Five students of the subsample were identified in the High to High group (pre- 
and post-test N2 Scores >= 54 points), representing 10% of the subsample, as compared 
with 12% of the total sample. The group’s mean Pre-test N2 Score was 59.37 (SD=3.17) 
with post-test N2 Score mean of 62.25 (SD=6.45) were consistent with the total sample’s 
pre-test mean of 60.27 (SD=4.51) and post-test mean of 62.44 (SD=6.28). Of the five 
students in the group, one was selected because the subject posted a slight decline from 
pre- to post-testing (though not enough to move below the cut point). All of the other 
subjects in the group gained in N2 post-tests. Three more subjects were chosen randomly 
from the remaining four for a total of four essays from High to High scorers. Of the four 
students in this group, 3 were male and 1 was female and all were from the second class 
(the class in which the primary researcher was the instructor). 
4.4.A.4  Selection of Low to Low Essays and New Gainer Group 
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Because Low-to Low scorers were so rare in the subsample (n=2), only one of 
whom completed both pre- and post-course essays, this group proved too small for 
adequate analysis. Thus, the category was omitted from the qualitative component of the 
study. Descriptive statistical findings about the group remain helpful from a 
programmatic point of view and to aid faculty in understanding the range of students they 
might encounter in their courses within the program, but the group was not an adequately 
represented for the purposes of this investigation. 
Due to the inadequate representation of the Low to Low scoring group in the 
subsample, the primary researcher expanded the examination of subjects who posted 
gains during the year, but whose pre-tests scores fell in the total sample’s lowest quartile. 
This second category within the Gainers group (“Low-Gainers”) was created in order to 
examine the characteristics of students whose pre-test scores were low relative to national 
norms and to scores within the sample.  
To create this new Low Gainer group, an SPSS quartile frequency analysis was 
used to sort the original 19 Gainers’ scores into pre- and post-test quartiles. This process 
subdivided the Gainer group into Gainers who gained from very low scores, with pre-test 
scores in the first quartile (henceforth labeled Low Gainers), versus those who had gained 
from the second or third quartiles into higher quartiles (Gainers). As it turned out, the 
four subjects randomly selected for essay analysis in the initial Gainer group each had 
pre-test scores that fell in the second or third quartile and post-test scores in the third or 
fourth quartile (see Table 6.2) so they retained the label, Gainers. The quartile analysis of 
N2 Pre-test scores and N2 Post-test scores of the 19 subsample Gainers yielded a distinct 
group of 7 Low Gainers (36% of subsample Gainers and 15% of the subsample) whose 
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pre-test scores were calculated in the lowest quartile but whose post-test scores moved 
them into higher post-test quartiles.  
Thus, the new group, Low Gainers, included students who began with very low 
scores relative to the total sample (the lowest fourth of the sample) and gained enough in 
N2 scores over the course of the year to move out of the lowest quartile of the sample by 
the post-test. Though the N2 Pre- and Post-test scores of this Low Gainer group were on 
average quite a bit lower than the average of the Gainer group (N2 Pre-test means 22.59 
versus 30.12), their gains across the sample were higher than other Gainers (N2 Change 
means 24.79 versus 20.33). Still, since the study seeks to consider the program’s impact 
on students across the full range of moral reasoning development, there is a clear benefit 
in incorporating this group of students who come in at significantly lower points in that 
range in the study.  
 From the group of seven Low Gainers in the subsample (14% of the 
subsample), three Low Gainers (6% of the subsample) were randomly selected for essay 
analysis, including 2 females and 1 male. All Low Gainers were from one class, not 
taught by the primary researcher of the study. 
4.5 DESIGN OF RUBRICS AND RUBRIC ITEMS  
4.5.A. Rubric Item Development 
Creating a qualitative research tool capable of capturing aspects of moral 
reasoning via a close examination of student writing involved the challenging prospect of 
operationalizing outcomes related to moral development and flourishing. A review of the 
literature of college student moral development research revealed an array of sources 
from which to draw attitudes and behaviors that signal moral development. Researchers 
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have utilized a variety of findings from DIT studies and other measures of moral, ethical 
and character development in identifying proxies for moral development and moral 
reasoning. Moreover, researchers such as Pascarella (1997, 2005a, 2005b) and Mayhew 
(2004, 2012) have explored the intersection of moral reasoning measurements and moral, 
character and ethical development gains reported in large student surveys. These types of 
research projects provided rubric elements which were tailored to the study’s aim of 
connecting moral reasoning data with this specific program’s course content as well as its 
explicit and implicit goals. Finally, an overview of moral and ethical development rubrics 
and benchmarking from a variety of higher education foundations and associations 
offered a final consideration of plausibly helpful and reliable rubric items for the analytic 
tool. 
4.5.B. Rubric items from DIT studies 
Extensive use of the DIT2 in research examining a variety of variables that might 
impact or be impacted by moral reasoning development was very instructive for 
developing a writing assessment tool. Mayhew (2002, 2004a, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2010a, 
2012a, 2012b) has examined the impact of pedagogical practices, classroom 
environments, course characteristics and the course taking patterns and behaviors in a 
decade of active moral development research with the DIT2. He has also explored a 
variety of outcomes hypothesized to be impacted by moral reasoning, including social 
justice attitudes and behaviors, political orientations, rejection of moral exclusion, etc. 
Mayhew notes that discomfort or dissonance about addressing complex moral or ethical 
issues may also be a hallmark of moral development, insofar as “individual social and 
cognitive development is a function of disequilibrium and the extent to which an 
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individual can reconcile one’s own perspective with those of another” (2007, p.59). Thus, 
this analysis looked to student writing for levels of intellectual humility and an 
acknowledgment of not fully knowing what a just or moral life might be like, akin to the 
ideal posed by Socrates (in Plato’s Apology, a required text in the course considered in 
the study) that a wise person knows that she does not know all that is to be known.  
4.5.C Rubric Items from meta-analyses and survey benchmarking 
A number of researchers have conducted meta-analyses of moral reasoning 
studies to consider various characteristics of students, college environments, and 
educational interventions related to moral development. The scholarly conversation 
around moral development research now includes work that combines or nests DIT 
studies within other, large surveys such as the Wabash National Study of Liberal Arts 
Education (WNS) (Mayhew, Seifert & Pascarella, 2012; Mayhew, Seifert, Pascarella, 
Laird & Blaich, 2012; Mayhew, Wolniak & Pascarella, 2008), the National Survey of 
Student Engagement (NSSE) and the College Student Experience Questionaire (CSEQ) 
to detect patterns of moral attitude and behavior (Kuh & Umbach, 2004; Pascarella, 
Seifert & Blaich, 2011). Using benchmarks from these surveys to analyze proxy variables 
found in these large databases, researchers have uncovered a variety of additional 
elements to explore and assess moral development among college students. While 
limitations related to large surveys’ dependence on self-reporting remind us that subjects 
tend to overestimate their own developmental gains (Bowman & Seifert, 2011; Pike, 
1995, 1996), leaders in the field of moral development research and learning assessment 
have much to contribute from these substantial research projects. Likewise, national 
organizations, foundations and research clearinghouses like the AAC&U, the Teagle 
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Foundation and the Dalton Institute on College Student Values’ Character Clearinghouse 
offer insightful rubric items from wide ranging research in the field of moral 
development. 
4.5.D Piloting of Rubrics 
In order to increase the reliability of the essay analysis, the primary researcher 
piloted the rubric application with a researcher experienced in qualitative analysis and 
coding. Five anonymous essays were randomly selected from the total group of sample 
essays to use in the piloting of the rubric analyses. The two researchers reviewed the 
essays separately, applying items from both rubrics, and then rating each rubric item. 
Researchers used a rating system to consider the extent to which the essay author 
demonstrated proficiency and/or proclivity for each of the moral reasoning proxy and 
course-related items within the rubrics. Researchers met on three occasions: first, to 
review rubric items and definitions, second, to establish parameters of the rating system, 
and third, to compare essay analysis, ratings and themes of piloted essays. The primary 
researcher utilized “Hyperresearch” software to label and rate phrases, sentences and 
sections of texts to which rubric items were applied. The second researcher hand-coded 
and rated the essays. 
During the pilot researchers determined that a scale of 1-3 allowed analysts to 
determine to what extent students exhibited proficiency in or proclivity (the tendency or 
inclination to choose a particular attitude, behavior, or value) for moral reasoning rubric 
items, and to what extent students were engaged in and/or by course-related items. The 
rating system also examined whether students demonstrated egocentric, emerging or 
integrated attitudes and understandings of moral proxy items. In other words, did student 
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writing exhibit an egocentric or primarily self-referential position with respect to the 
moral proxy item in question, or did the essay demonstrate an emerging or more fully 
integrated proclivity toward the item? Piloting helped clarify words, phrases, themes and 
questions within student writing that foregrounded the analysis process. For instance, 
while in one piloted essay a student acknowledged the value of showing interest the good 
of others (associated with “Prosocial Attitude” in the moral reasoning rubric), the student 
only reflected on how that might be applied to her/himself, not how s/he might engage in 
that value with others. The rating system was not used to validate DIT scoring but to 
detect patterns in student’s own reflections on what makes a “good” life and in their self-
reporting about the course’s impact on their attitudes and values. The rating system also 
sharpened of the researcher’s attention to nuances within the various themes and motifs 
in the essays. 
The pilot essay analysis included an extensive discussion about the best way to 
approach to the rating system. Researchers considered neo-Kohlbergian characterizations 
of Personal Interest, Maintaining Norms and Postconventional schemes along with other 
developmental scales in a thorough vetting of the rubric items’ meanings and 
interpretations. It is important to note that the rating system was used not to validate DIT 
findings but as a strategy to maximize open coding reliability. A rating of “1” was 
assigned to a writing that demonstrated a low proficiency, low proclivity or egocentric 
stance with respect to a moral reasoning item. A rating of “2” was assigned to writing 
that displayed a moderate and/or emerging proficiency with respect to the moral rubric 
items and a moderate or emerging engagement with the course-related items. A rating of 
“3” was assigned to a writing that consistently demonstrated and seemingly integrated 
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proficiency in moral reasoning rubric items or a consistent engagement with and 
understanding of course-related items. For instance, in rating the moral development 
rubric item, “Prosocial behavior,” the two coders who piloted the rubric agreed on a 
rating of “3” for an essay that thoughtfully and elaborately demonstrated how 
volunteering with physically and intellectually challenged adults and children during the 
year had impacted her thinking about the best way to live. For this same rubric item, the 
coders rated another essay “1” in light of that author’s highly abstracted suggestion that 
helping others would be a good idea, seemingly for others to do. For the most part, 
disagreement or uncertainty between the coders addressed the rating of “2” and thus a 
more regularized notion of what counted as “emerging” or moderate proficiency. Coders 
agreed that a student mentioning the importance of a rubric item was not enough, but that 
a “2” would be warranted if the student adverted to some apparent movement toward the 
value or ideal. 
In the course of piloting the rubric items, several items consistently overlapped in 
almost every instance. For instance, the moral development rubric item, “Civic 
engagement attitude,” which is operationalized as the “expressed desire to make a 
difference in communal contexts” and “Prosocial attitudes,” operationalized as “shows 
interest in the good of others without anticipation of personal reward” were used to tag 
the same aspects of essays at the same rating in just about every essay, and thus these 
items were collapsed in the final rubric analysis. The operationalized definition of one 
moral development item, “Diversity,” proved to be vague and open to several 
interpretations by the researchers and was thus revised via a review of the relevant 
literature as “the ability to articulate a position from the point of view of someone outside 
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one’s ‘insider’ group.” With respect to course-related items, “Use of texts in reflection,” 
which referred to students’ use of course texts in writing, appeared so consistently and at 
such high levels on post-course essays that it seemed to lose relevance and was thus 
omitted from the final course-related item rubric. Another course-related item, 
“References to text and course activities,” proved to be more helpful since this item 
sought a demonstration of student understanding of concepts within texts and course 
activities rather than a simple mention of them. Finally, it was determined that within 
course-related rubric analysis, a rating of “0” would be helpful to indicate no engagement 
with or mention of a course-related item. Thus the range of ratings used in the course-
related rubric was adjusted to 0-3, as opposed to the 1-3 rating system used on the moral 
development rubric. Since the ratings of these rubrics were not combined, this adjustment 
had no further implications.  
By the final meeting, the two raters achieved a 93% agreement rate on moral 
development rubric items and a 90% agreement rate on course-related rubric items. Thus, 
levels of rubric validity and rater reliability were considered sufficient to move forward 
with rubric analyses. The final rubrics are presented here in Chapter 4. 
4.6.  RUBRICS 
A two-pronged, rubric-based evaluation of student essays began with a first rubric 
that identified evidence of attitudes, understandings, behaviors or beliefs connected to 
postconventional moral reasoning. Analysis via open, descriptive, axial and selective 
coding of data served to illustrate and highlight a variety of proxies that connected to 
moral developmental gains (Saldaña, 2011). This first rubric was based on a review of 
moral reasoning literature, with particular attention paid to results of meta-analyses and 
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large national surveys, as well as an overview of selected pilot essays. Table 4.1 outlines 
this rubric’s 15 moral development proxy items for coding along with operationalized 
definitions and scholarly references for each item. While moral development rubric items 
serve as a priori codes, an analysis of essays allowed additional items that were central 
and uniquely illustrative of moral reasoning to emerge.  
First, essays were open-coded to identify statements that connected with rubric 
items and other items that emerge as possibly connected to student moral growth. Via an 
analysis of language frequency and depth of engagement, coded essay selections were 
rated as exhibiting no, low, moderate or high proclivity or engagement relative to rubric 
items consistent with coding protocols developed in the piloting of the rubrics with a 
second rater (See complete details of the rubric pilot in Section 4.5.D). A second cycle of 
axial coding established thematic clusters and coding categories found in the essays. 
Finally, selective coding was applied to axial codes to ascertain specific themes and 
categories that are associated with moral development.  
In a second rubric analysis, student writing was analyzed via in vivo coding of 
students’ own reporting of their perceptions of the moral content and dimensions of the 
course. The list of 12 course-related items comprising this second rubric design was 
derived from both the literature review and a thorough consideration of the course 
description as well as stated course and program aims (gleaned from the university 
catalogue, department web site and the program’s own self-description). In some cases 
rubric items refer to specific course content (eg. “Aristotelian ethics”) and in other cases 
to course objectives regarding ethical benchmarks (eg. “Theory and real world 
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connection”). Table 4.2 presents the 12 items of this analytic rubric in addition to 
operationalized definitions and scholarly source and course description identification. 
In vivo coding analysis of these essays and a subsequent cycle of axial coding of 
selected highlights from essays offered direct access to student expression of the 
connection between their own experiences of the course and course aims. 
“HyperResearch” software was utilized in all of the qualitative analysis processes and 
was especially helpful in this part of the writing analysis. In this analytic process, specific 
phrases, words and sentences from student essays that relate to these various course-
related items were gathered and then clustered to produce a picture of which practices, 
themes, texts and ideas of the course were particularly fruitful for students in their own 
development. Selective coding was construed based on a consideration of how faculty 
may best use insights from student essays to highlight areas of strength of the course and 
uniquely impactful themes, texts, discussions, assignments and ideas of the course. 
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Table 4.1 Writing Rubric Items, Moral development proxies for descriptive, axial and selective coding 
Moral 
Development Item Operationalized definition Scholarly source 
Prosocial 
attitudes 
Shows interest in the good of 
others without anticipation of personal 
reward 
Cooper, Liddell, Davis & Pasquesi, 2012; Gibbs, 2013; 
Gilligan, 1982; Kuh & Umbach, 2004; Rest et al., 1999b, 2000  
Prosocial 
behaviors 
Adverts to social action intended 
for the benefit of others without 
anticipation of personal reward 
Cooper, Liddell, Davis & Pasquesi, 2012; Gibbs, 2013; 
Gilligan, 1982; Rest et al., 1999b, 2000 
Civic 
engagement attitude 
Expressed desire to make a 
difference in communal contexts 
AAC&U Rubric, 2011; Astin & Antonio, 2004; Colby, 
Ehrlich, Beaumont & Stephens, 2003; Cooper, Liddell, Davis & 
Pasquesi, 2012; Gibbs, 2013; Reed, 2008 
Diversity 
Acknowledge and comprehend a 
variety of perspectives on issues and 
multiple worldviews 
AAC&U Rubric, 2011; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Gibbs, 2013; 
King & Mayhew, 2002; Kuh & Umbach, 2004; Pascarella, Seifert, & 
Blaich, 2010; Seifert, Goodman, King, & Baxter Magolda, 2010 
Personal and 
social responsibility 
Sees oneself as having agency in 
the welfare of others and the larger 
community 
Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Cooper, Liddell, Davis & Pasquesi, 
2012; Gibbs, 2013; Hersh & Schneider, C, 2005; Hoffman, 2005; 
Kuh & Umbach, 2004; Mayhew & King, 2008 
Critical thinking  
Demonstrates capacity to 
synthesize ideas, images, skills to address 
problems in innovative ways 
AAC&U Rubric, 2011; Kuh & Umbach, 2004; Pascarella, 
Seifert, & Blaich, 2010; Seifert, Goodman, King, & Baxter Magolda, 
2010 
Global thinking 
Attempts to acquire a 
comprehensive exploration of issues and 
problems of the global community 
AAC&U Rubric, 2011; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Cooper, 
Liddell, Davis & Pasquesi, 2012; Hoffman, 2005; Rest et al., 1999b, 
2000 
Socratic ideal 
Recognizes and acknowledges 
the limitations of one’s own 
understandings, contexts, and 
experiences 
 
Cognitive 
complexity 
Demonstrates a capacity to 
exclude simplistic models of problem 
Cacioppo et al., 1984; Colby & Kohlberg, 1981; Mayhew, 
2012; Mayhew & King, 2008; Mayhew, Wolniak & Pascarella, 2008; 
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solving Narvaez & Bock, 2002; Pascarella, Seifert, & Blaich, 2010; Rawls, 
2001; Rest et al., 2000  
 
Social 
complexity 
Rejects exclusionary thinking as 
regards social interactions and communal 
living 
Colby & Kohlberg, 1981, 1987; Cooper, Liddell, Davis & 
Pasquesi, 2012; Gibbs, 2013; Hoffman, 2005; King & Mayhew, 
2002; Mayhew & King, 2008; Pascarella, Seifert, & Blaich, 2010; 
Rawls, 2001 
Principled 
thinking 
Articulates universalizable 
principles and a desire to live according 
to widely held principles 
Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Gibbs, 2013; Mayhew & King, 
2008; Pascarella, Seifert, & Blaich, 2010; Rest et al., 1999a, 1999b, 
2000 
Context 
comprehension 
Acknowledges the limiting factors 
of context and signals a grasp of one’s 
own limited context 
AAC&U Rubric, 2011; Cooper, Liddell, Davis & Pasquesi, 
2012; Mayhew & King, 2008; Narvaez & Bock, 2002  
Ethical self-
awareness 
Attempts to express core beliefs 
and an understanding of their origins 
AAC&U Rubric, 2011; Blasi, 1980; Colby, Ehrlich, Beaumont 
& Stephens, 2003; Gibbs, 2013; Hoffman, 2005; Rest et al., 1999b, 
2000 
Ethical 
evaluation 
States an ethical position and 
provide an articulate summation and 
defense of it 
AAC&U Rubric, 2011; Colby & Erlich, 2000; Colby, Ehrlich, 
Beaumont & Stephens, 2003; Kuh & Umbach, 2004; Narvaez, 
2008; Rest et al., 1999a, 1999b, 2000; Seifert, Goodman, King, & 
Baxter Magolda, 2010 
Moral behavior 
Expresses change in behaviors 
toward self and others 
Blasi, 1980; Gibbs, 2013; Hoffman, 2005; King & Mayhew, 
2002; Pascarella , 1997; Pascarella, Seifert, & Blaich, 2010 
Expansive 
religious attitude 
Sees religious understandings as 
cause for expanding circles of care and 
concern rather than exclusion 
Astin & Antonio, 2004; Burwell, 1992; Getz, 1984; Maeda, 
Thoma & Bebeau, 2009; Murk & Addleman, 1992; Narvaez, Getz, 
Rest & Thoma, 1999 
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Table 4.2 Writing Rubric Items, Course –related items matched with in vivo codes 
Course –related item Operationalized definition Scholarly source 
References to texts & 
course activities 
Demonstrates an understanding of ethical 
or moral concepts as articulated in texts, movies, 
discussions, etc. of the course 
Halliday & Frantis, 2006 
Use of texts in reflection Utilizes texts to frame the project of on-going reflection and reflective thinking 
Halliday & Frantis, 2006; King & 
Mayhew, 2002; Mayhew & King, 2008; 
Narvaez, 2008 
Theory & real world 
connection 
Demonstrates increasing ability to connect 
theories of justice and real-world issues 
Bruess & Pearson, 2000; Cacioppo et 
al., 1984; Grunwald & Mayhew, 20008; Kuh & 
Umbach, 2004; Maeda, Thoma & Bebeau, 2009; 
King & Mayhew, 2002; Mayhew & King, 2008 
Course content as 
interruption 
Shows evidence of ethical and moral ideas 
that have caused disequilibrium or have 
problematized earlier assumptions 
Maeda, Thoma & Bebeau, 2009; King & 
Mayhew, 2002; Mayhew & King, 2008; Rest, 
1986, 1999a, 1999b 
Ethical-Political theory 
Articulates newly formed or formulated 
understanding of political theory regarding common 
good 
Reed, 2008; Perspectives in Western 
Culture Syllabus and Course Description, 
Braman, 2013 
Ethical theory Articulates newly formed or formulated understandings of ethical or moral theory 
Colby & Erlich, 2000; Halliday & 
Frantis, 2006; Narvaez, 2008; Reed, 2008 
Aristotelian ethics 
Shows an understanding of situation-based 
virtue ethics and demonstrates a nuanced view of 
the role of practical wisdom in assessing ethical 
choices  
Linstrum, 2009; Narvaez, 2008; 
Perspectives in Western Culture Syllabus and 
Course Description, Braman, 2013 
Religious/Natural Law 
ethics 
Shows an understanding of underlying 
foundations of morals and ethics and notices how 
these are shaped by inherent ends or ultimate 
purposes  
Narvaez, Getz, Rest & Thoma, 1999; 
Perspectives in Western Culture Syllabus and 
Course Description, Braman, 2013 
Kantian ethics 
Demonstrates a recognition that principles 
of goodness and justice are needed to clarify these 
notions for a community 
Linstrum, 2009; Narvaez, 2008; 
Perspectives in Western Culture Syllabus and 
Course Description, Braman, 2013 
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Common Good tradition 
Articulates the need for nuanced 
understandings of social order and the role of 
institutions; recognizes competing interests of 
community and individuals 
Reed, 2008; Perspectives in Western 
Culture Syllabus and Course Description, 
Braman, 2013 
Nietzschean/Existentialist 
ethics 
Recognizes the dignity of individuals and the 
primacy of spiritual values over and against the 
practical needs of society 
Perspectives in Western Culture 
Syllabus and Course Description, Braman, 2013 
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4.7  DATA ANALYSIS - RUBRIC APPLICATION 
The qualitative component of this study examined student writing from four 
subgroups of students, determined by DIT scores (see Section 4.3 for details of 
subgroups). As such, this aspect of the study utilized what Stake (1995) refers to as a 
collective case study, in which two or more cases are analyzed in order to learn more 
about something else. This study used student writing from these groups to understand 
more about student development reflected in DIT scores and how educational 
experiences in college impact that development. Stake maintains that while observation 
of one or even several cases “is a poor basis for generalization” it can offer a means to 
“refinement of understanding” (1995, p. 7). Triangulating data sources, such as this 
study’s yoking of quantitative data and case studies, aids a capacity to interpret what is 
happening beyond or behind data points. Here, analysis of student writing illuminated 
common and disparate themes from students’ educational experiences associated with 
moral development by identifying what students themselves considered to be important 
personal insights, questions and experiences from the course.  
From each of the 15 essays selected for rubric analyses, two sets of observations 
were captured: first, a set of clustered themes that emerged from coding related to the 
first rubric’s moral development proxy items, and second, observations pertaining to 
course themes, topics, texts, ideas, and classroom experiences reported by students to be 
impactful. The analysis process identified patterns within groups (Low Gainers, High to 
High scorers, Gainers, and Decliners) regarding moral development items and course-
related items. Analysis compared patterns between and across groups. Both 
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commonalities and differences illustrated what the various DIT scorers “look like” with 
respect to moral development proxy items and impactful aspects of the course.  
Two questions were posed in light of the first set of coding of moral development 
proxy items: 1a) which proxy items most notably stand out among High to High Scorers 
and Gainers and what are the similarities among them? and, 2a) which proxy items are 
conspicuously missing in Low Gainers and Decliners and what is similar about these 
missing components? Two additional questions were posed regarding the second set of 
observations of impacting course-related items: 1b) which classroom or course-related 
experiences are considered important and are actively reported by High to High Scorers 
and Gainers and which items are underreported? and, 2b) which classroom or course-
related items are important to Low Gainers and Decliners and which course experiences 
are underreported by these groups? 
A final interpretive stage of analysis explored the sorts of course-related 
experiences (encounters with texts, movies, discussions in and outside the classroom, 
etc.) that were connected to various moral development proxies for students at different 
stages of moral reasoning development. This interpretive step pivoted back to DIT data 
from the larger sample of 325 study participants. SPSS analytics were used to determine 
the percentages of students who fall into the parameters of the four groups. Quartile 
analysis offered general moral development benchmarks for the types of students who 
enroll in this program and revealed a number of helpful observations about students 
within and across groups. Findings are suggestive for programmatic pedagogical 
strategies aimed at enhancing and expanding the moral development of students at 
different stages of that development. 
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4.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Several limitations of the study may have impacted the extent to which findings 
of the study may be generalized regarding moral reasoning development. Literature in the 
field of moral development includes a number of important critiques of measures like the 
DIT which attempt to concretize and statistically assess what many consider to be an 
abstract construction of cognitive and affective functions (Elm & Weber, 1994; Gilligan, 
1982; Maxwell, 2010; Emler, Palmer-Canton & St. James, 1998). It also includes myriad 
critiques of the theoretical underpinnings of neo-Kohlbergian research and its normative 
claims. While several decades of neo-Kohlbergian research using the DIT has provided 
greater precision and clarity along these lines, the concerns remind moral development 
researchers to be wary of grand claims and overreaching conclusions. Recent neo-
Kohlbergian research which engages new insights in neurobiology and psychology 
suggest promising avenues to resolving aspects of moral development that have 
previously been difficult to identify and assess (Gray, Young & Waytz, 2012; Narvaez 
2001; Narvaez & Bock, 2010; Shu, Gino & Bazerman, 2011; Young & Saxe, 2011). This 
type of research is in a relatively nascent stage, however, and it suffers its own set of 
constraints. 
With respect to the qualitative analysis of students’ essays, research demands a 
careful consideration of the extent to which student’s self-reporting of their own 
developmental gains correspond to actual gains. Recent research, including a longitudinal 
sample of over 3,000 college students found students to be fairly inaccurate in assessing 
their own gains in cognition and personal development (Bowman & Seifert, 2011). 
Additionally, Pike (1995, 1996) suggests that while student self-knowledge is mostly 
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adequately self-reported, it seems that self-reporting of gains in development is not. It 
seems that knowing one’s present capacities is less challenging than fairly assessing what 
gains have been made. Across gender, race, academic achievement and institutional type 
Bowman and Seifert (2011) found startlingly low correspondence between self-reports of 
gains and longitudinal gains on the same construct, noting that subjects, especially young 
adults and students, tend to report socially desirable responses which threaten the validity 
of many studies that depend on self-reporting. 
In addition to these research-wide limitations, there are several important 
limitations of the study design that should be highlighted, first in terms of the sample of 
subjects involved in the assessment and second, in terms of aspects of the qualitative 
methods: 
1. The study itself lacks an adequate control group. Since the data were 
construed as part of a course evaluation, there was no control group established. 
Moreover, several aspects of the course make finding a control group unusually difficult, 
including its two-semester design and its restriction to first year students. A possible 
consideration for a future study along these same lines might include using a control 
group of first year students who wanted to take the class but were not able to register due 
to limited course space. This design would resolve some of the confounding effects of 
student self-selection into a course that is known to be challenging. 
2. The students in the study sample were not randomly assigned to the 
course. Their self-selection into a course known for its rigor and limited access adds a set 
of sample selection biases that demand careful attention as regards findings and 
conclusions about those findings. Students who would choose this type of course would 
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likely have high “need for cognition,” an attribute which is found to significantly 
correlate to high DIT scores (Cacioppo, Petty & Feng Kao, 1984; King & Mayhew, 
2002).  
3. It should be noted that the primary researcher was not only an instructor in 
the program but was also the instructor of one of the two classes from which the student 
essays were selected. In light of this, concerns of researcher bias threaten the validity of 
the study’s findings on two fronts. The primary researcher had prior knowledge that the 
DIT would be administered and understood its components quite well. Though the 
contents of the DIT were not discussed in the class, the primary researcher might have 
unconsciously “taught to the test” in a way that might not have occurred in other sections 
of the course. Also, the primary researcher knew that the qualitative measure (the essays) 
would also be used in subsequent course assessment, though during that year there was 
no plan to connect the essays with the DIT. A second area of concern relates to the 
researcher’s knowledge of the students whose essays comprise 24 of the 46 essays 
available for the qualitative subsamples. Knowledge of student work during a year-long 
course offers challenges to unbiased coding of those essays and thus necessitated 
additional safeguards against possible preconceptions. To address these limitations, two 
methods were employed: first, the director of the course program, who had access to the 
list of identification numbers and corresponding student names assigned identifying 
numbers to essays and deleted names from essays to veil student authorship; second, a 
second rater/coder was selected to participate in a pilot of the rubric coding protocols for 
both the moral development item and course-related item rubrics. Once a set of themes, 
topics and important course-related items were noted, clustering those themes in the 
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second round and analyzing them in a third round of coding was done by the study’s 
principle researcher. This second rater design provided a “second set of eyes” to identify 
impactful class topics, texts and experiences emerging from students’ essay reflections. 
Thus, while researcher bias posed a potential challenge to the validity of this study, 
safeguards such as concealing student names on essays and employing a second rater in 
the coding phase of analysis mitigated these limitations.  
4. Since the number of student essays used for this analysis and the number 
of classes they represent from the whole sample was relatively small, it is possible that 
the students in the two classes chosen for essay analysis were not representative of the 
group as a whole. The effects of class environment, pedagogical strategies, class 
dynamics, etc. may have significantly confound effects and thus skewed the qualitative 
findings. However, the strength of pre- and post-course design of the essays from these 
two sections of the course, taught by two different instructors, assures that analysis 
offered a unique illumination of various aspects of moral development and its relation to 
purposeful educational content and course design. The study’s use of a collective case 
study model, furthermore, illustrates that the study does not intend to represent the moral 
development of all college students or to verify DIT findings, but rather to gain a clearer 
and more refined understanding of moral development. 
The limitations inherent in researching moral reasoning and moral development 
were daunting to be sure. As noted in the literature review, limitations range from 
detailed sifting through confounding effects and apprehending components involved in 
moral development, to a more comprehensive hermeneutic of suspicion regarding the 
very notions of morality and of the human capacity for moral reasoning. Still, college 
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impact theory asserts that something unique in the college experience affects students’ 
moral development, particularly in the first and second years (King & Mayhew, 2002; 
King, 2009; Mayhew & King, 2008; Pascarella, & Terenzini, 2005; Rest, 1999). To what 
extent this development is (or is not) articulated or understood and what aspects of 
educational intervention play a role in it necessitates further study in the area of moral 
development and what spurs its growth. 
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Chapter 5: 
Analysis of Quantitative Data and Findings 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 This study focused on two sets of data in an attempt to examine facets of 
moral reasoning development in students in this liberal arts program. Analysis of the 
study sample DIT scores offered an overview of the range of student moral reasoning 
development that faculty may encounter in this program, or in other courses like this, and 
essay analyses provided a fuller account of 1) what students’ moral reasoning “looks 
like” in their own reflections on living a “good life” and 2) which aspects of coursework 
may have been particularly impactful in those reflections. The study did not seek to use 
essays to verify DIT scores but rather to examine what sorts of ethical and moral issues 
are commonly found among high and low scorers as well as among subjects who posted 
substantial gains or losses in DIT scores. Similarly, the study also sought to identify 
which aspects of this course were reported to be impactful or important by students in 
thinking about what makes a good life. Two rubrics were used to analyze the essays. A 
first rubric of moral reasoning proxy items was developed from a thorough review of the 
literature and a second rubric was designed with specific course-related items that are 
programmatically intended to raise moral and ethical questions. Chapter 5 presents the 
procedures and findings of the quantitative components of the study while Chapters 6 and 
7 provide overviews of the procedures and findings of the qualitative analyses. The 
central questions of the study will be addressed as far as the findings allow; additional 
issues discovered in the analyses and further questions raised by the data are presented in 
the final chapter.  
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5.2  DIT SAMPLE AND DIT ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 
As explained in details in Chapter 3, 325 subjects completed fully scorable pre- 
and post-course DIT tests (see Chapter 3 for a full discussion of the DIT and its scoring). 
This sample included 171 male students and 153 female students, with one subject not 
identifying gender. Scores from both pre- and post-course DITs were received in separate 
files from the University of Alabama’s Center for the Study of Ethical Development. In 
order to create and examine N2 change scores, the files were merged in SPSS (IBM’s 
“Statistical Package for the Social Sciences,” a statistical analysis program) using ID 
numbers to match cases. N2 Pre-test scores were subtracted from N2 Post scores to create 
a new variable, “N2 Change,” in order to identify change in subjects’ moral reasoning 
scores over the time period of the study. Descriptive statistical analyses and paired 
sample t-tests were run on the N2 Score pre-test and post-test variables and on the N2 
Change variable using a confidence interval of .95. These analyses garnered mean scores, 
measures of standard deviation, standard error of the mean, quartile descriptors and 
correlation information.  
An internal reliability analysis of the study’s DITs found a Cronbach’s alpha of 
.59 for the pre-test and .62 on post-test variables, calculated via an SPSS reliability scale 
analysis of 5 variables that represent the N2 scores within each of the 5 stories. These 
figures are lower than typical DIT reliability rates which are typically found to be in the 
high .70s to low .80s. However, Bebeau and Thoma (2003) point out that the Cronbach’s 
alpha will be lower when a full range of educational levels is not represented in a study. 
Since all of the subjects in the present study were in the same grade level, the Cronbach’s 
alpha found in this case was acceptable.  
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5.3  DIT FINDINGS 
5.3.A  Sample N2 Mean Scores and National Norms 
Three variables were used to capture a “picture” of the range of student moral 
reasoning development one might typically find among students in this program: 
subjects’ pre-course N2 scores, post-course N2 scores and N2 Change scores. Overall, 
students in this study scored much higher than national norms in both pre- and post-tests, 
with a pre-test mean of 40.75 at a standard deviation of 13.52 and post-test mean of 45.94 
with standard deviation 12.20. Table 5.1 depicts the descriptive statistics of the pre- and 
post-test N2 scores of the sample. These scores may be compared with researched  
 
Table 5.1  Study sample N2 Pre-and Post-test scores (N = 325) 
 Minimum Maximum Mean   
 score score score Std. Error Std. Dev. 
 
N2 Score_Pre 1.73   71.22 40.75  .749  13.52 
N2 Score_Post 14.07   75.59 45.94  .677  12.20 
 
national norms for college freshmen which report a mean N2 score of 31.05 at a standard 
deviation of 14.42. It is helpful to situate the scores found in this study against national 
norms in order to understand possible implications of higher or lower scores and dramatic 
change scores among students in the sample. Indeed, the pre-test scores of this study 
sample more closely mirror national figures for Master’s degree students, who achieve 
mean scores of 40.56 with a standard deviation of 15.06. A comparison of sample N2 
scores and national norms is depicted in Table 5.2. The present study’s sample post-test 
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scores come in even higher at 45.94 with a standard deviation of 12.20, rivaling 
nationally normed scores of students in graduate professional degree programs. To keep 
 
Table 5.2    Comparison of N2 Scores and National Norms 
 Ntl. Norm  Ntl. Norm Ntl. Norm  Ntl. Norm Sample  Sample 
 Freshman Senior MA Degree Prof. Degree Pre-Test Post-test  
 
N 2,096 2,441 853 1,582 325 325 
N2 Mean Score 31.05 36.85  40.56 44.97 40.75 45.94 
Standard Deviation (14.42) (15.53) (15.06) (14.87) (13.52) (12.20) 
 
these relatively high scores in perspective, and to describe the sort of student who tends 
to self-select into this program, it is interesting to compare these scores to those found in 
a similar study of first year students in a business ethics program at the same university. 
In that study (Sullivan, 2011), first year students from the university’s school of 
management who on average have posted the highest SAT/ACT scores coming into the 
university, logged pre-test N2 scores of 35.37 (with a standard deviation of 13.42) and 
post-test N2 scores of 40.16 (15.43), starting out in between the normal scores of college 
juniors and seniors and ending their first semester just shy of Master’s degree level-
normed N2 scores. Subjects of the present study sample coming from across the 
university and thus including students from the Colleges of Arts and Sciences, Nursing, 
Education and Management, posted significantly higher pre-test N2 scores. It is 
impossible to compare post-test scores between these study samples since the business 
ethics program consisted of only one term while the present study sample applied post-
tests after a two-term program. Still, to understand the range of scores of this present 
sample and of students who opt to enroll in a rigorous liberal arts core program, it is 
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important to highlight that the sample’s first year students posted higher scores in pre-
tests than students at the same university scored after a full term ethics course.  
One explanation for this difference within the same university with a presumably 
similar population could be explained in the breakdown of gender within the samples. 
The business ethics program study sample consisted of 71% male students (n=190) and 
29% female students (n=78), while the present study was weighted more evenly at 53% 
male students (n=171) and 47% female students (n=153 [one student not identifying as 
either male or female]).  Since female students’ scores were higher in pre- and post-tests 
in both studies, it makes sense that the higher percentage of female students represented 
in the present study resulted in higher overall scores. However, female students in this 
study posted pre-test N2 scores with a mean of 42.24  (SD=12.35), higher than their 
female business ethics counterparts in Sullivan’s 2011 study in which female students 
posted pre-test N2 mean scores of 38.68  (SD=14.14). In both studies, though female 
students posted significantly higher pre- and post-test N2 scores than their male 
counterparts, N2 change scores between males and females were not statistically 
significantly different in either study. See Table 5.3 for these comparisons. As discussed 
in the review of the research literature (see Chapter 2), several meta-analyses of DIT 
studies show gender to be a weak predictor of DIT performance, with educational 
attainment found in Thoma’s 1986 meta-analysis of over 6,000 subjects to be 250 times 
stronger than gender in accounting for variance of moral reasoning. But gender disparity 
in moral reasoning development is more complicated as educational levels increase. Both 
Thoma (1986) and Bebeau and Thoma (2003) found gender differences to be less 
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impactful in younger subjects, with women’s moral reasoning advantage over men 
widening at higher education levels. Boston College’s admissions’ strategy of pursuing a  
Table 5.3   Comparison of Pre-test N2 Scores among same-university freshman women 
and men in Business Ethics course (Portico) and Perspectives course  
 N N2 pre-test   mean score Standard Deviation  
Portico Study females 78  36.68 14.14 
Portico Study males 190  34.01 12.90 
Perspectives Study females 155  42.24 12.35 
Perspectives Study males 177  39.34 14.39 
National norms female freshmen 1,271  34.02 13.54 
National norms male freshmen 808  29.66 14.07 
(Note: Portico scores from Sullivan, 2011) 
 
relatively gender-balanced population results in its female students boasting higher GPA 
and SAT scores than their male classmates. While the neo-Kohlbergian paradigm affirms 
an association of moral reasoning with cognitive-structural development, research with 
the DIT consistently finds that moral reasoning is not reducible to cognitive or 
intellectual capacity. Female students’ higher DIT scores in this and similar samples may 
be connected to a range of variables including particular intellectual advantages or their 
advanced moral reasoning capacity. The consistency of higher female scoring among 
Boston College first year students raises important questions about the cognitive 
motivation, intellectual ability and moral sensitivity (a separate component of moral 
development according to neo-Kohlbergian theory thought to be more advanced in 
female subjects; see Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion) of the female students who select 
into the program but is unfortunately beyond the scope of the present study’s research 
questions. 
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5.3.B  Sample N2 Change Scores  
As stated above, pre- and post-test results were merged using matched cases and a 
new variable, “N2 Change,” was created via a descriptive statistical computation of the 
variables “N2Score_post” minus “N2Score_Pre.” The new variable “N2 Change” 
identifies change in subjects’ moral reasoning scores over the time period of the study. 
Table 5.4 illustrates the results of subjects’ scores changes. Overall, subjects in the 
sample posted a mean gain of 5.19 (SD=12.35) over their first year, a gain which is closer 
to the sort of gains Thoma (1986, 2003) finds in college students over their whole college 
career.  
Table 5.4    Descriptive Statistics of N2 Change  
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std.Deviation 
N2_Change 325 -37.71 51.79 5.1871 12.346 
 
A paired sample t-test of pre- and post-test N2 scores with a confidence level of 
95% showed that student N2 score gains from pre- to post-test were statistically 
significant, with a t result of 7.57 (2-tailed significance). The comparison of pre- and 
post-test means with standard deviations pooled resulted in a significant correlation of 
.543 (significance >= .001), as depicted in Table 5.5. A t-test of paired differences 
revealed that statistically significant gains in moral reasoning were made during the 
period from the pre-tests administered in September to the post-tests administered in late 
April of the year of the study. Thus, the general answer to the first research question, 
“Does the moral reasoning capacity of first year college students increase in a Great 
Books course with an implicit goal of promoting moral development?” is answered 
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affirmatively and the null hypothesis is rejected. Though moral reasoning development is 
expected on the basis of maturation alone, the sort of gains demonstrated in this sample is 
statistically significant. The scores of this sample are notable from both the perspective of 
the gains made within the sample and the mean scores achieved by the group as 
compared to national norms. 
 
Table 5.5     T-Test Statistics, Correlations and Paired Differences 
Paired Sample t-test statistics Mean N Std. Dev. St. Error Mean Correlation Sig 
Pair 1  
N2 Score_Pre 40.75 325  13.52 .75  
N2 Score_Post 45.94  325  12.20 .678 .543 .000 
  
 
Paired Differences Mean N Std. Dev. St. Error Mean t df Sig. 
Pair 1  
N2 Score_Pre-N2 Score_Post 5.19  325  12.35 .685  7.574 324 .000 
 
5.4  GROUPINGS OF DIT SCORES 
Quantitative data from the DIT and qualitative data from student essays were 
triangulated for the purposes of establishing groups for investigation. As such, groupings 
of DIT scores were identified based on mean N2 scores, mean N2 gains and losses and 
standard deviation calculations. These distinguishable groups highlight for instructors and 
program designers the range of student moral reasoning development that might be found 
in a group of first year college students encountered in a program like the one at the 
center of the study. The groups were: 
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1) Low Gainers: students whose pre- and post-test scores are low compared to 
national trends, with limited or no change (losses or gains ≤ 12 points 
[approximately 1 standard deviation]); 
2) High to High: students whose pre- and post-tests are high compared with 
national trends, with limited or no change (losses or gains ≤ 12 points 
[approximately 1 standard deviation]); 
3) Gainers: students who post significant gains in post-tests, regardless of position 
on continuum (gains ≥ 12 points [approximately 1 standard deviation]); 
4) Decliners: students who post significant declines in post-tests, regardless of 
position on continuum (losses ≥ 12 points [approximately 1 standard deviation]); 
5) Constant Average: students who post pre- and post-test scores commensurate 
with national averages and whose scores remain steady (gains or losses ≤ 6 points 
[approximately .5 standard deviation]). 
Essay analysis focused on the first four categories unless the fifth, subjects who 
scores remained constant with little or no change, was found to be of particular interest in 
the DIT analysis. It turned out that the categories, High to High, Gainers and Decliners 
were the most fruitful and populous groups, with the Low to Low scorers difficult to find 
in large numbers. The category of Constant scorers did not prove to be interesting for the 
study since scores in this range simply tended to move only slightly and in no particular 
pattern. Additionally, the parameters of the Decliner category warranted adjusting since 
N2 change loss of 1 full standard deviation was uncommon. However there were a 
significant number of subjects whose scores declined from pre- to post-test, a fact 
interesting in and of itself in light of assumptions about moral reasoning development as 
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an upwardly directed developmental model impacted by age and education. Thus the 
parameter for identifying Decliners was adjusted to include N2 score changes of -6 
points, or .5 a standard deviation, in order to avoid focusing on outliers in the qualitative 
component of the study. Essays written by students in this category represent a range of 
N2 change scores of -7.03 to -11.76. Thus this set captures the range of decliners in the 
subsample, the mean of which is -9.42 (SD=3.02).  
Similarly, those whose pre- and post-test N2 scores were low compared to 
national numbers and remained low, the Low to Low category, were uncommon within 
the subsample for essay selection. Even after adjusting the parameter of the LL group to 
students whose scores came in below the national norms and whose posted gains or 
losses of .5 standard deviation or more kept them below the national average, only one 
student from the subsample was identified in this group for the essay analysis component 
of the study.  
5.4.A  DIT Groups from DIT analysis 
In the final analysis, DIT groupings were identified using the following 
criteria: 
1) High to High: students whose pre- and post-tests are high compared with 
national trends, with limited change (losses or gains ≤ 12 points [approximately 1 
standard deviation]) (n = 40, 12%); 
2) Gainers: students with pre-test scores in any quartile and who post significant 
gains in post-tests (gains ≥ 12 points [approximately 1 standard deviation]) (n = 
88, 27%); 
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3) Decliners: students with pre-test scores in any quartile who post significant 
declines in post-tests, regardless of position on continuum (losses ≥ 6 points 
[approximately .5 standard deviation]) (n = 57, 17%); 
4) Low to Low: students whose pre- and post-test scores started and ended low 
compared to national trends, with limited or no change (losses or gains ≤ 6 points 
[approximately .5 standard deviation]) (n = 17, 5% [only 2 in subsample]) 
 
5.4.A.1  DIT Gainers 
 Using an SPSS variable filter (N2 Change >= 12), 88 Gainers were 
identified from the study sample, representing 27% of the total sample. The group posted 
a mean gain in N2 Change scores of 20.33, with a standard deviation of 7.87, gaining as 
much as 51.79 points in the maximum instance in the time between the pre and post-tests. 
Table 5.6 highlights the case of Gainers from the sample group. These gainers cut across  
Table 5.6    Gainers: Descriptive Statistics  
 N/total  % of Group Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.  
  
Sample Gainers N2 Change 88/325 27% 12.26 51.79 20.33 7.87 
Subsample Gainers N2 Change 19/49 38% 12.26 38.57 18.69 6.98 
 
the spectrum of high and low scorers, with 54% of gainers coming from the lowest 
quartile (N2_Pre < 31.35) of pre-test scores, 25% coming from the second quartile 
(N2_Pre ≥ 31.35 and ≤ 41.45), 15% from the third quartile (N2_Pre ≥ 41.45 and ≤ 51.26), 
and 6% from the fourth quartile (N2_Pre > 51.26). Gainers represented 27% of the total 
study sample and 38% of the subsample (the two classes from which essays for 
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qualitative analysis were drawn). Within the subsample, the gains posted by this group 
showed a mean of 18.69 with a standard deviation of 6.98. The four subjects selected 
from this group for the essay analysis component posted gain scores within 4 points of 
the mean in order to glean a representative view of this group. 
5.4.A.2  DIT Decliners 
A surprising number of students posted negative changes in N2 scores from the 
beginning of the course to its end after two semesters. A full 17% of the total sample, 57 
subjects, saw a decline 6 points or more (roughly .5 the standard deviation of the post-test 
N2 scores and N2 change scores which both had standard deviations of 12 rounded to the 
nearest whole number). As displayed in Table 5.7, these decliners saw a mean N2 change 
of -11.79 (SD=6.35), with a startling maximum decline of -37.71 in at least one case. Of 
the 57 decliners of the sample, 43 came from the top and third quartile of pre-test N2 
scores, with a pre-test mean score of 48.70 (SD=10.82) mean. That is, 75% of decliners 
in N2 change scores came from the top half of pre-test scorers, well above national and 
sample norms. Only 5 of the decliners came from the bottom quartile of pre-test scores. 
Table 5.7    Decliners: Descriptive Statistics  
 N/total  % of Group Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Sample Decliners N2 Change 57/325 17% -6.0 -37.71 -11.79 6.35 
Subsample Decliners N2 Change 5/49 10% -13.55 -7.03 -9.42  3.02 
 
Six decliners were identified in the subsample, enabling a random selection of four essays 
for the qualitative analysis. The N2 change scores of these four students fell within a 
standard deviation of the mean of the subsample group. Essays in this group present a 
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range of N2 change scores of -7.03 to -11.76 and thus are representative of the range of 
decliners in the subsample, the mean of which is -9.42  (SD=3.02), as well as the range of 
decliners in the total sample with mean change -11.79  (SD=6.35).  
5.4.A.3  DIT High to High Scorers 
High to High scorers represent the group of subjects whose pre-test N2 scores are 
a full standard deviation above the mean scores of the sample and at least two times the 
standard deviation above the national norms for college students generally. In this 
sample, the N2 mean score in pre-tests was 40.75. Adding one standard deviation of the 
pre-tests (13 points) to the pre-test mean, a cut point of 54 points was used to delineate 
scores for this High to High category on pre-tests. In order to avoid disadvantaging high 
scoring students, the post-test score cut point was kept at the same number, 54, since that 
threshold is far above researched expectations of college undergraduates’ N2 scores. An 
initial criterion for remaining in the High to High category was the requirement that 
subjects not post losses of more than 6 points (.5 standard deviation), but this additional 
requirement was found to be too restrictive and was omitted. Only one student in the total 
sample actually posted a large decline (-13.55 points) from a very high score in the top 
quartile (N2_Pre score = 60.54). This case was so extreme that is was considered an 
outlier and though it fell within the parameters of the High to High group within the 
subsample, it was thus not selected for the subsample essay analysis.  
The sample included 58 subjects whose pre-test N2 scores were above the cut 
point of 54, totaling 18% of the sample. By the post-tests, 40 students, representing 12% 
of the sample, remained above the cut point of 54 and thus in this High to High category. 
As stated above, when the additional criterion of not losing more than 6 points was added 
 138 
to the cut point demarcation, only 29 (9%) students remain in this high range. Therefore, 
this criterion was dropped to loosen the restrictiveness of the category. The mean scores 
of the High to High group came in at a pre-test mean of 60.27 (SD=4.51) and a post-test 
mean of 62.44 (SD=6.28), as shown in Table 5.8. These scores are far above national 
norms for graduate students, matching those found in research examining the moral 
 
Table 5.8    High to High Students in Sample (n=40/325, 12%) and Subsample (n=5/49, 
10%)  
   Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Sample HH N2 score pre   54.11 71.22 60.27 4.51 
Sample HH N2 score post   54.03 75.59 62.44 6.28 
Sample HH N2 Change   -9.82  16.57 2.17 6.70 
 
Subsample HH N2 score pre   54.88 63.40 59.37 3.17 
Subsample HH N2 score post  55.29 70.59 62.25 6.45 
Subsample HH N2 Change    -4.77  10.05 2.88 5.45 
 
reasoning levels of PhD/EdD students and Moral Philosophy graduate students. The 
subsample of two classes from which essays were drawn for qualitative analysis included 
5 students in this High to High category, representing only 10% of that subsample. 
Essays from four of these students were selected for the qualitative analysis component 
of the study.  
5.4.A.4  DIT Low to Low Scorers 
Low to Low scorers were not difficult to identify within DIT scores, but their 
inclusion in the qualitative component of the study proved to be daunting. Low to Low 
scorers were identified as students whose pre-test N2 scores were a full standard 
deviation below the mean of the sample pre-tests, or below 27.24 (mean of N2 Pre 40.75 
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[SD=13.51]). This cut point was also several points below the national mean N2 score for 
college freshman of 31.05. The post-test N2 scores of Low to Low students was 
identified as scores remaining below the mean of the sample pre-tests (40.75). Only 17 
students in the total sample, or 5% of the sample, fell into this category, with only 2 (4%) 
from the subsample. Table 5.9 gives an overview of some descriptive statistics of this 
group. Of the two students within the subsample who qualified in the Low to Low group, 
only one completed both pre- and post-course essays, and so the group was omitted from 
the qualitative component of the study (ie. essay analysis) due to a lack of adequate 
representation. In order to obtain helpful qualitative representation of low scorers, 
another group (Low Gainers, described in detail in Chapter 6) was designed to fill the gap 
left in the study by the exclusion of the Low to Low group in the qualitative analysis. 
Table 5.9    Low to Low Students in Subsample (n= 17, 5%) and Subsample (n=2, 4%)  
  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. 
Sample LL N2 score pre  1.73 27.23 20.55 7.50 
Sample LL N2 score post  16.28 30.93 24.50 5.14 
Sample LL N2 Change  -7.87  17.39 3.9501  7.41 
 
Subsample LL N2 score pre  18.07 20.72 19.40 1.88 
Subsample LL N2 score post  32.99 34.60 33.79 1.14 
Subsample LL N2 Change  12.26  16.53 14.40 3.01 
 
5.5   FINDINGS ACROSS GROUPS 
The groups originally identified in this study included four sets of categories: 
Gainers, Decliners, High to High scorers and Low to Low scorers. A fifth group, Low 
Gainers, was constructed during the qualitative analysis (see Chapter 6 for details). Table 
5.10 offers descriptive statistics for each of the five groups, including the percentage of 
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the total sample population that each group encompasses. Knowing the range of moral 
reasoning development faculty might encounter in students in a program like this is 
helpful for responsible design and implementation of liberal arts programming. This 
study seeks to shed light on the likely range of moral reasoning development and typical 
developmental variance found in students who select into rigorous programs. Table 5.10  
Table 5.10   Group statistics from total sample (n=325)  
 
 
Total 
Sample 
Gainers 
 
 
 
(N2Change 
≥12) 
Decliners 
 
 
 
(N2Change 
≤ -6) 
High to 
High 
 
 
Pre- and 
Post N2 
scores ≥54 
Low to 
Low 
 
Pre-N2 
 ≤ 27.24 and 
Post-N2 
≤40.75 
Low-
Gainers 
 
1stQ Pre-N2 
scores 
and N2 
Change ≥12 
N/Total 325 88 57 40 17 37 
% of 
Total 
100% 27% 17% 12% 5% 11% 
Pre-test 
N2 
mean(SD) 
40.75(13.52) 30.12(12.17) 48.70(10.82) 60.27(4.51) 20.55(7.50) 22.59(5.73) 
Post-test 
N2 
mean(SD) 
45.94(12.20) 50.45(10.82) 36.92(11.63) 62.44(6.28) 24.50(5.14) 47.38(7.46) 
N2 
Change 
mean 
(SD) 
5.19(12.35) 20.33(7.87) -11.79(6.35) 2.17(6.70) 3.95(7.41) 24.79(9.58) 
 
 
offers an overview of the groups identified in the study, relative to the whole sample 
(n=325). This information allows more adequate understanding of the likelihood that 
faculty might be working with students who fall into very low or very high ranges of 
moral reasoning development. Additionally, the data offer insight into the relative 
* Note that the group, Low Gainers, overlaps with the Gainers group and thus is not a separate 
percentage of the total sample. 
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presence of students who are apt to make great gains or whose moral reasoning 
development might regress. The table above reminds us that capturing a true picture of 
the nature of various groups includes apprehending how students’ pre- and post-test N2 
scores compare not only to national norms but also how they compare to each other 
within the total sample. In addition to the comparison of N2 pre-test, post-test and N2 
Change means given in Table 5.10, a quartile analysis of the total sample provides a 
snapshot of within-group ranges of scores. Table 5.11 shows the total sample (n=325) via 
pre-test N2 scores along the x-axis and post-test N2 scores along the y-axis. In this table, 
we see that 42 students (13% of the sample) of the 81 students in the first quartile of 
Table 5.11   Quartile Analysis Results: Total Sample subjects (N=325). Position reflects 
pre-test quartile (x-axis) combined with post-test quartile (y-axis) and percentage of total 
sample.  
 
 
pre-test scores remained in the first quartile in post-test scores. A group of 35 students 
(10% of the sample), moved from the first quartile to the second and third quartiles in 
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post-testing (24 students + 11 students, noted in the first vertical row) and only 4 (1%) 
moved all the way to the fourth quartile of post-test scores, concurring with moral 
reasoning literature which strongly suggests that moral reasoning is a step-wise 
progression. Quartile cut-points of the sample’s post-test N2 scores are on average 5.41 
points higher than the quartile cut-points of pre-test N2 scores, reflecting the substantial 
gains in mean pre- and post-test N2 scores depicted in Table 5.10. The data also highlight 
findings of a large group of gainers and students who retained very high scores over the 
course of the program. The table offers an overview of the kind of development that 
might be found among students in a program like this as well as the relative likelihood of 
moral reasoning development stasis or even decline that may be found among students. 
Moral reasoning decline was an interesting phenomenon to discover in the scores 
from this sample. As noted in Table 5.10, 57 students (17% of the sample) posted 
declining scores by the end of the year. However, the mean pre-test N2 score of this 
group is 48.71(SD=10.82), well above national and sample norms. Twenty-eight of these 
decliners (49% of the decliner group) were in the top quartile of the pre-test scores, with 
15 more (26%) scoring in the 3rd quartile, totaling 43 decliners (75%) scoring well above 
expected N2 scores in DIT pre-tests. Thus, most of the decliners were already in ranges 
well above expected norms and despite losses, their post-test scores tended to remain 
higher than norms. A scatterplot of these cases (Table 5.12) illustrates that the majority of 
decliners remained above national norms for college students. 
As stated above, gainers represented the largest of the identified groups within the 
total sample, with 88 (27% of the sample) subjects identified as gaining 12 or more points 
(1 standard deviation of the norm of the sample mean N2 pre-test scores) by post-testing. 
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Fifty-four percent of the gainers came from the lowest pre-test quartile, which concurs 
with DIT research expectations. Only 6% of the gainers from the sample, 5 subjects, pre-
tested in the top quartile. This is understandable since the top quartile was so high 
compared to national DIT norms that it would be unlikely to see the kind of gain (12 
points or more) that defined this group in the top quartiles.  
 
 
 
5.12   Scatterplot of Subsample Decliners 
 
Finally, the High to High group posted quite remarkable scores in this study. 
Forty students, or 12% of the total sample, had pre- and post-test scores above the 54 
point cut point, with a mean N2 pre-test score of 60.27 and N2 post-test score of 62.44. 
As noted earlier, these scores match national moral reasoning norms for PhD and Moral 
Philosophy graduate students. To have 12% of the total sample of first year college 
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students exhibiting these sorts of scores is startling and should be considered by those 
who are involved in the design and instruction of the program at the center of the present 
study. Results from the qualitative component of the study helps to flesh out these 
various findings and are presented in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 6: 
Analysis of Qualitative Rubric Data and Findings 
 
6.1   INTRODUCTION 
The qualitative component of the present study set out to identify elements of 
student writing that reveal aspects of students’ moral reasoning development and its 
relationship to participation in a liberal education program. As described in detail in 
Chapter 4, this qualitative component consisted of analysis of essays written at the 
beginning and end of a course by a subsample of students (n=15, in 2 class sections). As 
with the rest of the study sample, these students completed pre- and post-course Defining 
Issues Tests (DIT), a Neo-Kohlbergian measure of moral reasoning used widely for more 
than three decades in the area of moral development research (Rest, 1979, 1999a, 1999b) 
(Chapter 5 offers an overview of those quantitative, DIT findings). DIT data provided the 
means for identifying groups of subjects via pre- and post-test scores, test change scores 
and score quartile analyses. Quantitative information aided the primary researcher in 
identifying specific groups, including subjects with very high and very low DIT N2 
scores, subjects who made great gains in N2 scores, and subjects whose DIT N2 scores 
declined (see Chapter 5 and later in this chapter for details on groups). Using DIT 
groupings, subjects were selected from the two-class subsample for essay analysis in 
order to further explore aspects of moral development and its relationship to course 
participation revealed in student writing. The following chapter gives an account of the 
rubric analyses involved in this qualitative component. Chapter 7 will present findings 
from the open, axial and selective coding of student pre- and post-course essays.  
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6.2  ESSAY SUBSAMPLE 
From the population of 46 students who completed essays at the start and end of 
the class, the essays of 15 subjects (33% of the two class subsample) were selected for 
analysis (as described in Chapter 4). The 15 subjects included 4 Gainers, 3 Low-Gainers, 
4 Decliners, and 4 High-to-High Scorers, each of whom was assigned a pseudonym 
(depicted in Table 6.1). To ensure a clear articulation of qualitative findings, pseudonyms 
were assigned beginning with a first initial that matched the first letter of the affiliated 
group. For example, pseudonyms used within the Decliners’ group are Deb, Diane, David 
and Denise, while the High to High pseudonyms are Hannah, Henry, Hugh and Harold. 
Paper copies of all essays were scanned via OCR (optical character recognition) software 
to provide electronic versions of the essays for analysis. After the selection of essays was 
completed and essays were matched with DIT and class information, the final group of 
subjects whose essays were analyzed was found to include 10 female students and 
 
Table 6.1   15 Essay Subjects chosen from Subsample of Two Classes with Pre- and Post-
Course Essays (Two-class Subsample n=49, 20 males, 29 females); Essay Subject 
information (n = 15)  
 
     Class Class 
Category and Subject Pseudonyms Parameters N Females Males 1 2 
 
Gainers  N2 change ≥12pts 4  4  0 2 2 
Geraldine, Grace, Gretta, Gwen  
Low Gainers T1test=1stQ; N2change ≥12 3  2 1 3  0 
Laura, Lucy, Luke 
Decliners N2 change ≤ 6pts 4  3 1 2  2 
Deb, Diane, David, Denise 
High to High Pre- and post N2 score ≥54 4  1 3  0  4 
Hannah, Harold, Henry, Hugh 
 
Selected Essay Subjects Total   15  10  5  7  8 
 
Note: See full descriptions of group parameters in Chapter 5. 
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5 male students, with 7 students enrolled in one of the subsample classes and 8 enrolled 
in the second class. A quartile analysis of the original, total study sample (n=325) is 
presented in Table 6.2, showing the range of pre- and post-N2 scores by quartile, with 
pre-test N2 scores indicated on the x-axis and post-test N2 scores on the y-axis. All 
fifteen essay subjects are identified (by pseudonym) within the table, placed along the 
axes via their pre- and post-test N2 scores. Thus, Table 6.2 reveals a student’s pre-test 
position along the horizontal quadrants and her post-test position in the quadrants along 
the vertical axis. This table illustrates the pre- and post- test quartile change positions of 
the 15 essay writers relative to the 
 
Table 6.2  Full Sample Quartile Analysis (n=325): Pre-and Post-Test Combined 
Quartiles, including percentages of total sample; 15 Essay Subjects listed (in bold) from 
two-class Subsample (n=15, 5 males,10 females) identified in pre- and post-test 
combined quartile position 
  
 
Pre-test 
1st Quartile 
(lowest) 
Pre-test 
2nd Quartile 
Pre-test 
3rd Quartile 
Pre-test 
4th Quartile 
(highest) 
N 
Post-test 
4th Quartile 
(highest) 
4 (1%) 10(3%) 
Grace 
22(7%) 
Gretta 
45(14%) 
Hannah, 
Henry, 
Harold, Hugh 
n=81 
Post-test 
3rd Quartile 
11(3%) 
Luke 
21(6.5%) 
Lucy, Gwen, 
Geraldine 
31(9.5%) 18(5.5%) n=81 
Post-test 
2nd Quartile 
24(7%) 
Laura 
23(7%) 21(6.5%) 
Deb, Diane 
14(4%) 
Denise 
n=82 
Post-test 
1st Quartile 
(lowest) 
42(13%) 27(8%) 8(2.5%) 
David 
4(1%) n=81 
N n=81 n=81 n=82 n=81 n=325 
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quartile change positions of the total sample. For instance, as noted by his position on the 
table, the Decliner subject, “David,” came in with a pre-test score in the third quartile but 
his post-test score exhibited a decline that left him in the lowest post-test quadrant. Even 
though one High to High scorer’s N2 post-test score declined, he remained in the highest 
quartile of subsample post-tests along with the three other High to High scorers. Each of 
the Low Gainers, Lucy, Laura and Luke, began in the first or second pre-test quartiles 
and ended in the second or third post-test quartiles.  
6.3   ESSAY ANALYSIS 
The study’s qualitative analysis design called for several cycles of essay coding. 
Two rubrics were used to identify within student writing, 1) evidence of moral reasoning 
development, and 2) aspects of the class perceived by students to be associated with 
moral or ethical development. The rubrics (described in detail in Chapter 4) consisted of, 
first, a set of moral reasoning proxy items gleaned from a thorough review of the 
literature on moral reasoning development research, and second, a set of course-related 
items generated from a review of the course’s standard syllabus and course description. 
The rubrics were piloted (as described in detail in Chapter 4) with a second rater to 
ensure rubric reliability. 
6.4   ESSAY ANALYSIS: RUBRIC ANALYSES 
Essay analysis began with an examination of student writing via two established 
rubrics. “HyperResearch” qualitative date analysis software was used to “tag” pieces of 
student writing that demonstrated student engagement with particular rubric items. Then, 
a rating system was used to rate student writing along moral development items and 
course-related items using a 0-3 scale (0 = rubric item absent, 1 = rubric item nominally 
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present; 2 = rubric item emerging; 3 = rubric item evident/active). Ratings were analyzed 
and compared within and across groups. Once the rubric analysis was complete, essays 
were reread within identified groups and coded by hand to identify patterns and themes 
beyond the scope of the rubrics. Patterns of phrases and word frequencies were noted in 
this round of open coding, general themes emerging within groups were generated in the 
last round of axial/selective coding. This final, selective coding provided an overview of 
the differences and similarities across the four groups. These cycles of rubric analysis and 
coding offered a unique perspective on what the range of student moral reasoning in this 
type of course might look like. The results of the rubric analyses and coding (untethered 
from rubrics) are outlined in the following sections (see Chapter 4 for full details of the 
rubric rating and coding procedures, including piloting of procedures with second rater). 
Rubric analysis for all four groups is presented first, followed by open coding themes for 
each group. 
6.4.A Rubric Analysis by Group 
6.4.A.1 Gainers’ Rubric Scores 
The Gainer group consisted of four subjects whose DIT N2 change scores were 
greater than or equal to 12 points, the equivalent of one standard deviation increase from 
pre-test to post-test N2 scores. Along most rubric items, subjects in the Gainer group 
demonstrated increased ratings in post-course essay analyses. This was expected in the 
case of the moral development rubric since rubric items were designed to illuminate 
various aspects of moral development that have been shown to be impactful in moral 
development literature. In the case of course-related rubric items, the data of interest 
 150 
include post-essay ratings which express students’ own perception of the impact of 
aspects of the course on their developing ideas of living the best way.  
Of the 15 moral rubric items measured in the four Gainers’ post-essays (for a total 
of 60 scores), 66% of the rated items represented increases. Only Geraldine1 regressed 
along one moral rubric item. Table 6.3 offers the rated rubric items of the Gainer group, 
along with average ratings and increases. In terms of moral development rubric items, the 
lowest source of activity for this Gainer group was found along the rubric item 
“Diversity,” operationalized here as the ability to “acknowledge and comprehend a 
variety of perspectives on issues and multiple worldviews” (see Chapter 4 for a complete 
list of operationalized definitions of all rubric items), with an average rating decline of -
.4. Within the Gainer group, only one Gainer, Grace, increased .5 in her Diversity rating, 
while Gwen’s and Gretta’s ratings remained static and Geraldine’s rating declined a full 
point. Other items that saw low ratings among Gainers were “Socratic ideal” and “context 
comprehension,” each with an average rating increase of only .38. It is interesting to note 
the overlap of these three items which all deal with acknowledging the limitations of 
one’s own understandings and context and an accompanying need to account for multiple 
perspectives. Moral development literature suggests that these attitudes would be 
associated with moral development advances, but none of these Gainers displayed a 
robust rating in this area. It is possible that Gainers were more preoccupied with their 
own developing understandings than with the limitations of those understandings. A 
further discussion of this will be presented below in an overview of rubric analyses 
integrated with themes and motifs from essay coding. 
                                                 
1 Pseudonyms are used throughout the study, with initial letters of pseudonym indicative of study group, eg. 
a pseudonym beginning with a G is part of the Gainer group. 
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Table 6.3  Gainers’ moral development rubric outcomes from post-course essays and change from 
pre-course essay (in parentheses); including average post-essay item rating and increase; ordered 
from highest to lowest rating per rubric item 
 
Moral Rubric Item 
Grace  
Post-essay 
Gwen  
Post-essay 
Gretta  
Post-essay 
Geraldine  
Post-essay 
Avg. 
Item 
Rate 
Avg. 
Change 
Principled thinking 3(+1) 3(+1) 3(+1) 2(+1) 2.75 +1 
Cognitive 
complexity 
3(+1.5) 3(+.5) 3(±0) 2(+1) 2.75 +.75 
Prosocial behaviors 3(+.5) 3(+2) 2(+1) 2.5(+1) 2.6 +1.13 
Prosocial attitude/ 
Civic engagement 
attitude 
2(±0) 3(+2) 3(+2) 2(+.5) 2.5 +1.13 
Ethical self-
awareness 
3(+2) 2(+1) 2.5(+.5) 2(+1) 2.4 +1.13 
Personal & social 
responsibility 
2(+.5) 3(+2) 2.5(+1.5) 1.5(+.5) 2.25 +1.13 
Critical thinking 1(±0) 3(+1) 3(+1) 2(+1) 2.25 +.75 
Ethical evaluation 2(±0) 2(±0) 3(+2) 2(+1) 2.25 +.75 
Social complexity 2(±0) 3(+1) 3(+1) 1(±0) 2.25 +.5 
Socratic ideal 2(+1) 2.5(+.5) 3(±0) 1.5(±0) 2.25 +.38 
Context 
comprehension 
1.5(±0) 3(+.5) 3(+1) 1(±0) 2.1 +.38 
Global thinking 1(±0) 2.5(+1.5) 3(+2) 1(±0) 1.9 +.88 
Moral behavior 2(+1) 2.5(+1.5) 2(±0) 1(±0) 1.9 +.63 
Religious attitude 2.5(+.5) 3(+2) 1(±0) 1(±0) 1.9 +.63 
Diversity 1.5(+.5) 2(±0) 3(±0) 1(-.5) 1.9 0 
Average rating 2.1 2.7 2.7 1.6   
Overall change +8.5 +16.5 +13 +6.5   
 
The highest activity within the Gainers’ ratings was found equally in four items 
from the moral rubric: “prosocial attitudes/civic engagement,” “prosocial behavior,” 
“personal and social responsibility” and “ethical self-awareness.” All Gainers’ scores 
moved positively along these four items with the same average rating increase of 1.13. 
The first three of these items clearly share a common concern with the benefit of others 
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or the community generally. The fourth, “ethical self-awareness,” adds a turn to the self 
and one’s core beliefs. Possibly, these Gainers are reflecting on the importance of 
examining one’s values in order to adequately address the mandate of “making a 
difference” for others. It is notable that a common exhortation to students at this 
university is to become “men and women for others,” and it is possible that this 
communal ethos sets the conditions for moral development.  As mentioned above, while 
less change on average was seen in the categories of “Diversity,” “Socratic ideal” and 
“Context comprehension,” there was some variability within the Gainer group in these 
items. There was variability on remaining moral development items, with some gains and 
some losses on specific items. Notably, the item “Religious attitude” was one of the 
lowest rated and lowest changing items among three of the Gainers, but Gwen was 
deeply changed along this item. It was the only item in which one subject’s rating 
increased by 2 points, while all of the other three Gainers increased less than 1 point.  
The second rubric was also used to analyze Gainer essays. As described in 
Chapter 4, these course-related rubric items were constructed via a review of moral 
development literature and course objectives to identify aspects of the course’s content 
and activities that might be impactful to student moral development. The course-related 
rubric items that saw the most positive activity included three rubric items, “References 
to texts,” “Theory and real world connection” and “Course content as interruption.” 
Interestingly, course-related item ratings indicating a subject’s engagement with the work 
of specific thinkers represented the lowest score change activity among these four 
Gainers. As depicted in Table 6.4, no evidence of the impact of “Kantian ethics” was 
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found in any of the four Gainers’ essays, and student essays showed little or no evidence 
of rubric items, “Aristotelian ethics” and “Nietzschean/existentialist ethics.” Gainer  
Table 6.4   Course-related items rated in Gainer post-course essays and rating average; 
ordered from highest to lowest average rating per rubric item 
 
Course-Related 
Rubric Item 
Grace  
Post-essay 
Gwen  
Post-essay 
Gretta  
Post-essay 
Geraldine 
Post-essay 
Average 
rating 
References to texts 1 3 3 3 2.5 
Theory and real world 
connection 
2 3 3 1 2.25 
Course content as 
interruption 
0 3 3 2 2 
Ethical-Political 
theory 
0 2 3 2 1.75 
Ethical theory 0 2 3 2 1.75 
Religious/Natural 
Law ethics 
2 2 0 3 1.75 
Common Good 
tradition 
0 2 3 2 1.75 
Nietzschean/Existenti
alist ethics 
1 3 0 2 1.5 
Aristotelian ethics 0 3 0 2 1.25 
Kantian ethics 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Rating Points 6 23 18 19  
  
mentions of course material and activities averaged < 1 point along both of these course-
related items. Twelve instances of non-engagement (“0” rating) with course-related items 
were identified in Gainers’ post-course essays, though half of those instances were 
associated with Grace’s essay. Notably, two of the Gainers, Gwen and Gretta, wrote 
essays which provided 11 of the 13 highest ratings among course-related items.  
Insights gleaned from both rubrics provide an interesting perspective on what 
development looks like among Gainers and what matters to them in terms of coursework. 
Gainers’ concern with one’s role in the welfare of others and the development of core 
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ethical understandings and values coincides with their tendency to use texts and course 
material to problematize prior ethical understandings in order to address real world 
concerns. They do not seem overly focused on how theoretical frameworks may 
contribute to those concerns. Gainers seem to assert personal agency and the 
development of personal ethics over larger, perhaps more abstract ethical systems. Of the 
other 7 course-related rubric items, Gainers logged only 5 instances of active engagement 
(a “3” rating). This sharply concentrated pattern demonstrates Gainers’ focus on the 
developmental tasks they consider relevant. Comparing these rubric results with those of 
other groups may shed light on Gainers’ seeming disinclination to engage with theory 
and with specific ethical theorists. 
6.4.A.2  Decliners’ Rubric Scores 
The Decliner group consisted of four subjects whose post-test DIT N2 scores 
declined more than a half a standard deviation from their pre-test scores. The average 
DIT N2 change score found in this group was -8.38, somewhat lower than the average 
N2 decrease found in the full study sample Decliners (av.−11.79) and the two-class 
subsample Decliners (av. −9.42). As with the rubric ratings in the Gainer group, and as 
indicated in Table 6.5, ratings of those subjects whose DIT scores put them in the 
Decliners group saw numerous areas of advanced engagement in moral development 
rubric items. In fact, rating increases among Decliners were found along two of the same 
moral development rubric items in which Gainers increased, “Prosocial behavior” and 
“Personal and social responsibility,” with average rating increases of 1.1 in each item. 
Decliners logged this same average increase in both “Cognitive Complexity,” a 
demonstrated capacity to exclude simplistic thinking, and “Ethical evaluation,” an item 
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signaling the subject’s ability to offer a coherent articulation and defense of an ethical 
position. Decliners increased most, however, on “Principled thinking,” operationalized 
Table 6.5  Decliners’ moral development rubric outcomes from post-course essays and change 
from pre-course essay (in parentheses); including average post-essay item rating and increase; 
ordered from highest to lowest rating per rubric item 
 
Moral Rubric Item 
Deb  
Post-essay 
Diane  
Post-essay 
David  
Post-essay 
Denise  
Post-essay 
Avg. 
Item 
Rate  
Avg. 
Change 
Principled thinking 3(+2) 3(+2) 1(±0) 3(+1.5) 2.5 +1.38 
Personal & social 
responsibility 
3(+2) 1.5(+.5) 2(+1) 3(+1) 2.4 +1.13 
Ethical self-
awareness 
3(+1.5) 2.5(+1.5) 1(-1) 3(+2) 2.4 +1.00 
Cognitive 
complexity 
2.5(+1.5) 2.5(+1.5) 1(-.5) 2.5(+1.5) 2.1 +1.13 
Ethical evaluation 2(+1) 2.5(+1.5) 1(±0) 3(+2) 2.1 +1.13 
Prosocial behaviors 3(+2) 1(±0) 1.5(+.5) 2.5(+1.5) 2 +1.13 
Critical thinking 2(+1) 2(+.5) 1(±0) 3(+2) 2 +.88 
Context 
comprehension 
2(+1) 3(+1.5) 1(-1) 2(+1) 2 +.63 
Prosocial attitude/ 
Civic engagement 
attitude 
3(+2) 1(±0) 1(±0) 2.5(+.5) 1.9 +.75 
Social complexity 1.5(+.5) 2(+1) 1.5(+.5) 2(+1) 1.75 +.75 
Religious attitude 3(+2) 1(±0) 1(±0) 2(+1) 1.75 +.75 
Moral behavior 3(+1) 1(±0) 1.5(+.5) 1.5(+.5) 1.75 +.63 
Global thinking 2(+1) 1(±0) 1(±0) 2(+.5) 1.5 +.38 
Diversity 1(-.5) 1.5(+.5) 1(-1) 2(+.5) 1.4 -0.13 
Socratic ideal 2(±0) 1(-1) 1(±0) 1(±0) 1.25 -0.25 
Overall Change 18 9.5 -1 16.5   
Average Rate  
per subject 
2.4 1.8 1.2 2.3   
Overall Change +18 +9.5 -1 +16.5   
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here as the ability to articulate universalizable principles and a desire to live by widely 
accepted principles, with an average rating increase of 1.4. Three of the four decliners 
moved from a lower rating to a “3” (highest rating) in pre- to post essays along this rubric 
item. 
Decliners logged decreased ratings in post-essays along two items: “Diversity” 
and “Socratic ideal,” with average rating changes from pre-essays of -.13 and -.25 
respectively. Decliners also saw relatively low change in “Global thinking,” indicative in 
this rubric of a subject’s attempt to explore the broader issues and problems of the global 
community. Only one Decliner, Deb, was rated above a “1” on this rubric item. These 
three moral development items showed not only the most negative change but also 
received the lowest ratings average by Decliners. Hence, the lowest average ratings of 
these three items were not simply a matter of the absence of these items in student essays, 
but represented decreasing engagement with these items from pre- to post-essays. 
As for moral development item ratings (regardless of change), though in pre-
essays Decliners rated “Diversity,” “Context comprehension” and “Ethical self-
awareness” most highly, only “Ethical self-awareness” remained among the highest rated 
items in post-essays, along with “Principled thinking” and “Personal and social 
responsibility.” Items highly rated and positively changed in Decliner post-essays point to 
their intentions regarding ethics, personal responsibility and living according to widely 
held principles. However, the shift to acting on those ideas remained a low priority. The 
tendency of Decliners to highly value personal commitments to ideas and principles of 
ethics echoes Rest’s Maintaining Norms Schema and may account for where some of 
these Decliners may be “stuck” in aspects of this middle schema, unable to fully shift to 
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the Postconventional Schema. In Rest’s view, the Maintaining Norms Schema involves 
addressing the need for ethical and institutional systems that can handle a new construal 
of “society” inclusive of “Others” previously excluded from the “in-group” of the 
Personal Interest Schema (Rest, 1979, 1999). The cognitive coordination of meeting 
larger social demands with functional societal systems of rules, codes, and laws for the 
sake of a widening circle of stakeholders is a daunting task. But the difference between 
apprehending ethical principles and waiving one’s own interests to those principles is a 
daunting part of the shift to the Postconventional Schema. Though these Decliners exhibit 
increasing prosocial behavior, it does not yet rise to the level of their desire for principles 
and personal/social responsibility, and they are not yet sufficiently challenged by diverse 
and global issues that might direct them toward the Postconventional Schema.  
Overall however, Decliners fared well in moral development item ratings, logging 
17 highest ratings (“3”) in post-essays. But two subjects, Deb and Denise, logged the 
large majority of those highest ratings. David on the other hand logged no highest rating 
and received 58% of lowest ratings of moral development items in post-course essay 
analyses. It is interesting to note that David’s pre-test DIT N2 scores were 7.88 points 
lower than the Decliner average and his post-test DIT N2 scores were 6.75 points lower 
than average Decliner N2 scores. While the three female Decliners all posted pre-test DIT 
N2 scores that were well above national and whole Sample averages (all three scored ≥ 
48.98 in pre-test scores), their declines left them lower than total Sample pre-test 
averages, yet still above national averages.  
In terms of course-related rubric items, Decliners’ post-essays engaged most 
actively along three course items: “Ethical-political theory,” “Nietzschean/Existentialist 
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ethics” and “References to texts and course materials.” Echoing patterns from the moral 
development rubric analysis, Decliners often referenced the communal/political order 
called for in course texts, while also positing the primacy of the individual—a staple of 
Existentialist and Nietzschean paradigms (rubric outcomes depicted in Table 6.6). The 
combination of these seemingly disparate inclinations highlights a tension within 
Decliners’ developmental trajectory. While they see the need for systematic approaches 
to real world concerns, they also are drawn to the existentialist prioritizing of the 
individual. Decliners showed least engagement along five items: “Aristotelian ethics,” 
“Kantian ethics,” “Religious/Natural Law ethics,” “Common Good tradition” and 
“Theory and real-world connection.” It is significant to note that Decliners regularly 
mention having new ideas regarding the connection between political and communal 
order but they do not mention specific theories or authors such as Aristotle and Kant who 
strongly assert those connections. In general, Decliners’ essays did not exhibit evidence 
of course material as interruptive of their ideas, but tended instead to present their own 
ideas and then secondarily use course material as ratifying those conclusions. David’s 
essay in particular demonstrated this tendency. His essay included no mentions of course 
materials or course activities and only vaguely mentioned how he had changed in his 
thinking “this year.” He then goes on to develop a highly individualistic answer to the 
question of living a best way, using only his own pre-course essay as a point of reference. 
He claims that his ideas have developed quite a bit, but in actuality, his second answer is 
really a reiteration of his first answer, presented nine months earlier.  
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Table 6.6   Course-related items rated in Decliner post-course essays; rating average; 
ordered from highest to lowest average rating per rubric item 
 
Course-Related 
Rubric Item 
Deb 
Post-essay 
Diane 
Post-essay 
David 
Post-essay 
Denise  
Post-essay 
Average 
rating 
Ethical-Political 
theory 
3 3 0 3 2.25 
Nietzschean/Existe
ntialist ethics 
2.5 3 0 3 2.1 
References to texts 3 2 0 3 2 
Course content as 
interruption 
3 2 1 2 2 
Ethical theory 3 1.5 0 3 1.9 
Common Good 
tradition 
2 1.5 0 3 1.6 
Theory and real 
world connection 
3 1 0 2 1.5 
Religious/Natural 
Law ethics 
2 2 0 2 1.5 
Aristotelian ethics 0 2 0 1 .75 
Kantian ethics 0 0 0 2.5 .6 
Total rating 
points 
21.5 18 1 24.5  
 
In general the Decliner group did not regularly reference authors and intellectual 
traditions that advocate a deep connection between ethical theory and real world 
considerations, but instead tended to refer to authors such as Hobbes, Nietzsche or 
Augustine whose texts are easily construed as asserting the priority of the individual and 
individual interests. Thus Decliners’ essays seem to exhibit some qualities of Rest’s 
Maintaining Norms Schema but also seemed held back by the type of self-referential 
tendencies and self-interest common in the Personal Interest Schema. Decliners seem to 
hover in Rest’s Maintaining Norms Schema, with high regard for normative authorities 
but are unable as yet to pivot to the Postconventional Schema. In order to accomplish this 
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Decliners would have to reconcile the tension between social norms and individual 
interests, a developmental task that seems to have eluded most Decliners by the end of 
the course. The Kohlbergian Social Contract/Legalistic Orientation Stage coincides with 
Rest’s initial step into the Postconventional Schema. In this stage, a subject allows that 
the shared norms of the community–its legal systems, duties and customs–come from a 
rational judgments of what is good and bad, as opposed to individual assertions of self-
interest. This seems to be what Decliners cannot quite attain. While they acknowledge 
that they want to live in a way that seeks the good of others, or at least doesn’t impinge 
on the rights of others, they are still held back by basic Personal Interest Schema issues.  
6.4.A.3 High to High Scorers’ Rubric Scores 
Students whose pre- and post-course DIT N2 scores were significantly higher 
than the study sample and national norms were identified as the High to High Scorers’ 
group. The group’s scores on the moral development rubric items were quite impressive, 
with all four High to High Scorers rated as fully engaged (rating of “3”) on 7 of the 15 
items in post-essays. No post-essay rubric item saw less than an average rating of “2” 
(emerging). Overall change within the ratings of moral development items was moderate 
but this reflected the effects of the group’s higher pre-essay ratings compared to those 
seen in other groups’ pre-essays. One of the most interesting patterns noted in the High to 
High Scorers’ ratings related to a cluster of moral development items that were 
problematic in Gainers, Low Gainers and Decliners (as depicted in Table 6.7). The items 
“Diversity,” “Global thinking” and “Socratic ideal” were found to be either the lowest 
rated or least changed item, or both, in the post-essays of Gainers and Decliners. 
However, two of these items, “Diversity” and “Socratic ideal” were among the highest  
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Table 6.7   High to High Scorers’ moral development rubric outcomes from post-course essays 
and change from pre-course essay (in parentheses); including average post-essay item rating and 
increase; ordered from highest to lowest rating per rubric item 
 
Moral Rubric Item 
Hannah  
Post-Essay 
Harold  
Post-Essay 
Henry  
Post-Essay 
Hugh  
Post-Essay 
Avg. 
Item 
Rate  
Avg. 
Change 
Prosocial attitude/ 
Civic engagement 
attitude 
3(+2) 3(+1) 3(+2) 3(+1) 3 +1.5 
Personal & social 
responsibility 
3(+2) 3(+.5) 3(+2) 3(±0) 3 +1.1 
Cognitive 
complexity 
3(+1) 3(±0) 3(+1) 3(+1) 3 +.75 
Critical thinking 3(+1) 3(±0) 3(+1) 3(+1) 3 +.75 
Diversity 3(+1) 3(±0) 3(±0) 3(+1) 3 +.5 
Socratic ideal 3(+1) 3(+1) 3(±0) 3(±0) 3 +.5 
Principled thinking 3(+1) 3(±0) 3(±0) 3(+.5) 3 +.4 
Global thinking 2.5(+1.5) 3(+1) 3(+2) 3(+2) 2.9 +1.6 
Ethical evaluation 3(+2) 3(+1) 3(+1) 2(+1) 2.75 +1.25 
Social complexity 2(+1) 3(+1) 3(±0) 2(±0) 2.5 +.5 
Religious attitude 3(+2) 1(±0) 3(+2) 2(+1) 2.25 +1.25 
Moral behavior 1.5(+.5) 2.5(+.5) 3(+2) 2(±0) 2.25 +.75 
Ethical self-
awareness 
3(+1) 2(±0) 2(±0) 2(+1) 2.25 +.5 
Context 
comprehension 
3(+1) 2(-1) 2(-1) 2(-1) 2.25 -.5 
Prosocial behaviors 1(±0) 3(+1.5) 3(+2) 1(±0) 2 .9 
Average rate 
per subject 
2.7 2.7 2.9 2.5   
Overall Change +18 +6.5 +14 +8.5   
 
rated items in High to High Scorers’ post-essays and “Global thinking” was found among 
the highest change scores, at an average increase of +1.6. The item, “Religious attitude,” 
was also among the four items showing the greatest average increase for this group. This 
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item is notable since it did not appear as highly rated or highly changing for either 
Gainers or Decliners. The two remaining items that saw significant change for High to 
High Scorers were “Prosocial attitude/Civic engagement attitude” and “Ethical 
evaluation.” The former item was present in highest rating among Gainers (but not 
Decliners) while the latter was present also for Decliners (but not Gainers). Thus High to 
High Scorers shared with Gainers an affinity for prosocial attitudes and a desire to engage 
in communal issues, but were also able to evaluate ethical positions as was seen in 
Decliners’ rubric analyses.  
These qualities were supplemented in High to High Scorers with qualities like 
“Global thinking” “Diversity” “Socratic ideal,” all three of which received highest ratings 
or highest rating increase among the High to High post-essay moral development rubrics. 
In fact, these three items most starkly differentiate this group from Gainers, Low Gainers 
and Decliners. These three items were the lowest rated and saw the lowest rating change 
in Decliners’ post-essays and were among the lowest rated and lowest change items in 
Gainers’ post-essays as well. These three items offer unique facets of the High to High 
Scorers. Additionally, High to High Scorers’ post-essays exhibited high ratings in 
“Critical thinking,” an item not highly rated or highly changed in any of the other groups. 
With respect to the second rubric analysis measuring a subject’s engagement with 
course-related materials and activities, depicted in Table 6.8, the High to High Scorers 
exhibited marked differences from the other three groups. While matching levels of 
engagement in “Theory and real world connection,” “Course content as interruption” and 
“References to texts and course activities” with the other groups, this group of High to 
High Scorers additionally mentioned ethical and political theory regularly and robustly 
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throughout their essays. Their essays made wide-ranging use of theory and connected 
those theories with concrete, real world concerns. These students tended to highlight the  
Table 6.8   Course-related items rated in High to High Scorers’ post-course essays; rating 
average; ordered from highest to lowest average rating per rubric item 
 
Course-Related 
Rubric Item 
Hannah 
Post-essay 
Harold 
Post-essay 
Henry 
Post-essay 
Hugh  
Post-essay 
Average 
rating 
Ethical-Political 
theory 
3 3 3 3 3 
Ethical theory 3 3 3 3 3 
Common Good 
tradition 
3 3 3 3 3 
Theory and real 
world connection 
3 3 3 3 3 
References to texts 3 3 2 3 2.75 
Course content as 
interruption 
3 3 2 3 2.75 
Religious/Natural 
Law ethics 
3 0 2.5 3 2.1 
Aristotelian ethics 3 3 0 2 2 
Nietzschean/Existen
tialist ethics 
0 0 3 0 .75 
Kantian ethics 0 0 0 0 0 
Total rating points 24 21 21.5 23  
 
need for systemic efforts to address issues facing individuals and focused on the interplay 
between individuals and institutions, persons and social orders. Essays in this group 
demonstrated the very sort of engagement this program would ideally seek: an intelligent 
grasp of material and an abiding sense of how this somewhat abstract material should and 
can apply to the real world. 
6.4.A.4  Low Gainers’ Rubric Scores 
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After an initial DIT analysis of the two class subsample failed to provide a 
sufficient number of students with very low pre- and post-test scores, a Low Gainer 
group was established. This group included students who posted gains over the year but 
whose DIT N2 Pre-test scores were found in the two lowest quartiles and whose gains 
kept them only in the second or third quartiles. Three students within this group 
completed both pre- and post-essays so their essays were selected for analysis. Across 
Moral Rubric Ratings, Low Gainers posted the most modest ratings of all four groups 
within the sample, including the Decliners. As seen in Table 6.9, rubric item ratings fell 
between 1 and 2, with only three items reaching an average rating of “2” from the group: 
“Ethical evaluation,” “Personal and social responsibility” and “Principled thinking.” 
Ratings were lowest for this group among the rubric items, “Critical thinking,” “Moral 
behavior” and “Global thinking.” This last item, “Global thinking,” was thus among the 
three lowest rated items for every group except High to High Scorers. “Principled 
thinking,” on the other hand, was rated among the top moral development items in all 
four groups and “Personal and social responsibility” was among the top rated or saw the 
most change in rating in all four groups. Low Gainers’ essays posted high change among 
the following items: “Ethical evaluation,” “Prosocial behavior,” “Cognitive complexity” 
and “Socratic ideal.” Lowest activity was seen among the moral rubric items: “Critical 
thinking,” “Social complexity” and “Prosocial attitude/Civic engagement attitude.”  
Interestingly, Luke exhibited far greater change along moral rubric items within 
his essay than his two female counterparts, Laura and Lucy. Moral rubric item ratings 
increased 14.5 points overall in Luke’s post-course essay, while Laura’s essay posted 
 165 
only a 2.5 point increase overall and Lucy’s essay yielded a negative outcome of ratings 
on rubric items, falling .5 point overall.  
Table 6.9   Low Gainers’ moral development rubric outcomes from post-course essays and 
change from pre-course essay (in parentheses); including average post-essay item rating and 
increase; ordered from highest to lowest rating per rubric item 
 
Moral Rubric Item 
Laura  
Post-essay 
Lucy  
Post-essay 
Luke  
Post-essay 
Avg. 
Item 
Rating 
Avg. 
Change 
Ethical evaluation 2(+1) 1(0) 3(+1) 2 +.7 
Personal & social 
responsibility 
2.5(+.5) 1.5(-.5) 2(+1) 2 +.3 
Principled 
thinking 
2(0) 2(+.5) 2(+1) 2 +.5 
Religious attitude 1(-.5) 1(0) 3(+2) 1.7 +.5 
Prosocial 
behaviors 
2(+1) 1(0) 2(+1) 1.7 +.7 
Cognitive 
complexity 
1(0) 1.5(+.5) 2.5(+1.5) 1.7 +.7 
Social complexity 2(0) 1(-1) 2(+1) 1.7 0 
Diversity 1(-1) 2(+1) 2(+1) 1.7 +.3 
Context 
comprehension 
2(+.5) 1(0) 2(+.5) 1.7 +.3 
Prosocial attitude/ 
Civic engagement 
attitude 
2(0) 1(-1) 1.5(+.5) 1.5 -.16 
Ethical self-
awareness 
1(0) 1.5(+.5) 2(+1) 1.5 +.5 
Socratic ideal 1.5(+.5) 1(0) 3(+2) 1.5 +.8 
Global thinking 1(0) 1(-.5) 1.5(+.5) 1.3 +.3 
Moral behavior 1.5(+.5) 1(0) 1.5(+.5) 1.3 +.3 
Critical thinking 1(0) 1(0) 1(0) 1 0 
Average rate 1.6 1.2 2.1   
Overall Change +2.5 -.5 +14.5   
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In general, this group of Low Gainers posted low ratings and low change along 
rubric items. Luke’s high increases among ratings of rubric items echoes what is found in 
a quartile analysis of his DIT scores. Within the DIT, Luke moved from a pre-test DIT 
score in the first quartile to a post-test DIT score in the third quartile. His average rating 
across moral rubric items of 2.1 is on par with average ratings of Gainers and some of the 
higher scoring Decliners, if not the average ratings of the High to High Scorers. Laura’s 
lower average among ratings of moral rubric items at 1.6 with an overall increase of 
ratings of only 2.5 points corroborates her DIT scores, with pre-test DIT scores falling in 
the lowest quartile and post-test scores only moving into the second quartile. Lucy’s 
scores are quite interesting, since she was the sole Low Gainer who began with pre-test 
DIT scores in the second quartile (higher than other Low Gainers) and ending with post-
test scores in the third quartile. However, in essay analysis, her average moral rubric item 
rating was only 1.2, sharing with Decliner David the lowest overall average rating of 
moral items. She and David also were the only subjects within the group of 15 essay 
writers to post negative overall change along moral rubric items, with Lucy posting a -.5 
point change overall in ratings and David posting a -1 point rating change overall. 
Increases among the moral rubric item ratings, or lack thereof, also offer some 
clarifying information about the Low Gainer group. Within this group, ratings along all 
moral rubric items did not rise more than .8 points on average. Contrastingly, the Gainer 
group and the High to High Scorers posted average increases ≥ 1 point on five items and 
Decliners actually posted six items with average increases of 1 point or more. Low 
Gainers’ essays on the other hand showed average increases ≤ .5 along 8 moral rubric 
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items, while Gainers and Decliners saw only three items with such low change and High 
to High Scorers reported low change on only two items.  
Low Gainer essays were also analyzed via the second rubric to measure this 
group’s engagement with course materials. Low Gainers Laura and Luke both relied on 
course texts in answering the post-course essay question, though Lucy did not. All three 
of the Low Gainers mentioned a fairly substantial but only emerging sense of the course 
as playing a role in interrupting previous ideas about living well. The third highest rating 
of course-related rubric items among Low Gainers regarded “Nietzschean/Existenialist 
ethics,” which Laura and Lucy both used with some degree of focus. Luke highlighted 
more keenly the connection of theory and real world issues, a connection only briefly 
mentioned by the female students in this group. Authors who advocate systematic 
approaches to ethics, such as Kant and Aristotle, and theoretical approaches such as 
common good theory or other ethical-political positions were largely missing in this set 
of essays and fell into the lowest ratings for this group. Low Gainers overall seemed more 
interested in approaching the question from an individualistic point of view, which is 
echoed in their higher rating of existentialist writings, which highlight the role of the 
individual. Laura and Luke referred instead to larger, systemic approaches in taking up 
the question, wondering if the systems of religion or ethical/political theory ought to be 
considered when developing a thoughtful way to live. Laura highlighted Aristotle’s work, 
but only as regards wanting to live a life with friends in it, as opposed to utilizing his 
ethical theory as a whole. Luke’s engagement with theory did not evince a full 
understanding of how it might actually play a role in forming an ethical life, seeing 
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theory as more as aiding us in comprehending how others view happiness and ethics. 
Lucy avoided these more systematic approaches to ethics altogether.   
In general, Low Gainers’ mentioned course-related items in patterns similar to the 
Gainer group with the main exception of a stronger impact of “Nietzschean/Existentialist 
ethics” (outcomes depicted in Table 6.10). However, Gainers averaged higher ratings of  
Table 6.10   Course-related items rated in Low Gainer post-course essays and rating 
average; ordered from highest to lowest average rating per rubric item 
 
Course-Related 
Rubric Item 
Laura  
Post-essay 
Lucy  
Post-essay 
Luke  
Post-essay 
Average 
rating 
References to texts 3 1 3 2.3 
Course content as 
interruption 
2 2 2 2 
Nietzschean/Existenti
alist ethics 
2 3 0 1.7 
Theory and real world 
connection 
1 1 2.5 1.5 
Common Good 
tradition 
2.5 0 2 1.5 
Ethical-Political 
theory 
2 0 2 1.3 
Religious/Natural 
Law ethics 
0 0 3 1 
Ethical theory 0 0 2 .7 
Aristotelian ethics 2 0 0 .7 
Kantian ethics 0 0 0 0 
Total Rating Points 14.5 7 14.5  
 
course-related items, averaging 16.5 rating points as opposed to the Low Gainers who 
averaged only 12 rating points overall on course-related items. Low Gainers’ reliance on 
Nietzschean/Existentialist ethics is unsurprising, since it appeals to the sort of 
individualism that might be detected in the DIT. Low Gainers’ disinclination for theory 
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may signal personal interest schema concerns or the sort of instrumental-relativism of 
lower schema thinking from a neo-Kohlbergian point of view. Like Gainers, the Low 
Gainer group ended up preferring personal ethics formats over theoretical approaches. 
However, Laura and Luke both indicated emerging consideration of systematic, structural 
approaches to ethics even though their individualism eventually trumped these theoretical 
considerations. 
6.4.B Rubric Patterns across Groups 
A comparison of rubric ratings across groups provides a useful overview of the 
facets of moral reasoning development of these four different types of students as well as 
the kinds of course materials and activities that may be impactful for them. Discovering 
which “pieces” of moral reasoning are relatively active or inactive within particular 
student groups is illuminative of what instigates and/or stifles progress in this area of 
development.   
 Unsurprisingly, the ratings of High to High Scorers were markedly higher 
than the ratings within other groups. In fact, the lowest rating in that group, “Prosocial 
behavior” received a rating average that was as high as the highest average rating of the 
Low Gainer group, as depicted in Table 6.11. The moral reasoning development item that 
was rated highest for each group was “Principled thinking,” an item that signals a 
subject’s ability to articulate universalizable principles and expresses a desire to live by 
widely held principles. The subjects within all four groups clearly prioritized this 
endeavor. In general, we may say that the task of trying to identify solid and accepted 
principles to live by is a commonly shared goal among all subjects. Similarly, “Cognitive 
complexity,” defined in this rubric as demonstration of a subject’s capacity to exclude 
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Table 6.11  Moral Development rubric items ranked from highest to lowest (1-15) based on 
average rating per item by group, 0 (moral development item absent) -3 (moral development item 
highly engaged) 
 
Rank 
Low Gainers avg. 
Ratings 
Decliners’ avg. Ratings Gainers avg. Ratings 
High to High Scorers’ 
Avg. Ratings 
1 
Principled 
thinking  2 
Principled 
thinking 2.5 
Principled 
thinking 2.75 
Principled 
thinking 3 
2 
Personal & 
social 
responsibility 
2 
Personal & 
social 
responsibility 
2.4 
Cognitive 
complexity 2.75 
Personal & 
social 
responsibility 
3 
3 
Ethical 
evaluation 2 
Ethical self-
awareness 2.4 
Prosocial 
behaviors 2.6 
Prosocial 
attitude/ Civic 
engagement 
attitude 
3 
4 
Cognitive 
complexity  1.7 
Cognitive 
complexity 2.1 
Prosocial 
attitude/ Civic 
engagement 
attitude 
2.5 
Cognitive 
complexity 3 
5 
Prosocial 
behaviors 1.7 
Ethical 
evaluation 2.1 
Ethical self-
awareness 2.4 
Diversity 3 
6 
Religious 
attitude 1.7 
Prosocial 
behaviors 2 
Personal & 
social 
responsibility 
2.25 Critical thinking  3 
7 
Social 
complexity 1.7 
Critical thinking 2 Critical thinking 2.25 Socratic ideal 3 
8 
Context 
comprehension  1.7 
Context 
comprehension 2 
Ethical 
evaluation 2.25 
Global thinking 2.9 
9 Diversity 1.7 
Prosocial 
attitude/ Civic 
engagement 
attitude 
1.9 
Social 
complexity 2.25 
Ethical 
evaluation 2.75 
10 
Prosocial 
attitude/ Civic 
engagement 
attitude 
1.5 
Social 
complexity 
1.75 Socratic ideal 2.25 
Social 
complexity 
2.5 
11 
Ethical self-
awareness 1.5 
Religious 
attitude 1.75 
Context 
comprehension 2.1 
Religious 
attitude 2.25 
12 Socratic ideal 1.5 Moral behavior 1.75 Global thinking 1.9 Moral behavior 2.25 
13 Global thinking 1.3 Global thinking 1.5 Moral behavior 1.9 
Ethical self-
awareness 2.25 
14 Moral behavior 1.3 Diversity 1.4 
Religious 
attitude 1.9 
Context 
comprehension 2.25 
15 Critical thinking 1 Socratic ideal 1.25 Diversity 1.9 
Prosocial 
behaviors 2 
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simplistic problem solving, was rated in the top four rubric items in all groups. The 
prioritizing of this item across groups echoes the relatively high DIT N2 scores found in 
the total study sample (see Chapter 5 for details). Note that this item is not simply 
intellectual ability, which this study did not seek to correlate since DIT research strongly 
suggests that moral reasoning does not reduce to intellectual ability. “Personal and social 
responsibility” was yet another item that found its way into the highest ratings of many of 
the groups, with a first highest average rating among High to High Scorers and Low 
Gainers, and a second highest rating among Decliners. Only Gainers rated this item, 
defined as the seeing oneself as having agency in the welfare of others and the 
community, sixth out of fifteen items. However, it is interesting to note that Gainers’ 
second highest rating went to “Prosocial behavior” or adverting to social action intended 
for the benefit of others without anticipation of personal reward. None of the other groups 
included this item in their top average ratings. In fact, it was the lowest rated item for 
High to High Scorers. It would seem that while most subjects comprehend their own role 
in the good of others and society generally, only Gainers made moral or ethical action a 
priority over ideas of moral obligation.  
The area of clearest contrast regarded items “Global thinking,” and “Diversity,” 
which both deal with the degree to which a subject acknowledges and seeks 
understanding of global issues and to try to see them from different perspectives. As 
depicted in Table 6.12, “Global thinking” was among the three lowest average ratings for 
Low Gainers, Decliners, and Gainers, but was most among the top ratings by High to 
High Scorers. Similarly, “Diversity” was among lowest ratings for Gainers and Decliners 
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Table 6.12   Moral development rubric items ordered alphabetically, with group average ratings 
per item 
 
Moral Development Rubric 
Item 
(in alphabetical order) 
Low Gainers  
Avg. Rating 
Decliners 
Avg. Rating 
Gainers 
Avg. Rating 
High to High 
Scorers 
Avg. Rating 
Cognitive complexity 1.7 2.1 2.75 3 
Context comprehension 1.7 2 2.1 2.25 
Critical thinking 1 2 2.25 3 
Diversity 1.7 1.4 1.9 3 
Ethical evaluation 2 2.1 2.25 2.75 
Ethical self-awareness 1.5 2.4 2.4 2.25 
Global thinking 1.3 1.5 1.9 2.9 
Moral behavior 1.3 1.75 1.9 2.25 
Personal & social responsibility 2 2.4 2.25 3 
Principled thinking 2 2.5 2.75 3 
Prosocial attitude/  
Civic engagement attitude 
1.5 1.9 2.5 3 
Prosocial behaviors 1.7 2 2.6 2 
Religious attitude 1.7 1.75 1.9 2.25 
Social complexity 1.7 1.75 2.25 2.5 
Socratic ideal 1.5 1.25 2.25 3 
 
but among the highest rated items for High to High Scorers. Indeed, this item was rated 
more than a full point higher by High to High Scorers than any other group (next highest 
was the Gainer group) and more than doubled the rating of Decliners on that item. 
“Socratic ideal,” an item defined as acknowledging the limitations of one’s own 
understanding, contexts and experiences, was low for Decliners and relatively low for 
Gainers and Low Gainers, but very highly rated by High to High Scorers. Finally, Low 
Gainers’ lowest average scores came in on the rubric item “Critical thinking,” defined as 
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a demonstrated capacity to synthesize ideas, images, skills to address problems in 
innovative ways, while this item emerged as one of the highest rated items by High to 
High Scorers.  
Analysis via the course-related item rubric produced findings across groups that 
offer several fruitful areas for consideration. As shown in Table 6.13, High to High 
Scorers were rated on average the highest possible rating (3) on four course-related items: 
“Ethical-political theory,” “Ethical theory,” “Common Good tradition” and “Theory and 
real world connection.” That is, all four students in the High to High Scoring group 
mentioned or made use of theoretical approaches to ethical, political and common good 
issues and demonstrated a relatively advanced or nuanced grasp of those approaches in 
their post-course essays. They also regularly focused on the connection of those 
theoretical considerations with concrete and contemporary real world issues. In contrast, 
most combinations of these items were lower in the course related item ratings among the 
three other groups, with the sole exception of Gainers, whose essays demonstrated 
engagement along the rubric item “Theory and real world connection” as well. 
All four groups saw relatively high ratings regarding their references to texts and 
acknowledging the role of the course as interruptive of previously held ideas and beliefs. 
Three groups shared a common lowest rating (0) on the author/text-specific item, 
“Kantian ethics,” with the Decliners displaying some, albeit low, activity on that item. 
This low activity may reflect students’ rejection (or some Decliners’ acceptance) of a 
perceived rigidity within the Kantian ethical system. From a neo-Kohlbergian point of 
view, this rejection of the seemingly inflexible set of Kantian ethical absolutes makes 
sense as subjects attempt to reconcile complications encountered in the Conventional 
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stages. Kant’s call for grounding one’s morals in highly rigid formulas resonates with a 
Kohlbergian law and order-based ethics (Stage 4). Rest’s Maintaining Norms schema 
would also encompass this moral mode. Aristotle’s virtues-based ethics rates slightly 
higher engagement in students’ post-course essays, though not by much. Students  
Table 6.13  Course-related rubric items ranked from highest to lowest (1-10) based on average 
rating per item by group 
 
Rank Low Gainers average ratings 
Decliners 
average ratings 
Gainers 
average ratings 
High to High Scorers 
average ratings 
1 References to texts 2.3 
Ethical-
Political 
theory 
2.25 References to texts 2.5 
Ethical-
Political 
theory 
3 
2 
Course 
content as 
interruption 
2 
Nietzschean/ 
Existentialist 
ethics 
2.1 
Theory and 
real world 
connection 
2.25 Ethical theory 3 
3 
Nietzschean/ 
Existentialist 
ethics 
1.7 References to texts 2 
Course 
content as 
interruption 
2 
Common 
Good 
tradition 
3 
4 
Theory and 
real world 
connection 
1.5 
Course 
content as 
interruption 
2 
Ethical-
Political 
theory 
1.75 
Theory and 
real world 
connection 
3 
5 
Common 
Good 
tradition 
1.5 Ethical theory 1.9 Ethical theory 1.75 References to texts 2.75 
6 
Ethical-
Political 
theory 
1.3 
Common 
Good 
tradition 
1.6 Religious/Nat. Law ethics 1.75 
Course 
content as 
interruption 
2.75 
7 Religious/Nat Law ethics 1 
Theory and 
real world 
connection 
1.5 
Common 
Good 
tradition 
1.75 Religious/Nat. Law ethics 2.1 
8 Ethical theory .7 Religious/Nat. Law ethics 1.5 
Nietzschean/ 
Existentialist 
ethics 
1.5 Aristotelian ethics 2 
9 Aristotelian ethics .7 
Aristotelian 
ethics .75 
Aristotelian 
ethics 1.25 
Nietzschean/ 
Existentialist 
ethics 
.75 
10 Kantian ethics 0 
Kantian 
ethics .6 Kantian ethics 0 Kantian ethics 0 
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mentioned his ideas on relationship and friendships more regularly than the central ideas 
of his ethical treatise−the virtues needed to live a happy life. Similarly, authors and texts 
from the religious and Natural Law traditions received relatively slight mention.  
The most fascinating course-related rubric comparison across groups emerged in 
different prioritizing of “Ethical theory” or “Nietzschean/Existentialist ethics.” As stated 
above, all students mentioned references to texts and the course as interruptive of their 
own ideas. However, the actual course material and ideas from texts that different groups 
highlighted presented a startlingly different picture across groups. While Low Gainers 
and Decliners both highlighted “Nietzschean/Existentialist ethics” fairly regularly, rating 
on this item among Gainers and High to High Scorers was relatively low. These latter 
groups showed greater engagement with and mentioned much more regularly course 
material regarding ethical theory and ethical-political theory. Gainers’ and High to High 
Scorers’ partiality for comprehensive ethical theory combined with their prioritizing of 
the connection of theory and real world issues would be rewarded in a neo-Kohlbergian 
context which prizes this sort of higher order thinking and movement to connect ethical 
thinking to ethical action. Their preference for theoretical and systemic treatments of 
ethical issues over the individualist framework of Nietzschean/Existentialist ethics 
reiterates their commitment to moving beyond the scope of individual interests and “in-
group” preferences. It also echoes High to High Scorers’ and Gainers’ predilections for 
large-scale, systemic thinking in attempting to resolve the limits of simplistic law-and-
order arrangements. 
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Chapter 7: 
Essay Coding Analyses and Findings 
7.1   ESSAY ANALYSIS: THEMES/MOTIFS DETECTED IN OPEN AND AXIAL CODING 
A first cycle of open coding was completed on all pre-course and post-course 
essays from the 15 subjects chosen from the subsample. Words, phrases and sentences 
were highlighted and saved via Hyperresearch software and tagged to associate each item 
with moral development or course-related rubric items. Essays were subdivided into 
groups (details of groups can be found in Chapter 4) according to the study’s parameters 
and open codes were then merged to produce a set of axial themes for pre-essays and 
post-essays for each group. Thus, two sets of axial codes were identified for each group, 
including pre-essay themes and post-essay themes (eg. Gainers’ pre-essay themes and 
Gainers’ post-essay themes). A final round of selective coding was completed using these 
axial themes in order to glean the core or central themes of each group for comparison 
across groups. The following is a report of the findings from these analyses. 
7.1.A Themes within Groups 
7.1.A.1 Gainers’ Themes 
Several common themes emerged in open and axial coding of the Gainer essays. 
In pre-essays, all four Gainers emphasize the challenge of trying to answer a question like 
“What Is the Best Way to Live?” during the first week of college. Gretta2 reflects that 
“now that I have entered into a new chapter of my life…I have found myself in more 
diverse social situations in the first week of college than in my whole high school 
                                                 
2 Once again, pseudonyms are used throughout the study, with initial letters off pseudonym indicative of 
study group, eg. a pseudonym beginning with a G is part of the Gainer group. 
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career….I find myself missing the comforts of home and the security of the people I 
know so well.” Gwen notes that “sometimes happiness is found, and sometimes the 
search continues…what we perceive happiness to be is constantly changing,” echoing 
Grace’s stated desire for “a foundation that is constant, when everything else around me 
is constantly changing.” The theme of searching for a purpose or foundation in the midst 
of a changing horizon is pervasive in the Gainers’ pre-essays and is quite different from 
the sort of security issues found in the essays of the Decliners. While Decliners focused 
on the need for physical and familial security, Gainers focus instead on a desire for a 
personal foundation and sense of purpose and meaning. Themes of anxiety about 
uncertain and shifting personal foundations were largely missing in the essays of other 
groups, most clearly absent in the High to High pre- and post-essays.  
Gainers regularly reported in pre-essays that finding an answer to the question of 
a good and happy life would entail hard questions and arduous searching, with Gretta 
noting that “it takes bravery to live a reflective life…[taking] a lot of perseverance to 
keep reassessing your life and keep trying again to find the place where you belong.” 
These four pre-essays were full of words, phrases and ideas about challenges, striving, 
pursuing meaning, gaining foundations and finding purpose. Unlike any other group in 
the study, most Gainers posed numerous questions within their own essays. Geraldine 
suggested that the process of finding purpose would be “lengthy and open-ended” and 
would raise hard questions such as, “why am I here, and what am I doing?” Gretta 
highlighted the need for good and hard questions that would push her to reflect more 
deeply, at one point in her essay listing five questions in a row including, “Are these 
people like me? Do they share my values?.... These questions drive me insane…but now 
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that I am putting these questions to the test, I find that they help me on my road to finding 
my place….” She goes on to note that “[i]t is also a challenge to ask the right questions,” 
and not get caught up in the wrong, shallow questions that don’t lead one further toward 
meaning and a sense of purpose. Grace asserts confidently that the best way to live is 
“searching for [a] purpose, finding it, and then pursuing it.” This Gainer preference or 
predisposition for questions and challenges is echoed also in the Gainers’ expressed need 
for openness in this new college experience. Geraldine notes, “I want to push myself to 
try new things and meet new people,” while Gretta adds, “these answers don’t come 
easily…but the fact is at least I keep asking them.” Finally, Gwen sums it up this way: “I 
do not want to simply follow the crowd….I will aim to make my own decisions about 
how to make my life the best possible for me.” 
It is not surprising that Gainers’ post-essays reiterate the struggles inherent in the 
search for sustainable answers to life’s challenging questions, for purpose and meaning. 
Three of the Gainers highlight how hard this process is: “Many things have changed [for 
me] in this time period…but one thing has not changed, I still understand the importance 
of asking meaningful questions” (Gretta); “It’s hard to determine when exactly this 
question is answered…I do not think the good life is free of moments when you doubt 
this purpose or it seems lost…but you wrestle with asking yourself tough questions…” 
(Grace); “If happiness were easily attained, it would just as easily be lost” (Gwen). All 
four Gainers describe the search for authentic meaning, purpose or happiness to be 
central to finding a best way to live and describe that search as a process, something to be 
continuously sought, that is only just begun. Two of the Gainers stress in particular the 
challenge of this process, citing the cost of the search for knowing who you are and what 
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you truly believe and stand for. Gwen notes that suffering may aid us in gaining 
perspective on what really matters and while Gretta notes a universal ability to gain a life 
of goodness, she asserts that we “just need to be brave and truthful enough to do it.” 
These young women offer Viktor Frankl and Martin Luther King, Jr. as examples of 
figures who chose not to avoid the struggle that is a deep and sustained examination of 
the self and the state. 
7.1.A.2. Decliners’ Themes 
 While Gainers’ pre-essays focused on the precarious and uncertain nature 
of being a first year college student with many questions and much to learn, students in 
the Decliner group reported things in a quite different light. Their pre-essays were not 
peppered with questions, as the Gainers’ essays largely were. Instead, their essays took 
the the form of sure and solid opinions with not a single question listed in all four essays. 
These unquestioning voices revealed a dualism that was missing from the other groups. 
Essays and paragraphs began not with questions or statements qualified by “I think 
that…” or “It may be that…” as found in essays of other groups, but with strong 
unqualified statements like “A person must…” or “The primary focus in any person’s life 
must be….” These four Decliners exhibited a distinct air of confidence in their capacity 
to answer the question about living the best way, though almost all asserted the need for 
security and balance and several mentioned anxiety about making mistakes, wasting time, 
or letting restrictions hold them back. In general, these essays were profoundly different 
than their Gainer counterparts in both tone and content.  
All four Decliner pre-essays emphasized the need for balance. This was 
consistently highlighted by the four Decliner subjects. Diane focused much of her 
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reflection on a pyramid of needs (without citing Maslow, though clearly using his 
theoretical framework), spending more than one quarter of her paper discussing the 
human need for food and shelter and the effects of these needs on stress levels. She 
further argues that a fulfilling life would entail the “delicate balance of acting on one’s 
whims while maintaining a clear conscience” once these basics needs are met. Deb is 
similarly concerned with balance, likening living the best way to a high-stakes poker 
game. Her professional-gambler Grandfather taught his family that life is about knowing 
“when to hold a good-looking hand” and she chastises herself for youthful attempts to 
reach too far, too soon, seeing these as “simply stumbles in my pursuance of a balance 
between safe and risk-taking behavior.” She concludes with the reflection that we should 
recall “which gambles and refrains have worked and failed in the past, so that [we] can 
find the balance between the two and evolve into better human beings.” Subject David 
concurs, positing in his pre-essay that problems from his youth resulted from not 
understanding how to find the balance between perfectionism and being too carefree, 
finding now that “having a healthy mixture of both has…allowed me to learn exactly how 
I feel academics, and most of life in general, should be approached.” His conclusion that 
“being happy means finding that perfect balance between striving to do great things and 
having fun every day” aligns with the fourth Decliner, Denise, who lists five factors that 
“when combined, all…create a great balance between work and play” which is central in 
her picture of the good life. The theme of balance among Decliner essays was one of the 
most consistently found patterns among all of the essays. This concern may be connected 
to subjects’ need for a sure and secure foundation in the midst of the important 
transitional moment of starting college.  
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Decliners are keenly aware of factors that may threaten this delicate balance. For 
the most part, they view insecurity and external influences as the primary disruptors of 
perfect balance. Diane suggests that “life is riddled with numerous restrictions…two of 
the most powerful and influential…are gravity and conformity” which both cause 
physical and mental stagnation and atrophy. Diane’s conflation of conformity with the 
physical reality of gravity intimates a certain sense of powerlessness in the face of social 
convention or conformity. “Comfort is a huge factor,” claims Denise, who recognizes 
that finding the right balance between ambition and success will determine her capacity 
to have and do what she wants. She maintains that “with success, I will be able to afford a 
nice sports car and a high-end home…and teach in a third world country like Rwanda,” a 
goal which will satisfy both her passion to help others and her “interest in adventure.” 
Deb’s framework of life as a high stakes card game caused her to “[fear] that all my hard 
work would go to waste” at certain times in high school when her success seemed unsure. 
Decliners seem to perceive many external threats to the balance they crave and the goal 
of neutralizing those threats is apparent throughout their essays.  
One of the most unique and consistent characteristics of the Decliner group pre-
essays was what might be called a backward-looking quality. In three of the four essays, 
family and high school events and friends figure prominently, while the fourth essay 
focuses on the Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (presumably learned in a high school class). 
While students in the other groups mention high school and high school friends in 
passing, the Decliners were the only students to mention specific family members within 
their essays. Deb, David and Denise all highlight family and high school friends/events as 
central in their pre-essays, with Denise claiming that “[f]amily is a huge factor in my 
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quest for the perfect life….They are, in a sense, my foundation, so if I ever question 
myself, I can always go to my parents. They would give me advice on certain matters and 
maybe even bake me cookies and yummy desserts when I feel down!” Having “friends 
who know me and care about me” from high school is central to David’s sense of moving 
forward to find out who he truly is. This quality of looking backward to family and high 
school makes sense in light of the need for balance and security expressed by this group 
of students. The Decliners’ self-assurance is clearly premised on solid family ties but 
these students seem preoccupied with looking back to that foundation rather than looking 
ahead or to their new settings for help in defining what a best way to live might consist 
in.  
By the end of the year-long course, Decliners’ post-essays presented with very 
high levels of abstraction in characterizing what was needed for a best life. This was 
especially true in post-essays of the three female Decliners. Diane wrote eloquently and 
yet very abstractly on the need for authenticity in a successful life, noting within the essay 
the absurdity of trying to achieve it and the impossibility of ever fully understanding 
ourselves or others. She suggests that there is an “intellectual tension necessary to sustain 
the authentic self [and]…to maintain the emotional conditions needed to allow the 
individual to move fluidly, purposefully and meaningfully in life.” She goes on at length 
in a somewhat robotic tone about the temptations of the mind that persuade us that we 
can find meaning, such that we “go through the motion of living, but…without purpose 
and under false pretense…nonsensical and void of meaning.” Her idea of authenticity 
seems starkly alone and purely intellectual, though she admits that an authentic self “will 
be naturally inclined to live with others in a community and become a member of a 
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political system.” However, this persistently high abstraction belies Diane’s call for 
authentic community. The form of community she describes seems rather like drudgery, 
sounding neither appealing nor workable, and Diane herself concludes that society seems 
to inevitably create a psychological paranoia “in which one may never feel truly secure in 
her position in life.” Denise, too, concludes in her post-essay that the best life must be 
lived in a “society which comes at the cost of self-contentment and freedom” in which 
citizens are required to be active thinkers and would be compelled to treat those in lower 
classes (seen by her as an unfortunate but necessary aspect of society) with dignity and 
respect. She sees this working more effectively under the auspices of a highly conceptual 
belief in a God which is a “perfect being you can strive to be like and look up to.” 
Denise’s post-essay offers abstract ideas about establishing religious, political and social 
orders “full of enlightened individuals” who surrender their personal freedoms for the 
sake of communal order. But she seems half-hearted in this assertion. In a postscript to 
the essay, she adds, “I mean honestly, my dream world would have unicorns and 
rainbows in it. But since that is not practical, I guess I can settle for this one!” In the case 
of Deb, who drops her previously-used gambling analogy in her post-course essay, high 
abstraction also moves along religious lines. She notes that when she “hit rock bottom” 
during the year, she “prayed like I never had before…and I found self-love through 
God…now my life has meaning because of God’s love.” She concludes with a rather 
idealized view of how this would work, maintaining that, “life has meaning because of 
God’s love….[e]ach person needs meaning, and the best and only way to find that is 
through the meaning that God’s love instils in each human being.”  
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Deb’s shift from viewing life as a high-stakes card game to a seeming surrender to 
God was certainly connected a traumatic event during her first year of college which she 
reported in her essay. It is notable that two of the four Decliner essays included 
references to a significant emotional loss. David, whose decreased post-test N2 scores 
were the lowest in the subsample of essay writers, seems to “double down” on egoistic 
themes in his post-essay in which he refers to a difficult ending of an important 
relationship endured during the year. Rather than moving toward the high abstraction of 
the other Decliners, David writes about the experience of unrequited love which made 
him question himself. He considers his first essay to be very philosophical (though it 
wasn’t particularly so), reiterating and recommitting to his decisions in high school to 
find balance between perfectionism and being relaxed. For several pages, he recounts his 
reaction to living through the break up, determined now to find what is missing in his life. 
He describes losing weight and rebuilding his “muscle mass” in ways that “he hadn’t 
imagined that he could,” positing that in this physical transformation “my shallow 
motivations evolved into feelings of accomplishment and confidence.” He writes 
extensively about capturing lasting happiness, noting that “we are frustrated and unhappy 
when a person does not care about us the way we care for him or her, or similarly when 
our devoted time into an action or skill does not pay off the way we had desired.” 
Unsurprisingly, his essay is entitled “Reciprocated Love” and his conclusions tend 
toward a romanticized view of love that is willing to sacrifice everything for another 
person. Deb’s essay focuses on her attempts to find meaning in her grief following a 
traumatic event. She looks back on her initial, self-destructive reactions to this trauma 
concluding that the only way forward is to move beyond egoism to find a supportive and 
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loving community. She writes, “[e]ven though my four year old self tells me that it is, 
everything is not about me. Me, ME! But the I is important because when we start to 
correct ourselves and self-destruct less we can begin to offer the world our greatness.” 
Deb recounts great satisfaction in having been able to help a young girl while serving as a 
summer Bible camp counselor. She points out that the camp staff and everyone in her life 
who has loved and cared for her had done so out of a deep and abiding religious faith. In 
a time of trauma and grief, Deb’s post-essay is clearly marked by an intense search for a 
firm foundation to keep her from falling into a profound existential and moral abyss. She 
moves toward a communal model that first offers love and comfort, from which moral 
and ethical goodness will follow, “it is evident that a community’s job is to show others 
the right way. If we teach love, and preach love, people will be better.”  
Decliners’ post-essays do not entirely lack the sort of confidence and assuredness 
of their pre-essays. Though these essays do not communicate the high self-confidence of 
their pre-essays, Decliner post-essays still do not pose questions or refer to the issue of 
differing opinions on the central question of the best way to live, as many other essay 
writers did. Their use of textual references from the course consists almost entirely of 
noting how various thinkers support their own conclusions. The general tendency not to 
look to other ideas and to diverse opinions about the best way to live, accompanied by 
their wariness of external influences (demonstrated clearly in pre-essays) illuminates the 
sort of developmental retreat that many young adults experience when faced with 
personal and intellectual challenges. Though many of these Decliners acknowledge to the 
needs of those around them and of communities generally, their attempts to answer those 
needs come in highly abstract formulas. In thinking about how these students are or are 
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not moving forward in their preference for Postconventional Schema thinking, we might 
consider what sorts of basic and sometimes traumatic Personal Interest Schema concerns 
are drawing them back to lower schemes of moral development.  
7.1.A.3. High to High Scorers’ Themes 
The essays written by the four students in the High to High Scorers subsample 
were remarkable in a number of ways. High Scorers’ pre-course essays were articulate 
and presented a variety of themes. Rather than dwelling on the daunting challenge of the 
essay question as the Gainers had, or confidently approaching the question with certitude 
as the Decliners tended to do, the High Scorers took the approach of the pure or true 
relativist. These four high scoring subjects posited in their September essays that while 
demands of the world were important to consider, the question of the “Best Way to Live” 
could only be answered by the self, for the self. Henry begins, “When I think of the good 
life, no formula springs to mind….Each life is by its nature unique, indeed…facets of 
human existence render it not conducive to standardization or formulization….Any 
answer, then…will be inherently inadequate….To me then, the good life must be defined 
in the abstract.” Harold concurs with this principle, writing that “[W]hen answering the 
question ‘What Is the Best Way to Live?’ it is important to remember that the question 
refers to creating the best life for only that person, not anyone else. While it is true that 
helping other people is an important part of life, it does not benefit the subject of the 
question at all.”  
This focus on the self, however, does not take the form of self-absorption or self-
centeredness in High Scorers’ pre-essays. Rather, their individualism seems to have an 
existentialist quality, focused on themes such as viewing life as a whole, living one’s life 
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in a fully engaged way and authentically participating in life and in the world. Hugh 
asserts that we should always be open to change and growth, reflecting primarily on the 
aphorism, “[When] we cease to grow, we cease to live.” He concludes that openness and 
a willingness to be corrected and redirected by others are essential to living the best way 
since, “change is the very essence of what it means to be human.” Hannah echoes this 
chord, asserting that when “we become open to self-discovery, we become free to find 
our own happiness and we lose the clutter in our lives to find clarity.” For her, this 
getting to the essence of things beyond “the clutter” can “direct your life’s journey 
toward the things you find beautiful so that those moments when your life seems clear 
and in order…can turn into a lifetime of joy.” She mentions the sunsets of Utah as the 
thing she misses most from home, not because they remind her of home or family, but 
because they have the capacity to plunge her into a more deeply felt experience of the 
present moment. Henry’s version of this sentiment claims that “what matters is one’s 
disposition towards their own life….Living the good life is thus a decision…a decision to 
seek one’s own truth, one’s own priorities, one’s own values…unique to the soul who has 
crafted [them].”  
These rather cerebral construals for the most part remain fairly abstract in the 
group’s pre-essays, though High Scorers often allude to the need to ground their highly 
existentialist reflections in the real world. For instance, Henry notes that if one doesn’t 
figure out how to truly live his own life to the fullest, all the good he might want to do for 
others still would not be the best way to live, since “[at] the end of your life, you could 
have made a multitude of positive changes to the world, but if you did not enjoy a single 
second of it…what did you accomplish in life?” He concludes that finding love and 
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taking advantage of every possible opportunity offers the most benefit to the self and 
others. Hugh is more explicit in his desire to make a difference in the world, claiming that 
“what is most important to me is effecting change in the lives of those around me and in 
the community as a whole, in the spots that I believe need that change.” Despite these 
intimations of engagement with others and the world, however, the High Scorers’ pre-
course reflections remain relatively conceptual and nonconcrete. With one brief 
exception in Hannah’s pre-essay, none of the High Scorers mention home, family, high 
school or any perceived challenges of their present transition to college. These four 
subjects seem oriented to a larger, more abstract future and consider this essay question 
to be about life as a whole, seemingly without immediate implications. For the most part, 
they conclude that the question of living a best life is largely a progression, a process of 
decision-making or a journey that every individual must take up. 
By their post-essays, the High Scorers reassert this holistic approach but now 
more explicitly link its demands to society as well as to the self. Hannah, who in her pre-
essay posited enjoying sunsets as an example of how to live more fully in the moment, 
now sees her original insights as “incomplete and vague” but still pointing to something 
essential about those moments when she felt or perceived a rightness of being. She writes 
of being “most happy when my life felt in order.” But she adds now that “order and 
harmony are also the proper telos [aim] of society and should be treated as a societal end” 
since “society functions in the best way possible when it is rightly ordered, because 
whatever society values as the greatest good will affect all other things.” For her, 
understanding the “interconnectedness of people and the reality that each action of the 
individual affects the whole of society” provides for us a sense of the “holistic reality of 
 189 
society.” Harold also writes in very similar terms describing a “holistic individual” to be 
“truly good, for [he] strives to eliminate injustice and is genuine in the sense that it does 
not turn away from legitimate questions concerning the welfare of society.” He expresses 
a desire to strive for virtue by “addressing relevant issues facing me and the community 
around me” even though “this course of action has no benefit on [his own] social status.”  
All four of the High Scorers’ post-essays focus explicitly on the close link of individual 
and societal flourishing and emphasize the need for holistic social orders and systems. 
This group, much more than the other groups, takes a global perspective on the question 
of the best way to live and refer regularly to the interconnection between social and 
personal values. Henry posits that “while it is the individual’s job to create her own 
meaning, it is society’s job to create space for meaning to be pursued….We all have 
inherent dignity, which must be recognized both by our society and ourselves if we are to 
live the best way possible.” Hugh suggests that “human harmony” demands that we fight 
against capitalism’s “dehumanizing effects” that impact “aspects of our lives that 
previously resided outside the economic realm.” His concern that individuals may not be 
able to truly flourish within disorienting or corrupt social orders resonates with the global 
concerns of all four High Scorers.  
Indeed, while High Scorers’ post-essays were replete with issues of global scale, 
they also voiced concrete and particular concerns. While Hugh’s post-essay includes 
many textual references, he focuses his essay on a documentary about the economic 
collapse of 2008 which the class watched as an assignment. Like all of the High Scorers, 
Hugh admits that there are no easy answers to big problems facing society, noting that in 
the case of the economic meltdown, “good people making supposedly good decisions 
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resulted in the unjust economic ruin of so many.” He goes on to express his ambivalence 
about the “moral neutrality” of systems and institutions when so many people have to 
bear the brunt of systemic breakdowns. Henry more stridently declares that “systems 
reduce the individual” and arbitrarily define values and meanings. He asserts that this is 
why he works on political campaigns and argues that “we must be honest with ourselves 
about the root of the systems that underlie our society and recognize where we degrade 
rather than bolster the dignity of the individual.” Closer to home, Harold notes the regular 
disparity in college life between a “lifestyle with the appearance of goodness and one that 
is truly good” and states that “I am beginning to realize that the life I ought to live might 
not look much like this one.” Two full pages later, he revisits this theme in his 
conclusion, writing that, “it seems unlikely that the guy slapping girls’ butts at a party 
will go on to have any sort of ability to solve issues of injustice in the world.” This 
constant interchange between the flourishing of individuals and social systems is a clear 
mark of the High Scorers’ post-essays, indicating the propensity of the students in this 
group to pivot seamlessly from questions of individual goods to common goods. This 
clearly is the sort of ability sought in the DIT, which prizes one’s capacity to hold in 
adequate tension abstract values of justice on the one hand and the particular and 
immediate needs of individuals on the other.  
Rest’s construal of the Postconventional Schema ratifies High Scorers’ 
conclusions that while global and systemic problems may seem daunting, we should not 
fall into resignation or despair. These four students were surprisingly optimistic about 
what individuals and societies might accomplish. Hugh hopes that we might be called “to 
build a new economic paradigm, a system in which students read for the sake of gaining 
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knowledge and in which being a good banker means looking after the money of others 
rather than gambling with it.” As Henry adds, “my conception of the excellent life is 
predicated upon the simple notion that humans have the capacity to live excellently…to 
take seriously the truth of our lives without succumbing to despair and meaninglessness.” 
Finally, it is helpful to note that all of the four High to High Scorers highlight the 
importance of systems that work for the sake of the dignity and welfare of individuals. 
All four of these students stress the need for social order that encourages personal 
flourishing and social harmony. Their calls to create political and economic systems that 
promote goodness, respect and dignity were tinged with religious overtones, but for the 
most part, these students were restrained in their appeal to religious foundations. Hannah, 
who purports to have no particular religious commitment, finds value in the kind of 
“agapic love” and cosmic purpose that she has heard about from faculty and 
administrators. She balks at claiming any specific belief or insight into God, but sees 
religious ideas as helpful in recognizing “that our actions matter beyond just ourselves 
and affect the absolute and infinite scheme of things…and thus each individual’s actions 
have great significance in the big picture.” Still, these High to High Scorers seem to 
move from a version of pure relativism in pre-essays to exactly the sort of moral 
complexity that Rest and Kohlberg were seeking to identify. These students display an 
ability to move seamlessly between the demands of the individual and society, expressing 
nuanced understandings of the ways that social, economic, political and religious 
contexts intersect with concrete needs of individuals. For these students, questions of 
justice and morality are framed with an eye to how those may be worked out in people’s 
lived experiences and they thus assert that social and political orders ought to elevate 
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human interconnection and foster greater respect for human living. These are heady 
assertions from 18 and 19-year olds. Their insights into the reciprocal relationship 
between macro- and micro-moral demands coincide quite precisely with the 
characteristics of the ideal-types posited by Kohlberg, Rest and other moral development 
theorists.   
7.1.A.4. Low Gainers’ Themes 
Themes found in open and axial coding of Low Gainers’ pre-essays were very 
illuminating. These three essays shared many similar themes with both Gainers and 
Decliners. Low Gainers’ pre-essays exhibited some of the backward-looking quality of 
the Decliners, with Laura spending a fair amount of her essay reflecting on her father’s 
unhappiness in his job. She reports that he is considering a career change that would 
bring him back to a job he had wanted while in college, more than 25 years ago. She 
notes that “regardless of his monetary success he is unfulfilled,” and that some jobs 
“drive the humanity out of an individual as they are forced to value capital gain over 
personal relationships.” The two other Low Gainers mention family and friends as well. 
Luke claims that “in a basic sense what makes me happy is being around the people that I 
love,” but he seems uncertain about the sufficiency of this, noting that in his best life he 
“would have all of these basic necessities but on top of that material items of really high 
value.” Lucy claims that one cannot be happy without family and friends and the love 
that radiates in and between them. She insists that to live best includes “remembering that 
I am loved and have done fun things with those who love me,” reiterating the insistence 
on ties to family, friends and home common among Decliners. While Low Gainers often 
mentioned the need to search for purpose and pursue passion as Gainers had done, the 
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tones of their pre-essays were more confident, like Decliner essays. They posed no 
questions within their pre-essays, a consistent hallmark of the Gainer group. Low Gainers 
did acknowledge that finding happiness and purpose is a challenging search, a journey 
and takes effort, similar to Gainers’ pre-essays. Laura goes so far as to claim that “it is 
each person’s duty as a member of the global society to discover their [unique] talent and 
act upon it,” possibly alluding to the uncertainty that her father’s career change might 
present to the family.  
Uncertainty and some degree of fear are marks of Low Gainers’ pre-essays that 
are shared with Gainers. Luke writes at length about his present feeling of contentment 
and comfort, being “self-satisfied at this moment…I have no serious worries…[but] 
knowing that this could change in any instant.” Laura has a similar nagging feeling of the 
temporary nature of these assertions, noting that “[p]eople could be more fulfilled and 
live without the regret my father lives with if they listen to their purpose, rather than to 
their wallets, no matter how difficult it is to do so.” But for Gainers, that uncertainty 
resulted in a mandate to openness, whereas in Low Gainers, there is an air of sure opinion 
as seen regularly in Decliners. Also similar to Decliners, the Low Gainers seemed to 
crave balance. Lucy calls for balance several times in her pre-essay. She claims that we 
must balance taking care of oneself while trying to help others, “learning to balance 
selfishness with selflessness.” Indeed, this theme is so important that Lucy mentions it six 
times in her last two paragraphs alone.  
In post-essays, Low Gainers once again bring together aspects of both Gainers 
and Decliners in seemingly equal measure. Like the Gainers, each subject within the Low 
Gainer group focuses on finding a best way to live, or finding happiness as a challenge in 
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the face of persistent suffering that is part of life. Luke’s early insistence in his pre-essay 
that his life of comfort is close to the best life, now acknowledges that “temporary 
happiness is easy to come by…[but] brings both happiness and sadness” eventually. He 
wonders now at the end of the year if happiness is even “possibly unachievable,” and he 
concludes that “we as humankind simply will never live this way at the same time.” He 
laments that suffering is such that at any given time, someone or some group will be 
unhappy, but wonders if we are “morally responsibility for at least attempting to make 
other’s lives better.” It’s not surprising when reading this essay that Luke’s rubric ratings 
were substantially higher than the other two Low Gainers and that his DIT N2 scores 
moved him from the lowest quartile in Pre-tests to the third quartile in post-tests.  
Laura concurs with Luke’s sense (and Gainers generally) that life must include 
facing struggle and suffering. She claims we must live in community “for better or 
worse” and that “it is in being exposed to corruption [and corrupt people] that one 
discovers the strength of his character.” She highlights the life and writing of Viktor 
Frankl and admires his conclusion that love proves “that the good outweighs the 
bad…and gives one’s life meaning.” She goes on to claim that one must “trust in the 
strength of the absurd, in my case in the characters of relative strangers” to be happy and 
to live a full life, “even though it will inevitably lead to disappointment and incidences of 
heartbreak.” Laura relies on several political philosophers to build her basic 
communitarian position, including Aristotle as well as modern philosophers Hobbes and 
Rousseau. In an important way, Laura is trying to reconcile what she sees as a righteous 
human search for community and meaning with the intrinsic suffering and heartache of 
life. But it still seems to her like an act of absurdity.  
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Though Lucy gained in her post-test N2 score, moving from the second to the 
third N2 score quartile, her essay shared much with Decliner post-essays. She tended to 
move to high abstraction, as many of in the Decliner group did, relying on a rather 
abstract notion of authenticity as the key to the best life. Interestingly, this same theme of 
authenticity was used as a central point by Decliner Diane. Though Diane and Lucy were 
from different classes they came to extraordinarily similar conclusions about the need to 
become “an authentic self” (more so even than becoming authentic, they both insist on 
becoming this sort of self, or performing this type of authentic personhood). Both focus 
on the constant conflictual state of life and conclude that becoming authentic is the only 
way to diminish these conflicts. Lucy points to the conflicts “between a person and the 
public, the second between the individual and the world, and the last between man and 
himself” and decides that we must at least try to resolve the conflicts within ourselves. 
But the example she ends up using, after a high level of abstraction about life and the 
need to become an “authentic self” is this: “for example, if an individual does not want to 
go to a party but goes anyway because he feels pressured, he is going to experience an 
internal tension. Instead, this person should obey his will and make other plans.” This, for 
Lucy, is what authenticity might be about. She mistakes the existentialist exhortation to 
authenticity for voluntarism or the determinacy of the will:  
[i]f someone wants to dedicate his life to the service of others, it would be 
authentic of him to do so. If another wants to become a successful 
businessman and not give to others, it would be authentic to do this as 
well. Whichever way an individual choses to live his life, he should do it 
because he wants to.  
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Her desire to prioritize the individual’s will results in a problem of instrumental 
relativism that Lucy can’t quite work out. She goes on to conclude that “anyone who says 
they are perfectly happy is lying….All we can do as humans is to attempt to make the 
most out of what we are given. However, it is not easy. You may have to tell your friend 
that yes, her top is in fact ugly.” These are not the high moral and globally aware 
concerns of the High to High Scorers’ post-essays, or even the reiteration of how 
challenging it is to face the inherent suffering of life. Low Gainers’ reflections remain 
mostly oriented to concrete and particular issues within their own limited horizons. Other 
people largely remain “other” and as such are quite outside the orbit of these Low 
Gainers’ concerns.  That Lucy cannot conceive of a deeper moral issue for her final 
paper’s conclusion than how to tell a friend that her top is ugly reminds us of why her 
DIT scores remain low despite gains.  
7.2   ESSAY ANALYSIS: THEMES/MOTIFS DETECTED IN SELECTIVE CODING 
Selective coding offered a robust view of central motifs found across groups. 
Open coding provided a wealth of insights into themes in the writing of particular 
subjects and axial coding allowed the primary researcher to analyze general themes 
within each group. In order to gain adequate an adequate view across groups, however, 
selective coding sought a more holistic or bird’s-eye view of patterns identified within 
groups for the purpose of parsing themes from the subsample as a whole. The selective 
coding process in this case entailed thoroughly reviewing the axial codes of each group 
and condensing these codes to several main core themes or central ideas that emerged in 
each group. The following analysis resulted from a comparison of this selective coding 
process.  
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7.2.1 Moral Development Themes across Groups 
Analysis of student writing across the four student groups offers many insights 
into the moral reasoning development of first year college students. The sheer variety of 
characteristics exhibited across groups reveals the range of student moral development 
found among students enrolled in the type of liberal education program at the heart of this 
assessment. Findings from across-group analysis allows us to consider how student work 
may signal a student’s position along that developmental range and may help educators 
become better at reading and responding to those signals. Within across-group analysis, 
the essays of Gainers, Decliners and Low Gainers were the easiest to compare and 
contrast. Themes found in High to High Scorers’s essays were quite different from the 
other groups and yet those differences offer insights into refining programmatic 
objectives with an eye to increasing student moral development generally.  
Juxtaposing Gainers and Decliners provided important areas of contrast, with 
Low Gainers sharing attributes of both of these groups. One of the most striking ways in 
which Gainers and Decliners differ is in the format of their pre-course essays. Gainers 
consistently posed their answers in terms of questions while Decliners offered very sure 
and solid opinions about the essay question. Indeed, in post-essays Decliners seemed 
hesitant to critique their own pre-essays and in some cases reiterated their first answers or 
indicated that they were simply adjusting their original ideas. Gainers’ openness, on the 
other hand, was ratified not only by their claims that one should be open to questions and 
different perspectives, but also by the very use of questions throughout their essays. 
Gainers also regularly reported that adequately answering this question of the best way to 
live was a challenge. All Gainer essays referred to this as a pursuit, a process, a search 
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and all Gainers noted the high degree of difficulty of this pursuit. In this sense, Gainers 
present a very forward thinking posture and they see this pursuit as an active and 
demanding process. Many Gainers write about needing to leave behind old ideas and 
ways of thinking and being anxious about moving forward into unknown territory. The 
questions used in their essays exhibit how poised they are for development. Decliners’ 
essays exhibit something quite contrary to this. Their essays are marked by a backward-
looking quality. Most mention home, family and friends specifically and spend a fair 
amount of these short essays affirming how important these close circles are, referencing 
others outside their circles only in conceptual terms, as if the “world out there” is still 
only a vague idea. In some sense, Decliners reflect much more on where they have come 
from rather than where they are going. They focus on the need for balance, which no 
other subjects highlighted with the exception of one Low Gainer, Lucy. Interestingly, 
Lucy’s post-essay was the only subject from the essay subsample to join Decliner David 
in logging a negative change score on the moral development rubric. Decliners’ need for 
balance and safety seems to be an expression of a general anxiety of moving toward a 
future they perceive as demanding. While they express a desire for freedom (presumably 
associated with adulthood) and are deeply suspicious that social, ethical and political 
structures will limit those freedoms, their yearning for safety and balance reveals a basic 
fear of surrendering the security of childhood.  
In post-essays, Decliners often move to high abstraction along ethical, personal 
and religious themes. At the end of the course many Decliners mention difficult personal 
challenges such as the death of a family member or a breakup with a romantic partner, 
pointing to the sort of circumstances that may impact or interrupt development. Unlike 
 199 
Gainers, they do not see finding a happy or meaningful life as a difficult task or as a 
pursuit or struggle. They acknowledge the need to find one’s purpose but this seems to 
them to be a discovery that will simply happen, while Gainers see this as a challenging 
task −something to be done and pursued. The question of personal ethical agency 
emerges here as an important distinction across groups. Gainers seem to be working out 
the connection of theory and real world issues as it relates to them. They scored much 
higher on the moral development rubric item, “Theory and real world connection” than 
Decliners or Low Gainers, and their post-essays advert to these concerns. However, they 
did not mention or reflect on specific theoretical models from course material that might 
help in this endeavor. They intimated concern for the connection of theory and personal 
ethical agency to real world problems, but ultimately chose personal ethics over larger 
construals of ethics or morality by the end of the course. Decliners similarly expressed 
concern about how things in the world ought to run but made no attempt to connect their 
own ethical agency to problems of the world or issues outside their own spheres. For 
them, the centrality of self was expressed in terms of personal interests, not personal 
agency in the world.  
Not surprisingly, Low Gainer essays share qualities with both the Decliner and 
Gainer groups. Low Gainers see finding a happy or best life as a challenge or a difficult 
search, much like Gainers did in both pre- and post-essays. In pre-essays they posed this 
pursuit as active −something one must strive for, achieve, and discover −as Gainer pre-
essays had. However, the general hesitation of the Gainer group and that group’s 
propensity for posing numerous questions within their reflections was missing from this 
Low Gainer group. Instead, the Low Gainers expressed themselves in the same format as 
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Decliners, offering their answers in the sort of opinion format as opposed to a questioning 
format. Still, these Low Gainers also were more tentative about their answers than 
Decliners, acknowledging that their answers might need adjustment. They seemed 
anxious about what they didn’t know but showed no indication of being ready to move 
toward larger social or moral issues. Echoing Perry’s Multiplicity stage, these students 
evinced no desire to raise truly challenging or even possibly irreconcilable questions 
beyond the scope of their own circles, and yet they place great trust in their own instincts 
in seeking good and meaningful lives. Low Gainers also shared with Decliners a focus on 
home, family and friends though with less specificity. Like Decliners, Low Gainers 
expressed the need for balance, especially in regards to balancing self-interest and 
selflessness. This seemed to point to a basic tension in the Low Gainer essays between 
wanting to take the welfare of others into account but fearing that it would demand too 
much of them to do so. In post-essays, Low Gainers agreed that struggle and suffering are 
part of the search for a meaningful and happy life. They do not engage in the movement 
toward high abstraction found in Decliner post-essays, nor do they move to the level of 
questioning that is upheld and reiterated in Gainer post-essays. Rather, Low Gainer post-
essays conclude largely that suffering is just a part of life that must be admitted: that 
heartache and struggle are inevitable, no life is perfect, and conflict is a necessary facet of 
community. But all Low Gainers state in post-essays that political, ethical and religious 
institutions are necessary, even though they will never be perfect. Low Gainers seem to 
be in the position of recognizing the limits of dualism and personal interest. They seem 
ready to admit that workable systems are needed for the advancement of all−even those 
outside “in-groups.” And yet, Low Gainers’ pre- and post-essays exhibit a fairly incessant 
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circling back to themselves, a tendency that impedes a sustained consideration of the 
larger social demands of communal and cultural contexts.  
As stated above, Decliner essays exhibited a great deal of backward-looking 
reflection. Specific family members and high school friends, as well as lessons learned in 
high school (both academic and personal insights) were prominent throughout these 
essays. Balance and safety were highlighted by these students but were completely absent 
in Gainer and High to High Scorer essays. Themes of physical health, basic human needs 
and aspects of homelife emerged regularly in Decliner essays but were absent in the 
essays of other subjects, with a few slight exceptions among Low Gainers. Decliners 
displayed a high level of abstraction in post-essays, perhaps as a mode of coping with 
challenges posed to their dualist viewpoints from events in their personal lives, 
coursework or general maturation. This movement to high abstraction suggests not a 
forward motion to a deeper consideration of larger communal or cultural contexts, but 
rather a retreat from those considerations to some other, more abstract dualism. For 
instance, Diane’s post-essay focuses almost entirely on the demand for personal 
authenticity and pure freedom above all else, even though she claims the very idea of 
these is inherently absurd and cannot be reconciled in coherent social orders. This sort of 
retreating from the basic question of a best, meaningful or good life is a regular theme 
among Decliners and it communicates their sense of futility in the face of coordinating 
complex social demands. Decliners’ preference for existentialist themes and texts from 
the course echoes this attitude of futility and the subsequent desire to retreat to the self as 
the starting point of any reflection on meaningful living.  
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This sense of the futility in finding a truly adequate answer to the question of the 
best life was also found among High to High Scorers’ post-essays but here it is found in a 
new context. These high scorers also referenced existentialist themes as Decliners had, 
but posed Existentialism’s insistence on the centrality of the individual as a necessary 
supplement to their very pronounced preference for large ethical and political 
considerations. Their doubts about the ever sufficiently answering the question of a best 
way to live were explicitly linked to a fear that individuals may get lost in the necessary 
process of establishing solid and progressive social, ethical and political systems. The 
futility expressed in these essays suggests something akin to Perry’s advanced stage 
relativism, which allows for commitment to communal structures and systems. It is not 
surprising that High to High Scorers’ pre- and post-essays essays offer a wide array of 
strong appeals for adequate social orders and political structures that ensure justice for 
all, with special emphasis on the marginalized. Essays from this group also highlight 
religious themes that coincide with these political goals, linking these social concerns to a 
holistic view of the person and society. High to High Scorers are careful to keep coming 
back to the concrete needs of individuals even as they make fairly grand claims about the 
need to give greatest attention to large-scale social, ethical and political structures. In pre-
essays, High to High Scorers were already making clear statements about how closely 
linked individuals and society are in the pursuit of authentic and meaningful happiness.  
In post-essays, each of the High to High Scorers emphasized that the best way to live 
must involve active and simultaneous concern for individuals and communities. This is 
exactly the kind of macro-morality that Rest identified in his Postconventional Schema: 
an ability to fluidly move between the demands of macro-morality and micro-moral 
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concerns. That is, from the neo-Kohlbergian point of view, advancement in moral 
reasoning is evinced by one’s capacity to hold in complex tension the need for large, 
working ethical and political systems and the exigencies of individual living and concrete 
realities. The High to High Scorers of this study are clearly excelling in reconciling this 
tension and finding nuanced and complex ways to approach issues of macro- and micro-
morality, as shown both in their DIT N2 scores and in their writing.  
7.2.2 Course-Related Themes across Groups 
Rubric analysis of course-related items captured an overview of student 
engagement with the course materials across and within the different groups, as reflected 
in post-essays. However, axial and selective coding revealed interesting nuances 
regarding how students made use of course texts, ideas and class assignments that were 
not readily apparent in rubric analyses. Subjects’ treatments of Aristotelian and ancient 
Greek ethical thought is an illuminating example. All groups included at least one subject 
who mentioned Aristotle, using his ideas on personal moral agency, friendship, or justice. 
Aristotle was one of the commonly mentioned figures in post-essays but there was wide 
variation in how the groups utilized this thinker’s practical approach to ethics. Gainers 
and High to High Scorers demonstrated high engagement with Aristotelian thought, with 
many of these students adding Socrates and/or Plato in their reflections on practical 
ethics. Decliners and Low Gainers mentioned Aristotle’s ethical ideas with some 
frequency but showed less engagement with those ideas overall. Most interesting, 
however, was how the groups differed in juxtaposing thinkers and ideas.  
While only two Gainers’ post-essays featured the ideas of Aristotle, all four 
Gainers highlighted his or other works such as that of Socrates and Jesus in order to 
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articulate the hard work and sacrifice that a truly happy life would entail. When Gainers 
did refer to Aristotle, they combined his practical ideas with the works and words of 
Viktor Frankl, Martin Luther King, Jr., Socrates and Jesus, all figures who suffered in the 
pursuit of a good, ethical life. Gainers seem to present these figures aspirationally, as 
models of how a good life might actually look when things inevitably get challenging. 
For them, Aristotle’s approach to a life of happiness and goodness offers a theoretical 
structure that also practically addresses the fragility of human living. In the case of a third 
Gainer, Socrates’ teachings were posited as a helpful guide and reiterate the importance 
of openness, titling her paper, “The Importance of Questions According to Socrates, 
Plato, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Me.” Combining Greek thought on the development of 
virtue and ethics with figures whose work and lives point to the great demands of the 
ethical life is a common and central theme found among Gainers. This echoes general 
themes found throughout Gainer essays of their awareness of and openness to the 
challenges of moving forward to ethical engagement in the world.  
High to High Scorers share this engagement with ancient Greek ethics. However, 
they combine Greek philosophical thought with contemporary, global issues, rather than 
focusing this engagement on questions or figures of the past. High to High Scorers were 
much more apt to bring Aristotle into dialogue with documentaries they had viewed, 
questions about the inherent fairness of modern economic systems, contemporary social 
justice issues, or how to reconcile the rights of individuals and social structures. This 
tendency affirms the moral development rubric analysis’ finding of High to High Scorers’ 
advanced capacity to hold macro- and micro-moral questions in tension and their aptitude 
for comprehending the lived implications of theoretical understanding.  
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Contrastingly, the two Decliners who mentioned Aristotle or ancient Greek 
thought in post-essays used these ideas quite differently than Gainers and High to High 
Scorers. In one case, Aristotle’s thought was presented in highly abstract and theoretical 
terms and in another, only Aristotle’s theory of friendship was mentioned in the context 
of the subject’s assertion that living a good life “require[s] relationships with other 
people.” This, the author suggests “is a very realistic viewpoint, that people in society 
struggle between altruism and serving only themselves.” Decliners concern with the self 
seems to block their attempts to deeply engage with Greek notions of a practical ethics of 
agency and its implications for contemporary issues.  
Finally, Low Gainers were even less apt to mention Aristotle or engage in ancient 
Greek ethical thought, but did mention Viktor Frankl’s reflections on suffering or “the 
suffering of the Jews in the Bible,” reminiscent of Gainer post-essays. While Low 
Gainers saw courage and optimism in the face of suffering as admirable, they gave their 
assent to it begrudgingly. As one subject put it, “[i]f Viktor Frankl, who lived through the 
worst evil that community living has produced, can still say that living with others is 
worth it…then it is safe to say that the good outweighs the bad.” But this, she concludes, 
includes our ability to “trust in the strength of the absurd.”  
Coursework is clearly perceived and processed differently among these groups. A 
student’s ability to apprehend the relationships between course materials, her own life 
and the larger issues and problems of her times is evidently connected to her moral 
development. Whether one’s ability to make those connections is a cause or effect of 
moral development is unclear but it seems apparent that a student’s reception of course 
material and her capacity to grasp the connection of coursework to “real life” tells us a lot 
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about her moral development generally and how that development might present itself to 
educators. 
7.3   ESSAY ANALYSES: LIMITATIONS OF FINDINGS 
There are several important limitations to consider regarding the findings from the 
present study’s analysis of student writing and any conclusions that might be drawn from 
them. First, there is the matter of possible researcher bias. The subsample of students 
included in the qualitative component of the study was a convenience sample that 
included two classes out of sixteen classes included in the program at the heart of the 
study. One of these classes was taught by the primary researcher. Thus, of the 15 students 
whose essays were eventually selected for the writing analysis, 8 were students in the 
primary researcher’s class. Though the researcher has taught the class for 16 years prior 
to this study, it is possible that she unintentionally taught the course in a way that 
implicitly or explicitly advantaged student performance on the DIT and student writing 
along rubric lines. Additionally, although names were removed from student writing and 
aliases were assigned, it is possible that the primary researcher’s knowledge of the 
students and their general attitudes and behaviors would add confounding bias to the 
analysis process. This type of researcher bias is a very serious consideration, especially in 
qualitative research. However, the mixed-methods approach of the present study may 
ameliorate researcher bias to some degree, since DIT scores were used to determined 
student groups rather than teachers in the program or the primary researcher. 
Additionally, rubric analyses that were piloted with a second rater (who was not involved 
in the program being studied), were helpful not only in rating students on a variety of 
literature-based moral development and course-related items, but also aided the writing 
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analysis by highlighting aspects of essays that were important, rather than depending on 
the researcher’s understanding or conceiving of student ideas. It is hoped that these 
aspects of the study mitigate some of the study’s possible researcher-based bias. 
Limitations of the study also include concerns about the students involved in the 
study’s writing subsample. An ideal sample for the writing analysis would have included 
a random selection of students from all classes participating in the DIT, but 
unfortunately, only these two classes used both pre- and post-course essay assignment. 
The impact of teaching practice, demographic diversity within the class, student self-
selection into the course and into these two classes specifically, may all confound the 
findings as well but were not measured in this study. However, particular qualities of the 
course, including the relatively small class size and full year format, offered students not 
only depth of contact with ideas and materials of the course but also offered a sustained 
and communal discussion of ethical, social, political and moral questions at a time when 
researchers have found young adults making great strides in moral reasoning 
development. As stated earlier in this work, research has demonstrated very clearly that 
college participation positively impacts moral reasoning development, with particular 
advancement in the first year of college. Moreover, research shows that this development 
does not reduce to intelligence or to a number of other factors one might assume 
underlies this sort of development. In order to get a better sense of how college student 
moral development actually happens and how specific college experiences influence that 
development, it is important to listen carefully to what students themselves report about 
their own ideas about how one best constructs and lives a meaningful and purposeful life.  
7.4   ESSAY ANALYSES: CONCLUSION 
 208 
Despite potential limitations, the qualitative component of the present study offers 
an important element to a thorough and robust examination of student moral reasoning 
development. While quantitative analysis via the DIT and rubric analyses offer 
generalizable data about students and their experiences in a college course or program, 
qualitative analysis uncovers facets of moral development that escape quantitative 
measures. How students perceive their own development and how capable they are in 
articulating different and differently changing aspects of moral development are 
imperative for gaining a full picture of advancement in this developmental area.  
Having pre- and post-course essays in this case offered a unique view of a variety 
of cognitive and affective movements associated with moral reasoning development. The 
essays at the center of this part of the study showed substantial variation in both students’ 
moral reasoning development at the beginning and end of the year-long course and the 
extent to which course-related materials impacted or interacted with that development. 
However, the writing analysis also contributed two important and unique facets of 
student moral development that are of interest to educators: first, the analysis 
demonstrates how differently students at various stages of development receive and 
process coursework and course materials; second, the analysis reveals important features 
of moral development that educators may easily identify to better instill, support and 
build upon moral reasoning advancement. Knowing what moral reasoning looks like in 
students who are advanced in this area and who gain greatly in their first year, as well as 
knowing what blocks development may provide educators with important considerations 
for designing courses, creating responsible and reasonable educational objectives and 
pedagogical strategies that actually correspond to student development.  
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Chapter 8: 
Implications of the Study and Conclusion 
8.1   REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DESIGN 
Moral development is a notoriously elusive area of development research, 
simultaneously widely contested and sought in American higher education. In that arena, 
the advancement of moral development boasts a wide array of concerned stakeholders, 
from college professors and administrators to politicians, employers, students and 
parents. There is much at stake in how we address what moral development is, what it is 
not, whether and to what extent it can be measured, and what educators can do to set the 
stage for it. These issues are particularly important for those who design and implement 
liberal education programs, since moral development has long been claimed as a goal of 
that educational paradigm. As public debates intensify over the cost, value and purpose of 
higher education, educators in the liberal education tradition have good reason to defend 
moral development as a key objective but must demonstrate its ability to deliver on this 
claim. Evidence-based assessment is a critical piece of this endeavor. Against the 
backdrop of public and political demands for accountability accompanied by increasing 
shifts toward vocational and pre-professional higher education, liberal education needs to 
prove its relevance and value. To that end, liberal education, which has not historically 
been oriented toward research and evidence-based design and evaluation, must begin to 
fruitfully assess the objectives it claims to uniquely advance. Those aims extend far 
beyond purely intellectual pursuits. The persistence of moral and ethical development in 
American college and university mission statements testifies to its enduring presence. But 
an important question remains: can the moral aims of liberal arts education be adequately 
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measured and if so, what can we discover about the sorts of experiences that motivate, 
promote and sustain moral growth?  
The present study contributes to addressing these questions by examining data on 
one aspect of moral development –that of moral reasoning development (described in 
detail in Chapter 2)− among first year college students enrolled in a liberal education 
program at a research university with a robust liberal arts core curriculum. Moral 
development literature suggests that the period between adolescence and young 
adulthood is a very productive time for moral reasoning growth and that this area of 
development is highly active in the first year of college, especially in the context of 
residential four-year colleges (this is the case even when a number of related factors are 
controlled, such as intelligence, college readiness, race, gender, and so forth). As 
researchers Patricia King and Mathew Mayhew put it, “intentionally or unintentionally, 
moral development is an outcome of higher education” (2002, p. 249). These researchers 
have joined others in exploring the impact of various aspects of liberal education –course 
materials, pedagogical strategies, classroom sizes and times, teaching styles, etc.− to 
uncover aspects of liberal education that might be uniquely effective in advancing student 
moral reasoning. However, research is only just beginning to help us understand precisely 
how and why that development is happening and which particular aspects of college are 
most influential in this advancement.  
This study takes an important step toward understanding the association of moral 
reasoning development and liberal education coursework that seeks to set the conditions 
for that development. Results of the study illuminate important features of student moral 
reasoning that should guide the planning, implementation and evaluation of courses that 
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anticipate moral development objectives. The study’s findings indicate wide variation of 
moral reasoning development and developmental gains in a group of first year college 
students during a year-long liberal education course designed to engage students in 
questions of justice, ethics, virtue and the good life through a rigorous study of the 
philosophical and theological foundations of western thought. This variation in student 
development interacts in important ways with students’ ability to receive, engage and 
make meaning of what they encounter in the educational process. Implications of these 
results fall into two main categories: first, the study offers a wealth of information about 
the moral reasoning development of a group of first year college students and how their 
levels of development and gains over time interact with liberal education coursework; 
second, the results provide insights into effective assessment practices for liberal 
education courses and programs. This second set of implications raises a number of 
important questions for practitioners of liberal education as they begin to take seriously 
the charge to evaluate programmatic objectives using data-driven methods that have not 
traditionally sat comfortably within that educational paradigm.  
8.2 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY FINDINGS 
The study focused on three central research questions. The first research question, 
whether this course resulted in moral development growth, is answered affirmatively. 
The second inquiry investigated how students perceive the moral dimensions of the 
course and the third inquiry explored the relation of those course dimensions to student 
moral reasoning development. Despite variation found in student perception of the 
course, triangulated quantitative and qualitative data aids us in gaining a full picture of 
students’ engagement with aspects of the course and the impact of that engagement on 
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moral development. Distinguishing subsample groups allowed an exploration of the 
attributes, concerns, opportunities and impediments associated with the moral growth of 
students at different stages of development. The following section will explain the 
study’s affirmation of the first research question and will address results related to the 
second and third questions. Interpretations of the results will be presented in section 8.3 
and implications of the findings will be presented in sections 8.4 and 8.5. 
Students in the study sample demonstrated tremendous growth over the year of 
the course as compared with national norms. Even though mean pre-test scores of this 
sample showed a very high starting point for this sample relative to researched national 
norms, mean gains of this sample were commensurate with typical gains reported over 
four years of college in aggregated research. While the quasi-experimental nature of the 
study cannot establish the cause of these sorts of gains, the study takes important steps in 
exploring which aspects of the educational experience might be influential in this 
development. Great variation was identified among the DIT scores of students in the 
course though mean N2 scores of the whole sample were found to be significantly higher 
than national norms for college students in both pre- and post-tests. In fact, the pre-test 
mean scores of this sample more closely match national figures for Master’s degree 
students and mean post-test scores came in even higher, rivaling nationally normed 
scores of students in advanced graduate professional degree programs. It is apparent that 
a significant percentage of students in this course present with very high levels of moral 
reasoning compared to other students of the same age and educational level, and most 
students will make significant gains while enrolled in first year college courses. 
Additionally, students on the whole will present with a wide array of moral reasoning 
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capacities, from these very high levels to quite low levels of moral reasoning, and that 
development will change positively or in some cases negatively in widely divergent ways 
within the context of our courses and programs.  
The type of variation found across the study sample in terms of DIT pre- and 
post-test N2 scores and findings from analyses of student writing is instructive. DIT 
outcomes showed a wide range of student development including low-level scorers, 
subjects who gained or declined precipitously in N2 scores, students who experienced 
gains from very low points along the DIT spectrum, and students whose scores were 
substantially higher than national norms and their classmates. Results showed that 12% 
of the sample posted very high N2 scores at both the start and end of the course, while 
5% of the sample posted N2 scores well below national norms for students of that age 
and educational level. While the mean gains of the sample were notable, 27% of the 
sample made substantial gains of more than one standard deviation, with 11% of the 
sample making these sorts of gains from quite low starting points. The picture was not 
entirely rosy, however. Seventeen percent of the sample posted declines in N2 scores by 
the end of the course, though steep declines (a full standard deviation) were rare. Using 
four of these categories, High to High Scorers, Gainers, Low Gainers and Decliners, a 
helpful picture of moral development attributes and course engagement patterns emerged 
from student writing analyses within and across groups. Two moral development rubrics 
including 15 literature-based components of moral reasoning (such as “Prosocial 
behavior” and “Civic engagement attitude”) and 11 course related items (such as “Course 
content as interruption” and “Aristotelian ethics”), offered a close examination of which 
components of moral reasoning and which features of the course were actively 
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emphasized (or underemphasized) by students in their writing about living “the good 
life.” Variation within student writing was remarkable and is indicative of how essential 
qualitative analysis is in explaining more robustly what moral reasoning development 
data means. The study found high variation across these student groups and great 
consistency within groups regarding notable aspects of moral development in which 
students seemed most or least engaged. Those same patterns of variation and consistency 
were identified in student reporting of how coursework interacted with their evolving 
abilities to address questions with moral dimensions. 
Students with very high moral reasoning scores displayed a capacity for pivoting 
fluidly between micro- and macro-moral concerns and, though concerned with the 
establishment of functioning systems and institutions, always tracked back to a care and 
concern for individuals even over and against societal demands. They showed greater 
preference for connecting real world issues to the ethical and political theory than their 
classmates and the scope of their moral, ethical and political concerns sought wider and 
more diverse contexts than students at lower levels of development. These high scorers 
consistently brought textual analysis of justice issues into dialogue with contemporary 
issues and expressed openness to diverse and diverging opinions on the good life. High 
Scorers consistently made connections between class materials and other ideas, texts, 
lectures, documentaries and activities from other parts of their lives. Other students, 
whose N2 post-scores exhibited great gains but who did not reach these highest moral 
reasoning elevations, shared with high scorers a proclivity for combining theory and real 
world concerns. Their essays added their sense of how hard they perceived this pursuit to 
be. Gainers consistently viewed the search for the good life as a struggle but did not shy 
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away from the challenge. The most startlingly common feature of Gainers’ writings was 
an almost incessant use of questions, mostly directed to themselves, about what a life of 
justice and ethics might entail. It is notable that no student from outside the gainer group 
posed a single question in essays, while this was a common feature in Gainer essays. In 
post-essays this preference for questions was combined with an appreciation of thinkers 
who exemplified an “examined life” and engaged in dogged or even self-sacrificial 
pursuits of justice.  
At the other end of the moral development spectrum, students posting declining 
N2 scores took a distinctly different approach to reflecting on the good life. They were 
overly and overtly confident in their reflections, offering no questions and little 
acknowledgment that the question of a good life posed any difficulty. Writing from this 
group exhibited a backward-looking tendency, as though home and past friendships and 
experiences had taught them enough to sufficiently address the question. Decliners and 
Gainers privileged principled thinking and apprehended personal agency in the welfare of 
others, but Decliners scored lowest of all groups in integrating diverse perspectives and 
acknowledging the limitations of their own understandings and contexts. Comprehensive 
assessment like this can pinpoint significant differences in the ways that one type of 
student makes meaning of moral concerns as opposed to another. Students who showed 
declines in moral reasoning and students who gained from very low pre-test positions 
share a basic preference for existentialist and Neitzschean themes within course material 
as well as a relative distaste for theory. Low Gainers’ share with Gainers an apprehension 
of the challenge of pursuing ideas about the good life, but their tendency to prioritize 
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individual experience while eschewing theory reveals how much like their Decliner 
classmates these Low Gainers are with respect to reception of course materials.  
8.3 INTERPRETATION OF THE STUDY FINDINGS 
8.3.A Interpretation of DIT Findings 
Findings in this study strongly support moral reasoning research claims. However, 
adequate interpretation of these findings must address some of the unexpected aspects of 
the results. DIT scores and gains found in the study were both substantially higher than 
national norms (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 1999b, 2000), which raises questions 
about the validity of the sample and the influence of confounding variables. The first set 
of concerns is associated with particular attributes of the sample and course investigated 
in the study. The course at the center of the study is offered at a highly selective 
university. Due to this selectivity, we assume that students enrolled in this university 
would have significantly higher intellectual ability compared with national trends and 
since intelligence is positively associated with the development of moral reasoning it 
makes sense that scores of students at a highly selective college would post higher DIT 
N2 scores (King & Kitchener, 1994; King & Mayhew, 2004). Moreover, the observed 
course is known for its rigor and enrollment in the course is limited so the course likely 
attracts students with high cognitive motivation which is also found to be associated with 
moral reasoning growth (Mayhew, Seifert & Pascarella, 2010; Mayhew, Wolniak & 
Pascarella, 2008). One might argue that the high moral reasoning scores and gains found 
in the study reflect advanced intellectual ability, cognitive complexity or advanced 
cognitive motivation. Interestingly, the study sample, which included students from 
across the four areas of the university (including Schools of Nursing, Education, Arts and 
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Sciences, and Management) posted mean N2 pre-test scores that were more than 5 points 
higher than mean pre-test scores of students from one area of that same university (the 
School of Management), to which students are generally admitted with higher SAT/ACT 
scores (Sullivan, 2011). In other words, while we might assume that higher intellectual or 
cognitive capacity as measured via the SAT would be associated with higher moral 
reasoning scores, it did not bear out in this comparison (admitting that these groups 
cannot be robustly compared). Furthermore, DIT research (particularly in the past 
decade) corroborates Rest’s assertion that moral reasoning is not simply cognitive 
development but is a social cognitive development that involves different kinds of 
interactions between cognition, affect and tacit construals of morality (King & Mayhew, 
2002; Mayhew & King, 2008; Mayhew, Seifert & Pascarella, 2010; Mayhew, Wolniak & 
Pascarella, 2008; Narvaez, 1999, 2001; Rest et al., 1999b; Thoma, 2002). Indeed, King 
and Mayhew’s meta-analysis of 172 studies of moral reasoning development finds that 
while high levels of moral reasoning are associated with complex, higher-order cognitive 
activity, cognition is a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral reasoning growth 
(2002). Results from the study also pay primary attention to the differences among the 
students in the sample rather than focusing on a comparison of these students with a 
control group or national norms and trends. The triangulation model of the study offers a 
means to view the influence of this course on the moral growth of these students, rather 
than looking to show evidence that these students have more or less moral reasoning 
capacity than others outside the study. Finally, it is important to note that the study seeks 
primarily to address the question, Can liberal education be assessed? by uncovering how 
students across the range of moral reasoning development enter, change and leave their 
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first year of college (with respect to that development) and what we can discern from 
their writing about the ways that coursework interacted with that development.  
Results of the study highlight the tremendous growth that most students 
experience in the first year of college in terms of their increasingly complex and nuanced 
abilities to address moral issues. They also remind us that development in this area is 
much more than simply a matter of growing up (King & Kitchener, 1994, 2004; King & 
Mayhew, 2002). Findings from this study give a broad picture of moral reasoning gains 
across the spectrum of scorers and as such, tell a story of the wide variation in 
development and developmental gains that we find among first year college students with 
respect to moral reasoning. Gains may be found at all levels of development and those 
gains look quite different at different levels of development. This reinforces Pascarella’s 
suggestion that great variation among college students’ moral reasoning development 
may explain why the cumulative effect of college experiences is pronounced and large as 
opposed to that of a single or particular experience (1997). Examining two different types 
of gainers is an important step in uncovering which aspects of moral development and 
course engagement tend to be associated with developmental gains while others are 
closely associated moral reasoning level consolidation (Mayhew, Seifert & Pascarella, 
2012; Thoma & Rest, 1999). Results show, for instance, that Low Gainers exhibit course-
related preferences that are more like those of Decliners than those of other Gainers. On 
the other hand, Low Gainers are more similar to Gainers in seeing the quest for a good 
life as a challenge, search or pursuit and lack the overt self-assurance of the Decliners. 
Results related to students whose scores declined over the year provide a fascinating 
snapshot of the sort of retrenchment that some developmental theories propose. One 
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might argue that this negative change contravenes neo-Kohlbergian research that posits 
upwardly directed development. Rest’s schema theory suggests that once subjects move 
to higher modes of moral reasoning, they do not lose these capacities (Rest et al., 1999b). 
However, the schema theory argues that a subject is at any given time demonstrating 
preference for one schema over another and in transition phases may appear to move 
back and forth between schemas. Periods of transition and consolidation may account for 
minor gains and losses. It is notable that the study’s original group parameters had to be 
adjusted to find adequate numbers of students whose DIT scores declined precipitously. 
There simply were not enough students in the sample whose scores showed significant 
post-test losses as the original group parameters speculated, though there was an adequate 
group of students to consider whose scores had dropped somewhat. Findings related to 
subjects who lost ground reveal that most of these students came from the lowest and 
second lowest quartiles of pre-test scores and none came from the top pre-test quartile. In 
other words, most students who did decline in DIT scores did so at lower levels, where 
personal interest schema concerns might reemerge and restrain development before 
consolidation in the Maintaining Norms or Postconventional schemas occurs. Moral 
disengagement and developmental retrenchment at significant transitional points have 
been suggested by other developmental models and may be supported by these findings 
(Bandura, 2002; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, 1996; Perry, 1999). Still, 
the characteristics of Decliner activity in this study do not contradict DIT research claims 
that subjects tend to not slide back once they have achieved higher levels of moral 
reasoning.  
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The quantitative findings of this study are in and of themselves quite robust and 
helpful. Data from the study offer insights into the relative presence of students at very 
high or very low levels of moral development, as well as students who are apt to make 
significant gains or whose moral reasoning capacity might regress. Using DIT data to 
establish categories of high and low scorers and high and low gainers allows a coherent 
account of findings despite the great variation found therein. These groupings offer a way 
to assess student positionality along the range of moral development and to think more 
cogently about how to best address the needs of students at those different points in their 
development. In sum, quantitative data show that moral reasoning development is not a 
simple and straightforward trajectory. It is a multifaceted process, the parts of which 
often move in piecemeal and fragmented ways. Results of this study show that not all 
aspects of moral reasoning are created equal, so to speak. That is, pieces of moral 
reasoning seem to emerge separately and are utilized to different extents by different 
subjects. It is when the pieces begin to coalesce that we see the kind of preference for 
advanced schemes over lower schemes (as opposed to a Kohlbergian hard stage model), 
described by Rest and identified in the DIT (1999b). In the process of moral or ethical 
meaning-making, the various components of moral reasoning identified in the moral 
development rubric of this study (and described in detail in Chapter 4) are activated. As 
students advance along these various moral reasoning components, they become more 
adept in resolving questions that are insufficiently answered by lower order moral 
thinking. The data from this study suggest that the extent to which students make use of 
the components of moral reasoning affects their ability to make sense of moral dilemmas, 
moral questions and the demands of living a moral or ethical life. 
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8.3.B Interpretation of Writing Analyses 
Analysis of student writing via two rubrics and several rounds of essay coding 
fleshed out quantitative results from across- and within-group developmental differences. 
Insights from these analyses take important steps in apprehending and understanding 
various components of moral reasoning and their relative activation and mobilization in 
educational contexts. Examining students’ own articulations about living “a good life” 
and analyzing their engagement with perceived impactful aspects of the course allows us 
to scrutinize specific aspects of moral reasoning to uncover which components of moral 
reasoning are active at high or low levels of development and at high or low levels of 
developmental change. This investigation also allows a view of aspects of moral 
reasoning that may be sluggish or dormant at lower levels of development or growth. 
All of the students from the study’s essay subsample prioritized living according 
to universalizable and widely held principles, and most exhibited a relatively advanced 
capacity to exclude simplistic ways of thinking, But only students at very high levels of 
moral reasoning development demonstrated engagement with differing perspectives and 
diverse views on how to live a good life. The pursuit of principled living appeals to most 
students in principle, so to speak, but the practical reality of doing so demands that 
subjects gain a broader and more adequate apprehension of “the other” beyond one’s in-
group. Results of this study imply that the central difference between those at higher or 
lower levels of development and change lies in the ability to expand circles of concern. 
Subjects at lower levels of development and developmental change adverted to macro-
moral issues but only in abstract ways and they seemed unable to think about how their 
own lives were connected to these larger concerns because they could not view those 
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concerns from a point of view other than their own. Additionally, they presented their 
care and concern for people in their own circles as evidence of moral concern for others. 
In neo-Kohlbergian terms, this tendency to privilege in-group concerns and ignore “the 
other” is a main impediment to Postconventional thinking (Rest et al., 1999b). Students at 
very high levels of development, on the other hand, displayed expansive and highly 
inclusive notions of circles of concern. Their high engagement in prosocial attitudes and 
prosocial behaviors such as participation in service trips, work for political causes, 
connecting course material to concrete, global suffering, and so forth, give further 
evidence of the importance of broad construals of “the other” at higher levels of moral 
development. An interesting conclusion may be drawn about a particular aspect of moral 
reasoning that research has begun to explore. Nascent research has begun on the effect of 
cognitive motivation on moral reasoning. This feature of development refers to a 
willingness on the part of an individual to engage in effortful thinking and has been 
associated with moral reasoning development (Cacioppo, Perry & Kao, 1984; King & 
Mayhew, 2002; Mayhew & King, 2008; Mayhew, Seifert & Pascarella, 2010; Mayhew, 
Wolniak & Pascarella, 2008). This study’s results suggest that a similar attribute of moral 
reasoning might be necessary to growth: a willingness on the part of an individual to 
engage in effortful consideration of “the other.” Researcher Matthew Mayhew has 
examined the effects of experiences of diversity on students’ moral development, 
including diverse peer interaction and exposure to diverse thought (Mayhew, 2004; 
Mayhew & Engberg, 2010; Mayhew & Fernandez, 2007; Mayhew & King, 2008; 
Mayhew, Wolniak, Pascarella, 2008) but how willing a student may be to be effortful in 
the specific task of expanding one’s conception of “the other” has not been studied.  
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Essay analysis revealed a nuanced view of how students approached, received and 
made use of course texts, ideas and assignments throughout the year. Indeed, the 
divergent approaches used in addressing the essay question discloses a lot about students’ 
positions along the range of moral development and their capacity to engage with course 
materials in effective ways. An openness to questions and a Socratic willingness to admit 
what they did not know was an important feature of students who posted substantial 
moral gains. A corollary willingness to take on the “big” questions of life, even at 
personal cost, was associated with growth. Gainers seemed to find great consolation in 
reflecting on thinkers who made personal sacrifices to live according to principles, 
regularly juxtaposing theory with these examples. These same course activities were 
recognized by students at lower levels of development but were conceived abstractly and 
not as examples that point to concrete ways of living. Students at lower developmental 
levels seem to process course material in such a way as to hold ideas and examples at 
arm’s length since they are seemingly unready or unwilling to integrate these fully. 
High scoring students and high gainers shared a preference for ethical theory and 
ethical political theory and combined these with strong displays of theory and real world 
connections. Decliners shared this preference for ethical political theory but were 
strikingly disengaged with the connection of real world issues and theory. They exhibited 
greater engagement with existentialist themes, which allowed them to focus on 
themselves and to shut down questions concerning those outside their own, limited 
horizons. The certainty and confidence with which Decliners approached their pre-essays, 
their persistent emphasis on balance and safety, and their backward-looking tendencies 
give ample evidence of the intricate and extensive personal and emotional growth that 
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must accompany moral development. Moreover, it is helpful to recall that several 
Decliners reported recent traumatic experiences, including the death of a parent and a 
difficult romantic break-up. Interestingly, only one other student in the study, a Low 
Gainer, mentioned the effects of a traumatic event (her father’s job loss and subsequent 
long-term unemployment) and her pre- and post-test N2 scores were the lowest of that 
particular group. While we cannot control the exigencies of personal loss and trauma that 
may impede development, it is important to remember how impactful these kinds of 
experiences may be and how much they may thwart our efforts to foster moral 
development. Moral disengagement theory may offer insights into how and why these 
experiences short-circuit moral growth (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara 
& Pastorelli, 1996).  
8.3.C Limitations of the Study  
This study employed a mixed-method, longitudinal, theory-based approach to 
evaluate student moral development and course-related perceptions and employed a 
triangulation design to uncover the interaction of student moral growth and coursework 
(Saldaña, 2011; Stake, 1995). A well-researched measure of moral reasoning was 
combined with two rubrics developed by the researcher for student essay analysis in the 
triangulation of data. Findings from the study are fairly comprehensive but also admit of 
some important limitations. First, the study suffers from a lack of an control group, since 
all of the students in the study were exposed to the intervention investigated in the study. 
Thus, the comparison group used in the study included aggregated national norms, 
making it quite difficult to determine the accuracy of the results. The comparison of data 
was complicated by the high selectivity of both the university and the course in question, 
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both of which introduce the possibility of confounding variables associated with student 
self-selection, college readiness, cognitive motivation, and so forth. A feasible control 
group could include students who wanted to take the course but didn’t get in and enrolled 
in one of the university’s many sequenced, two-semester courses or for another year-long 
course. This would ameliorate the problem of self-selection since it could be assumed 
that these same students would have selected into the course if possible. As to other 
limitations of the study design, it would be impossible to randomize selection into the 
treatment without making major changes to the way the course is administered and 
populated. Since the course is known to be rigorous, many students would not want to be 
randomly placed in the course. Thus attempts to evaluate this particular program will 
almost inevitably be confounded by self-selection issues. In future assessment designs, an 
ideal control group would include a course outside the liberal education tradition, perhaps 
a pre-professional ethics course, though most of these would be one semester courses 
only. To resolve this issue, one might argue for measuring students’ moral reasoning in 
this course at the end of only one semester but the course uses a full-year design and, as 
such, it would do the course a disservice to measure its goals at only the end of the first 
half of the course. Comparing the effect of this particular course against another, similar 
course is possible, but this would not address the central feature of the question regarding 
the impact of liberal education on moral reasoning.  
A second drawback of this investigation is the relatively limited scope of the 
sample. The study examines data on one group of students in one program at one 
university and thus is very limited in its generalizability. Since the study employed a 
secondary analysis of course assessment materials, it was difficult to avoid this limitation. 
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In the future, program evaluators may want to expand the assessment to include further 
pertinent data and identify and include comparison groups from other universities or 
colleges. Exploring various attributes of different educational environments would open 
up several paths of inquiry that were not available in this study.  
The inclusion of a limited array of data in this study is a third area that may 
weaken the study’s findings. Other studies of moral reasoning development include many 
data points that are relevant to moral development including measures of intelligence, 
cognitive motivation, college readiness, classroom practices, extracurricular patterns, 
diverse peer experiences, class time and size, and so forth. Future attempts to gain assess 
the effects of this course might include research into other salient aspects like the ones 
mentioned here. 
A final, possibly limiting factor of the study regards the positionality of the 
researcher, who was the instructor in one of the classes at the heart of the study. Issues 
related to this concern are addressed in detail in Chapter 4.  
8.4   IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COURSE, PERSPECTIVES IN WESTERN CULTURE 
Overall, the study concludes that participation in this liberal education course did 
positively influence the moral reasoning growth of the students involved in the study. 
Educators in this program would be well served by reflecting on the range of 
development and of developmental gains found in this study. They would also be well 
served by knowing what sort of moral development they should expect to find among 
their students, particularly as they conceive moral and ethical development in course and 
program objectives. The groups identified and described in this study provide a basic 
breakdown of the types of students populating our classes as well as salient attributes of 
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the moral development of students in these groups. This study proposes that highlighting 
major groups like these − students whose moral reasoning capacity is quite high or quite 
low and students who show great developmental gains or losses in this area− reveals how 
multidimensional and versatile course moral development goals should be. Since students 
come into our courses at such different developmental starting points, it makes sense to 
have a comprehensive and flexible set of goals in this area. What we seek to accomplish 
is not simply for all students to rise to the level of moral reasoning of graduate students or 
to achieve one particular developmental level, but to build on the capacities they already 
have when they enroll in our classes, to promote gains in the area of development we 
purport to foster and to aid students in maintaining the development they have achieved. 
A number of recommendations emerge from the study results. 
While most faculty members are adept at assessing their students’ intellectual 
ability, their grasp of central ideas and their ability to write coherently, it would certainly 
surprise most faculty members to discover that some of the first year students in their 
classes have the moral reasoning capacity of a first or second year graduate student. In 
light of these findings, faculty members should be reminded that meeting the needs of 
their top students should not be limited to intellectual challenges but should include 
moral and ethical challenges as well. Moreover, we must remember that while facets of 
moral development are closely associated with cognitive and intellectual development, it 
really is an area of development that demands coherent pedagogical attention in its own 
right. In dealing with students who display the attributes of very high levels of moral 
reasoning, educators should note that students themselves may very well model for us 
what works. Students at very high levels of moral reasoning demonstrate attributes that 
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we should pay attention to since these attributes serve to recommend pedagogical 
practices that may activate the kinds of attributes needed for growth.  
Research has demonstrated the positive effects of different pedagogical strategies 
and experiential classroom practices such as perspective–taking, intergroup dialogue, 
guided inquiry, dilemma discussions, role taking, and active learning (Mayhew, 2004; 
Mayhew & Engberg, 2010; Mayhew & Fernandez, 2007; Mayhew & King, 2008; 
Mayhew, Wolniak & Pascarella, 2008; Mentkowski, 2000; Grunwald & Mayhew, 2008; 
Reiman, 2004; Skoe, 2010). Although there are no specific experiential extracurricular 
activities required in this course, faculty design and build into curriculum experiential 
components that facilitate these sorts of effective practices. Small group discussions, 
peer-to-peer interviews and written assignments are helpful in setting the conditions for 
students to encounter the lived, moral dimensions of the course and of course materials. 
A further step might include requiring students to draw parallels between this course and 
other experiences, classes, ideas and activities or allocating percentages of grades to these 
activities. The regular, focused discussions on the connection of course materials to 
current political events that most faculty make time for in this course capitalize on the 
habits of high level students to bridge theory to real world concerns. Assigning 
attendance at campus lectures or documentary viewings in group settings and asking 
students to identify the central moral question within the topic at hand is used in limited 
ways by faculty. This should be encouraged more regularly, since it clearly mobilize 
moral sensitivity, an important feature of moral development (Bebeau, 1987, 1993; 
Bebeau & Brabeck, 1987; Rest et al., 1999b) and serves to bring coursework into 
dialogue with contemporary concerns. This format also sets the conditions for students to 
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discuss global implications of issues with each other in order to activate the effect of 
positive diverse peer interaction (Mayhew, Wolniak & Pascarella, 2008). These topics 
may also be addressed in larger class discussions and grounded in ethical or textual 
analysis.  
Within the context of enacting textual analyses of current event and experiences, 
best practices include presenting diverse interpretations and perspectives in class in an 
attempt to move dualists toward positions of relativism and to encourage students to build 
habits of perspective-taking and holding competing points of view simultaneously 
(Mayhew et al., 2008). These are practices in which high order thinkers will naturally 
engage. However, recent research suggests that “merely exposing students to diverse 
perspectives may not be enough to disrupt existing schema associated with egocentric 
frames for understanding justice, as many students may retreat from, rather than work 
through, the discomfort engendered by confronting unfamiliar perspectives” (Mayhew & 
Engberg, 2010; Mayhew, Siefert, Pascarella, Laird, Blaich, 2012). Investigations into this 
particular pedagogical strategy recommend developing models that teach students 
strategies for working through discomfort and confrontation that invite broadened 
frameworks and widened circles of concern. Capitalizing on students’ habits that are 
already regularly activated at various levels of development would be a good first step in 
developing those models. Mayhew suggests that presenting series of competing 
viewpoints within course content enacts integration that is central to the meaning-making 
processes of students. The content of this course lends itself well to this strategy, since 
the respected thinkers presented in the course present differing views, criticize each 
other’s work and encourage confrontation of ideas. Thus, educators in this course should 
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highlight and make regular use of this feature of the course in an attempt to help students 
avoid developmental retrenchment and retreat.  
Results from this study affirm the efficacy and primacy of a rigorous practice of 
questioning one’s assumptions and conventional knowledge. Findings from Gainer essays 
signaled that students on the precipice of making significant developmental gains engage 
in persistent and consequential questioning. This activity relates to the basic assumptions 
undergirding the DIT itself−that the dilemma format includes and instigates fruitful 
questions that trigger tacit moral understandings and expose those understanding as 
sufficient or insufficient to the demands of the question (Narvaez and Bock, 2002; Rest, 
1973, 1999b). It is important then that we as educators model for students the basic 
premise that good questions are as important as good answers. Helping students grapple 
with and expand their questions by pointing out further pertinent facets of the line of 
inquiry and connecting these to other meaningful questions, rather than trying to quickly 
answer them, encourages the sort of openness that Gainers displayed in essays. Being 
persistent in the pursuit of good questions is apparently central to how students pursue 
making meaning of moral and ethical concerns.  
Insights related to data from students whose N2 scores declined are instructive for 
thinking about how to address key pieces of moral development that were inactive in 
student moral reasoning. It makes sense to make use of developmental components that 
are active in order to stimulate inactive components. For instance, in the case of the 
Decliners in this study, educators could appeal to students’ sense of personal agency and 
desire to engage in action for the benefit of others (both found to be fairly active in 
Decliners’ writing) while simultaneously challenging the inconsistency of wanting to 
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help only those within our in-groups. Since this course does not include specific 
extracurricular, experiential or service components (see discussion above), creating 
opportunities and experiences appropriate to this course’s format to help students 
encounter the legitimate needs and demands of “the Other” are important antidotes for 
personal interest, ego-centric and dualist tendencies. Noting the preference that Gainers 
showed for the juxtaposition of theory with figures and thinkers admired for the sacrifices 
they made for their principles suggests that using historical and current exemplars may 
help students understand what Postconventional thinking actually looks like. Including 
current examples of this sort of excellence is important since students at lower levels 
seem to use powers of abstraction to dismiss as “things that happened in the past” the 
pertinent challenges to their egocentric and in-group thinking.  
Finally, in light of the results of this study, one might argue that convening 
students in homogenous groups for course activities, discussions and assignments would 
be advisable so that strategies tailored to various developmental tasks could be employed. 
Some research into best practices related to students at different stages of development 
suggest that students at varying levels of development need different and at times even 
conflicting modes of pedagogical support. Knefelkamp and Widick’s 1974 work with 
Perry’s scale of intellectual and ethical development suggest that a fruitful challenge for 
students at late multiplicity and contextual relativist stages would include low degrees of 
structure within instruction (Stephenson & Hunt, 1977). These researchers also found that 
a high degree of structure is an important support mode within instruction for student at 
dualist and early multiplicity stages. However, combined research on the usefulness of 
presenting competing perspectives and the positive effects of diverse peer interaction 
 233 
suggests that this strategy may backfire and leave students to simply reinforce their own 
points of view. Indeed, many moral development researchers surmise that it is the 
experience of heterogeneity within the college experience (encountering new ideas, new 
people from different backgrounds and with different beliefs and values) itself that is at 
the heart of the positive effects of college participation on student moral development 
(King and Mayhew, 2002, 2008; Mayhew, Seifert & Pascarella, 2010, 2012; McNeel, 
1991, 1994; Mayhew, Wolniak & Pascarella, 2008; Maeda, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2009; 
Pascarella, Seifert & Blaich, 2010; Pascarella & Terenzini 2005; Narvaez, Bebeau & 
Thoma, 1999b).  
8.4.A Effective Practices of the Course  
Many of the practices recommended by moral reasoning research are featured in 
the course investigated in this study. A thorough apprehension of the results of this study 
and of moral reasoning development literature confirm that many practices embedded in 
liberal education formats like this one are quite impactful in advancing moral reasoning 
among students. In particular, the qualitative findings of this study revealed that specific 
course features were especially effective in prompting distinct aspects of moral reasoning 
development. Thus, it appears to be true that the course’s wide array of effective 
procedures and pedagogical methods provided enough breadth to reach students across a 
range of development. Results of the study show that certain course features were 
particularly notable. 
First, the course’s year-long format added greatly to its effectiveness in engaging 
students in a sustained, dialogical and communal approach to questions of justice and 
ethics. Particularly notable was that as a 12 credit course, it represented a substantial 
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percentage (on average 40%) of a student’s first year GPA and as such was able to 
command students’ attention to its themes and coursework. Meeting for 6 hours weekly 
in small class settings (all sections of the course are capped at 25 students) established an 
environment well suited for thorough and ongoing discussions about the “big questions” 
of life. Moreover, the course’s restriction to freshmen only allowed for more comfortable 
class participation and allowed students at similar, though not homogeneous, levels of 
moral development to approach and work through these challenging themes and 
questions together.  
Though extracurricular experiential learning components that have been found to 
be associated with moral growth, such as service learning (Gorman, Duffy, Heffernan, 
1994), were not part of this course, experiences of sustained conversations, movie and 
documentary film viewings, written reflections and assigned attendance at campus 
lectures were regular features of the course that supplemented course texts. Faculty in the 
program are encouraged to engage students in discussion formats and many employ 
Socratic modes of discussion, which emphasizes not only the centrality of questions but 
also seeks to bring interlocutors to points of interruption and logical crisis wherein 
limitations of lower order thinking are exposed and reconsidered. Thus, coursework, 
course activities and the course format are designed to interrupt lower order moral 
thinking by not only exposing students to ideas of justice and ethics, but by engaging in 
sustained philosophical and theological attempts to resolve deep problems in these areas. 
Qualitative findings from this study show that these practices were associated with the 
mobilization of a variety of facets of student moral reasoning. Students who exhibited 
high levels of development consistently noted the impact of ethical and ethical-political 
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theory and the connection of theory with real world concerns on their ability to apprehend 
and process increasingly complex aspects of living a “good life.” Students who showed 
great gains demonstrated in pre-tests their readiness for bringing previous assumptions 
into question, supporting very recent research into important distinctions between moral 
transition and consolidation periods in student moral development (Mayhew, Seifert & 
Pascarella, 2012).  
What is less clear is why these aspects of the course did not keep some students 
from losing ground in their moral reasoning development. Results from the study found 
that basic levels of anxiety, evidenced in Decliner tendency to emphasize the need for 
balance and safety in both pre- and post-essays, combined with the backward-looking 
orientation of most Decliner essays suggest that lower order thinking and habituation may 
be associated with moral and ethical retrenchment that resists these educational strategies. 
Thus, new and creative strategies are always welcome and should be actively sought, 
particularly with these students in mind. 
8.5  IMPLICATIONS FOR LIBERAL EDUCATION PROGRAM DESIGN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Educators involved in the design and implementation of liberal education courses 
and programs do not need to be convinced that they should actively attend to the 
intellectual development of their students. They do this all the time, methodically and 
responsibly, and they find ways to regularly assess if their students are meeting their 
expectations. But when it comes to other developmental advances that liberal education 
espouses and claims to effect, educators are often at a loss as to how they might 
methodically and responsibly foster this pursuit. Furthermore, moral development 
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assessment is time consuming and difficult since its components are imprecise and hard 
to quantify. Too often, we rely on anecdotal evidence and hope for the best. Finally, there 
are important post-modern and contemporary criticisms of education’s ability to promote 
moral growth and general ambivalence about the educator’s role in that development. 
However, it remains the case that: 1) research shows clearly that college students are 
experiencing great gains in moral reasoning; 2) college participation is linked to 
advanced moral reasoning; and 3) the liberal education paradigm claims moral 
development as a hallmark objective; and 4) liberal education paradigm has been shown 
in research to be a more effective educational paradigm in promoting moral reasoning 
development than other educational contexts (King and Mayhew, 2002, 2008; Mayhew, 
Seifert & Pascarella, 2010, 2012; Mentkowski, 2000; Pascarella, 1997; Pascarella, Seifert 
& Blaich, 2010; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005; Pascarella, Wolniak, Seifert & Blaich, 
2005). With these four points in mind and in light of liberal education’s need to defend its 
place in the American higher education scene, it only makes sense that those of us who 
work in liberal education begin to more accurately and robustly evaluate our work in this 
area of development. The answer to the question, can liberal arts education be assessed? 
is that it can and should be assessed. Liberal education does make a difference in the 
moral development of students, as demonstrated in this investigation of a sustained, 
carefully designed liberal arts curriculum at this institution. Uncovering the extent to 
which these results may be generalized to other liberal education programs, courses and 
contexts demands much further analysis and assessment. That will entail a great deal of 
effort, resources and willingness on the part of liberal education professionals to develop 
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tools that suit the task. A “one-size fits all” approach will not suffice for the many aspects 
of student development that we seek to explore.  
Finding and developing adequate tools to measure this wide array of 
developmental trajectories are central of this endeavor. Familiarizing educators with 
developmental theory and working with a variety of accepted, theory-based measures of 
development are first steps toward gaining a real view of what student development looks 
like and how we can most effectively promote it. This study suggests that other important 
steps are using mixed-methods approaches to assessment, since in this case, analysis of 
student writing illuminated aspects of student development and engagement in 
coursework that were not readily apparent in quantitative analysis. Multi-faceted 
investigations may help us ascertain not only advancements in moral reasoning but also 
help distinguish the specific conditions needed to spur and sustain development. Analysis 
of writing is only one option among many for allowing student perception to add breadth 
to our evaluation processes. Interviewing students may also be a suitable option for this 
type of analysis. Both formats complement a measure like the DIT, which utilizes a 
recognition model of assessment that is aptly supplemented by a production format of 
student writing or interviews (Rest et al., 1999b).  
The variety of developmental levels and gains found in this study further suggest 
that educators would profit from conceiving of a variety of milestones in moral reasoning 
advancement to more adequately capture the essential features of development. Just as 
we would not recommend one-size fits all assessment formats, neither should we use a 
one-size fits all approach to construing developmental objectives for our students. By 
having a better grasp of how students enter, change in and leave our programs, educators 
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would have a better sense of what might be reasonably expected from different students 
and would be able to better interpret when, how and to what extent gains are achieved.  
Assessment tools like the one at the center of this study seek to reveal what can be 
known about the development of student moral reasoning and how effective our 
educational programs are in promoting this development. Understanding more about how 
students approach, perceive, work out and make meaning out of moral and ethical 
questions will enable us to be more effective in designing and implementing impactful 
coursework and pedagogy to that end. The assessment format of this study was successful 
but it can be improved upon. Identifying specific variables within coursework, course 
activities, classroom practices and classroom environments would add greatly to a study 
of this sort. This assessment can and should be developed and replicated as either 
continued, program-wide assessment or as individual class assessments within similar 
types of courses.  
The results of this study are suggestive of further areas of research that would add 
substantially to our understanding of student moral reasoning development and moral 
development more generally. Longitudinal studies would allow us to discover if the gains 
made by students are long lasting and upwardly directed. Work in this area would also 
provide a better sense of how first-year college effects come to bear on development in 
the rest of college and beyond. A revised version of the present study might seek to 
identify why groups of students at different developmental levels are better or worse at 
receiving and processing particular course material and activities and how those 
differences impact students’ capacity for growth. Finally, it is important to remember that 
course and program assessment primarily seeks improved ways of helping students 
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flourish. This means that assessment ought to always have a particular eye to creating and 
developing our pedagogy, our course materials and our interactions with students. If our 
students are not better off when they leave our classes, intellectually, morally and 
personally, then liberal education is not doing its job well. We may not yet know the best 
ways to challenge and support student moral reasoning development, but as we improve 
our assessment tools and pay closer attention to this often disregarded developmental 
area, we may know better ways to offer the challenges and support students need. 
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